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A HORNBOOK TO THE CODE*
This comment is designed to acquaint the reader with the major
sections of the Revised Washington Criminal Code. In addition to
analyzing the language and operative effect of each section, the stu-
dent authors have compared each section with its counterpart under
the present law and with the different positions taken by other modern
revised criminal codes. This comment is intended to supplement, not
replace, the official comments to the Code; therefore, the student au-
thors have concentrated on raising a number of issues not dealt with
in the official comments.
I. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES
One of the major accomplishments of Washington's Proposed
Criminal Code is the consistent classification of offenses. The existing
law, which is the product of generations of differing legislative moral
judgments, contains at least nineteen categories of sentences.' The
* The following students have contributed to this comment: Peter L. Buck (Family
Offenses, Public Indecency); Joseph C. Calmes (Assault); Robert H. Campbell (Arson,
Burglary); Harvey H. Chamberlin (Principles of Liability and Responsibility, The De-
fense of Criminal Insanity); Dwight J. Drake (Kidnapping); G. Douglas Ferguson (Dis-
orderly Conduct); Donald J. Hagen (Homicide); James C. Harrison (Justification); Ste-
phen B. Hazard (Sexual Offenses); Barbara L. Johnston (Classification of Offenses);
Laurie D. Kohli (Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law, Violations); Paul E. Krug (An-
ticipatory Offenses); Michael R. Sorensen (Theft and Robbery, Fiaud).
1. A brief review of the provisions of Title 9 of WASH. REV. CODE (1959) reveals the
following sentences (in order of apparent decreasing severity). Alternative or concur-
rent fines are omitted although a review of those provisions would greatly increase the
number of different dispositions available.
death
life or death (determined by jury)
life imprisonment
not less than 10 years
not less than 71/2 years
not less than 5 years
not less than 1 year
not more than 20 years
not more than 15 years
not less than I nor more than 14 years
not more than 10 years
not less than 1 nor more than 10 years
not more than 5 years
not more than 2 years
not less than 3 months nor more than 1 year (jail)
not more than one year (jail)
The existing law is replete with inconsistencies. For example, "not less than one year"
is roughly equivalent to "not more than twenty years" since WASH. REv. CODE §
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Proposed Code reduces this quagmire to three categories of felonies,
two categories of misdemeanors and a "violation" category. 2 The
range of sentences remains much the same, from punishment by
death,3 to imprisonment in the county jail for not more than ninety
days. 4 However, the sentences for all offenses have been collected and
classified in one section of the Code, 5 whereas each offense in the exist-
ing code contains within its own definition section a specification of the
sentence to be accorded the offender. Generally, existing law specifies
the sentence in terms of a minimum or maximum term of years, often
with an alternative or concurrent fine. However, some crimes are
merely classified as "felonies," "gross misdemeanors" or "misdemean-
ors," with specification of the sentence for these categories found in
R.C.W. §§ 9.92.010-.030.6
The Proposed Code differs from the present law in several respects.
First, the Code has added an alternative fine not to exceed twice the
9.95.010 (1959) requires the judge to set a maximum term of at least twenty years where
no specific term is provided for by statute. It is doubtful, however, that the legislature
intended that the selling of erotic materials to a minor (not less than one year for the
third offense; WASH. REV. CODE § 9.68.060 (Supp. 1971)) be equivalent in severity to
carnal knowledge of a female child between ten and fifteen years of age (WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.79.020(2) (1959)).
2. REV. WASH. CRIM. CODE §§ 9A.20.010-.020 [hereinafter cited as R.W.C.C.].
3. In the existing Washington law, punishment by death is authorized for treason,
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.82.010 (1959), and this section would not be repealed by the Pro-
posed Code. An examination of the reported cases reveals no instances in which the
treason statute has been applied, however. The existing law provides that in the cases of
first degree murder and first degree kidnapping, the jury shall decide between life im-
prisonment and the death penalty. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.48.030, 9.52.010 (1961). The
Proposed Code limits the death penalty to murder (R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.025), but this
provision will have to be scrutinized in light of the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).
4. In both the existing law and the Proposed Code, the classification "misdemeanor"
carries a ninety day jail sentence. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.030 (1959) and R.W.C.C. §
9A.20.020(3). The alternate fine has been increased in the Proposed Code from $250 to
$500, "primarily as a reflection of the diminished worth of a dollar." R.W.C.C. §
9A.20.030, Comment at 99.
5. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.20.010-.030.
6. The Proposed Code's simplification of the penalty scheme for offenses is similar
to that undertaken by other recently revised state criminal codes. In New York, for
example, a classification system more confused than that existing under present Wash-
ington law was condensed into five classes of felonies, three classes of misdemeanors,
one class of violations and one class of traffic infractions. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.05-. 10
(McKinney 1967). The greater number of classifications in New York's revised code
may be due to the fact that (a) New York revised a larger proportion of the existing
criminal law than does Washington's Proposed Code; (b) the new sentencing provisions
cover not only the new laws of the recently adopted New York Code, but also every of-
fense defined elsewhere in New York law; and (c) more discretion in sentencing is given
the judge in New York than in Washington.
In Washington the judge's discretion is limited by WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.010
(1959), which requires that the offender be sentenced to the maximum term allowable.
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amount of the defendant's gain from the commission of the crime.7
This provision is similar to sections found in the proposed or recently
adopted penal codes of several states.8 Under the new provision, an
offender might be required to pay twice the amount of his gain into
court, plus restitution to the victim-potentially a cumulative payment
of three times the amount of gain.9 The section presents a potential
conflict in the case of a felon who may be economically incapable of
paying a heavy fine in addition to restitution, court costs and family
support.10 Arguably the judge should receive some legislative guid-
ance in ordering the priorities of thse various demands on a defen-
dant's economic resources.
Second, the Code provides for the imposition of a fine of up to
$10,000 for a first degree felony as an alternative to a minimum of
The Board of Prison Terms and Parole is given discretion to set the length of the term
served by the offender. These provisions will not be repealed by the Proposed Code. In
New York, on the other hand, the judge is given greater discretion to determine the
length of the sentence. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1967). The result
is that the Washington codes, present and proposed, tend to provide for uniform sen-
tencing within the system.
The Model Penal Code, based on the premise that the "court should play a substantial
role in sentencing," contains a classification of offenses quite similar to that found in
Washington. MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954) [here-
inafter cited as M.P.C.]. The Model Code provides for three classes of felonies, two
classes of misdemeanors and one class of violations, but evidences throughout the inten-
tion that the court shall have a great deal of discretion in sentencing. See, e.g., M.P.C. §
6.11 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954), wherein the court is given authority to reduce the degree
of crime for which the defendant is convicted and therefore reduce the sentence im-
posed.
7. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.030. Under the proposed federal code, the alternative fine
would be the larger of twice the actor's gains or twice the victim's loss. PROPOSED NEW
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 3301(2) (1971).
8. See, e.g., M.P.C. § 6.03(5) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); ORE. REV. STAT. §§
161.625, .635, .655 (1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW, art. 80. (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-44 (Supp. 1972).
9. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.030, Comment at 100. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.210
(1959), which would not be repealed by the Proposed Code, allows the judge to impose
on the defendant such payments "as are necessary (1) to comply with any order of the
court for the payment of family support, (2) to make restitution to any person or per-
sons who may have suffered loss or damage by reason of the commission of the crime in
question, and (3) to pay such fine as may be imposed and court costs.... "
The New York code also apparently allows such a triple payment. N.Y. PENAL LAW §
65.10 and art. 80 (McKinney 1967). Under New York law, however, the court may only
impose a fine if the defendant has gained money or property through the commission of
the crime. No alternative fine in a specific amount is available to New York judges,
except in the case of a corporation. Id., § 80.10.
10. Of the recently proposed and adopted penal codes only Michigan has explicitly
recognized the potential conflict between the imposition of a fine and restitution to the
victim. MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 1510 (Final Draft 1967) provides that a fine may not
be imposed if it will "prevent the defendant from making restitution or reparation to the
victim of the crime."
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twenty years' imprisonment." This represents a substantial departure
from current law in that no existing crime which is the equivalent of a
first degree felony under the Proposed Code has an alternative penalty
of a fine. 12 The change may represent a desire to penalize corpora-
tions for first degree felonies, although it is difficult to imagine cir-
cumstances under which a corporation could be convicted of any such
crime.13 It is more likely, however, that this change represents a mis-
guided and internally inconsistent attempt to broaden the discretion
given the judge in sentencing an individual. Arguably, the judge
should be given discretion to impose a fine combined with restrictive
probation conditions, but the wording of the proposed statute allows
the imposition of a fine alone, a considerably less potent sanction (es-
pecially for a rich man) than the alternative minimum term in a
correctional institution of at least twenty years. 14 Whatever the purpose
of including such a mild alternative to an extremely severe term of
imprisonment, the legislative intent should be made more explicit.
Notably absent from both existing and proposed Washington law,
is any specification of the criteria to be considered by the court in de-
termining the sentence. 15 The reason for this omission may be that
11. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020. The fine may also be assessed concurrent with imprison-
ment. Id.
12. Under the Proposed Code, the first degree felonies are found in R.W.C.C. §§
9A.32.020 (murder), 9A.40.010 (kidnapping), 9A.44.040 (first degree rape), 9A.48.010
(first degree arson), 9A.52.010 (first degree burglary) and 9A.56.170 (first degree rob-
bery). The roughly equivalent present law provisions are found respectively in WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 9.48.030, 9.52.010, 9.79.010, 9.09.010, 9.19.010, and 9.75.010 (1961).
13. The drafters of the proposed California Penal Code apparently concluded that a
corporation could not commit a first degree felony; they propose that any person con-
victed of a first degree felony "shall" be sentenced to prison, and no provision is made
for an alternative fine. STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR THE REVISION OF THE
PENAL CODE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE §§ 315, 325 (1971). It should be
noted, however, that the range of offenses classified as first degree felonies is smaller in
California's proposed code than it is in Washington's.
14. It is at least questionable whether a choice between a fine of $10,000 or a min-
imum twenty year prison term for a first degree felony should be within the discretion of
the judge. In practice, the discrepancy should pose few problems, however, since Wash-
ington judges rarely fine felony offenders. WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES'
ASSOCIATION, FACTORS AFFECTING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN FELONY SENTENCING IN
WASHINGTON STATE 69-70 (1971).
15. Throughout the New York provisions relating to sentencing, criteria are set out
to be considered by the court in determining the sentence. N.Y. PENAL LAW tit. E (Mc-
Kinney 1967). Many proposed and recently adopted penal codes in other jurisdictions
have also carefully described factors to be considered by the court in sentencing con-
victed offenders. See, e.g., M.P.C. Art. 7 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954); MODEL SENTENCING
ACT ART. 3 (1963); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 161.645, .705-.735 (1971); CONN GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 53a-29, 53a-34, 53a-40 (Special Pamphlet 1972).
Proposed and adopted penal codes in other jurisdictions sometimes include a set of
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much of the discretion given to the judge in other jurisdictions is given
to the Board of Prison Terms and Parole in Washington. 16 Neverthe-
less, several options may be "implemented solely through an exercise
of judicial discretion . *... ,7 The basic judicial decisions of whether
to grant probation, the conditions to be imposed on such a grant,
whether to impose a fine, and what recommendation to make in im-
posing a prison sentence, are considerations in which Washington
judges should have some statutory guidance, as do the judges in many
other jurisdictions.18
Violations
Finally, a significant innovation in the classification scheme is the
creation of the new "violation" category.' 9 A violation is a
non-criminal offense under the Code. One convicted of a violation
will be subject only to a fine, which may not exceed $500;20 he will
criteria for imposition of fines, a feature which Washington law, present or proposed,
lacks. For example, M.P.C. § 6.03 allows the imposition of a fine of up to $10,000 for a
first degree felony, subject to the criteria set out in M.P.C. § 8.02. A fine is not to be
imposed under the Model Penal Code unless the defendant has derived a pecuniary gain
or a fine is specially adapted to deterrence or correction. In addition, a fine may not be
imposed if it will interfere with restitution or the defendant will be unable to pay it.
Similar provisions are found in ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 161.625-.645 (1971).
Other states allow imposition of a fin& for first degree (or equivalent) felonies only
under limited circumstances. In New York, for example, no fine may be imposed unless
the offender realized a gain of money or property through commission of the crime,
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 80.00 (McKinney 1967), and in the proposed Michigan Code the
sentence for a class A or B felony (other than for a corporation) cannot consist solely of
a fine. MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §§ 1210 (4)(b) and 1505 (1967). California's Proposed
Code does not allow imposition of a fine for first degree felonies under any circum-
stances. STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR THE REVISION OF THE PENAL
CODE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE § 325 (1971).
16. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
17. Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wn.2d 882, 884, 416 P.2d 104, 105 (1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
18. See WASHINGTON STATE SUPERIOR COURT JUDGES' AssOCIATION, FACTORS
AFFECTING JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN FELONY SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE 9-11
(1971) for a fuller discussion of the present omissions in Washington law relating to
sentencing. The validity of this discussion would not be altered by the adoption of the
Proposed Code.
19. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.040(3):
An offense constitutes a violation if:(a) it is so designated in this Title or in any other statute of this state defining the
offense; or
(b) no other sentence than a fine, or fine and forefeiture or other civil penalty is
authorized upon conviction; or
(c) it is defined by a statute other than this Title which provides that the offense is
a prohibited act without designating it a crime.
20. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4).
153
Washington Law Review
not acquire a criminal record nor be subject to any other penal disad-
vantage, including imprisonment.
The stated purpose of this new classification is to give the legisla-
ture some measure of flexibility in discouraging certain acts without
imposing an overly harsh penalty. Further, a category of offenses
which carries with it no possibility of imprisonment is not only advis-
able but is necessary in terms of economics, caseloads and manpower. 21
As the Proposed Code now stands, eleven offenses have been classi-
fied as violations. 22 Most of these involve a lowering of the sanctions
imposed by the present law; however, in three instances, conduct
which presently is not subject to sanction has been made unlawful,
and is punishable as a violation.23
The violation classification is a desirable and necessary tool which
the drafters wisely included in the Code. However, it appears that the
inclusion of this category was poorly planned and incompletely ac-
complished. One glaring omission is apparent upon examining the vi-
olation provision of the Proposed Revised Seattle Criminal Code.24
The drafters of that code took care to insert a provision expressly
stating that a person charged with committing a violation shall not be
denied any of the "constitutional rights he would have were the pen-
alty deemed criminal. '25 Lacking such a provision, the Proposed
Code creates potential problems in determining the rights to be af-
forded a defendant in this quasi-civil area.
Other questions arise when an attempt is made to define the ambit
of the violations category. The Code specifically provides that the vio-
lation provisions apply to non-Title Nine offenses, unless it is ex-
21. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
22. The eleven offenses which have been classified as violations are R.W.C.C. §§
9A.28.010(3)(f) (attempt to commit a misdemeanor); 9A.28.020(2)(e) (criminal solici-
tation to promote a misdemeanor); 9A.28.030(3)(e) (conspiracy to commit either a
misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor); 9A.52.060 (third degree criminal trespass);
9A.56.050(3)(c) (appropriation of lost property worth less than $50); 9A.76.020 (unrea-
sonably refusing or failing to summon aid upon request of a person known to be a po-
lice officer and who is not injured nor threatened with injury); 9A.76.065(2)(a) (a rela-
tive rendering criminal assistance to a person who has committed a misdemeanor or a
gross misdemeanor); 9A.76.070 (hindering apprehension of an escapee from a mental
institution or other such detention facility); 9A.84.030 (disorderly conduct); 9A.84.060
(loitering); and 9A.88.030 (patronizing a prostitute).
23. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.28.020(2)(e), 9A.76.065(2)(a), and 9A.88.030.
24. PROPOSED REVISED SEATTLE CRIMINAL CODE § 12A.01.090(3), (4).
25. Id., § 12A.01.090(4).
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pressly provided otherwise.26 Section 9A.04.040(3) states that "an of-
fense constitutes a violation if ... no other sentence than a fine, or
fine and forfeiture or other civil penalty is authorized upon convic-
tion .... ." Therefore, any non-Title Nine offense now punished solely
by a fine would become a violation. A conceptual problem is created,
however, in the case of a non-Title Nine offense which is punished
solely by a fine greater than $500,27 for the Code further provides that
"every person convicted of a violation shall be punished by a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars. '28 Thus a classification dilemma
arises: is such an offense a violation or not? If indeed it is a violation,
may the fine exceed $500? A solution to this conceptual difficulty may
be provided by a sequential reading of the relevant Code provisions;
i.e., if an offense is punished solely by a fine, it is a violation; therefore
that fine may not exceed $500 notwithstanding any statutory provi-
sions to the contrary.
Finally, the drafters of the Proposed Code have failed to deal ade-
quately with the practical problems of enforcement in this area.
29
Again, the Proposed Seattle Criminal Code includes some provisions
which may serve as a guideline. The drafters of that code propose that
if the actor is suspected of having committed a violation, a citation be
issued; the alleged violator may not be taken into custody unless the
officer cannot reasonably ascertain-the actor's identity.30 In the latter
case, the accused may be taken into custody only for fingerprinting
and other enumerated procedures and must be released immediately
thereafter. The accused may be arrested and bail may be set only if
the accused violates his promise to appear in court. While these provi-
sions may inconvenience the violator who fails to carry adequate iden-
tification, they nonetheless are necessitated by the inevitable situations
in which the violator refuses to cooperate with the officer who appre-
hends him.
26. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.050(2) provides that "the provisions of chapters 9A.04
through 9A.28 RCW are applicable to offenses defined by this Title or another statute,
unless this Title or such other statute specifically provides otherwise."
27. A scanning of various non-Title Nine offenses revealed no penalties involving
only fines of more than $500. Therefore the problem posed may be theoretical in nature.
However, it is foreseeable that some future legislation may create an offense which is
punishable by a fine greater than $500, in which case the same questions would arise.
28. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4)(a).
29. For another view of the problems in enforcing the violations category, see
Holmquist, The Draftsman's View of the Revised Code, at pp. 280-81 of this volume.
30. See the discussion of the violations provisions in the section entitled Code




The potential failure of some persons to pay the fines assessed for
their violations raises another problem of enforcement. The Code spe-
cifically provides that those guilty of violations are not to be impris-
oned solely for failure to pay their fines; as an alternative the Code
authorizes the court to employ civil sanctions for contempt or other
civil remedies to satisfy unpaid judgments.3' While this provision is
reasonable, and probably mandatory under the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Tate v. Short,3 2 it too raises questions of enforcement. If an
indigent is unable to pay his fine, he cannot be convicted of contempt;
therefore the court must turn to "other civil remedies" to find a means
of enforcing the judgment. Developing and imposing civil remedies
short of imprisonment will force the courts to search for innovative
sanctions whose constitutionality may not have been tested. Hope-
fully, this burden on the courts will be balanced by a more flexible
and rational treatment of minor offenses.
The violation category is new and unfamiliar to this jurisdiction
and, as established in the Code, not yet totally flawless. But it meets
an increasingly pressing demend of the courts, the legislature and the
public for a means of control which is flexible yet effective, restrictive
but not Procrustean. With the inclusion of some additional provisions
to bolster and clarify this new classification and its enforcement, the
violation category could become one of the most beneficial and useful
sections of the Proposed Code.
II. PRINCIPLES OF LIABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY
A. Actus Reus and Mens Rea
The Proposed Code codifies the basic principle that the minimal
requirement for criminal liability is a voluntary act or omission.33
31. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4)(c).
32. 401 U.S. 395 (1971). In Tate the Supreme Court held that it is unconstitutional
to automatically convert the failure of an indigent to pay a fine to a term of imprison-
ment under a statute authorizing a fine as the only penalty.
33. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.010 provides in full:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct
which includes a voluntary act or an omission to perform an act of which he is
physically capable.
(2) The possession of property is a voluntary act if the actor was aware of his phys-
ical possession of such property or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient
period to have been able to terminate his possession.
(3) For purposes of this section:
156
Vol. 48: 149, 1972
A Hornbook to the Code: Principles of Liability and Responsibility
This requirement excludes all involuntary acts such as reflex actions,
acts committed during hypnosis, epileptic fugue, unconsciousness 34 or
sleep, and failure to perform an act which the actor is physically in-
capable of performing.3 5 This treatment is consistent with accepted
principles of criminal jurisprudence36 and appears to conform to ex-
isting Washington law.37
The Code provides that possession of property constitutes a volun-
tary act if the actor was sufficiently aware of his control over the
property to have been able to terminate his possession.38 Although one
may legally possess something without knowing of its existence for
purposes other than the criminal law,39 possession in the criminal law
usually means conscious possession.40 This knowledge of possession
(a) "voluntary act" means a bodily movement performed consciously as a result
of the actor's effort or determination; and
(b) "omission" means a failure to perform an act as to which a duty of perform-
ance is imposed by law.
The term "omission" has not been defined by a Washington court.
34. Unconsciousness or automatism is a defense sometimes confused with criminal
insanity. Some cases suggest that one who is "unconscious" or "semi-conscious" when he
acts is not criminally liable because he lacks the requisite mental state -for the crime
charged. However, the better rationale is that when one acts "unconsciously" or
"semi-consciously," he is not acting "voluntarily." While few cases involving automa-
tism have been decided in the United States, those that have been decided support auto-
matism as a defense to crime. W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 337 (1972). The
defense is raised with much greater frequency in Great Britain. The unconsciousness or
automatism defense is available even when an accused is not suffering from a "mental
disease or defect." Ellis v. United States, 274 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1959); Carter v. State,
376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Crim. 1962). See Edwards, Automatism and Social Defense, 8
CRIM. L.Q. 258 (1966); Fox, Physical Disorder, Consciousness, and Criminal Liability,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 645 (1963); Williams, Automatism, in ESSAYS IN CRIMINAL SCIENCE
(Mueller ed. 1961).
35. See M.P.C. § 2.01(2) and Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Also excluded is
the case in which one person physically forces another person into bodily movement.
For example, where A by force causes B's body to strike C, the act by B is not volun-
tary.
36. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 546 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as
PERKINS]; J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 400 (1 Ith ed. 1957); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON
LAW 46 (Howe ed. 1963); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 17-18 (2d ed. 1961); W. LAFAVE
& A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 179-181 (1972); and M.P.C. § 2.01, Comment (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955).
37. See State v. Carter, 4 Wn. App. 115, 479 P.2d 544 (1971).
38. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.010(2).
39. See, e.g., South Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman, [1896] 2 Q.B. 44, where
the court held that a landowner enjoyed possession of a ring in a pool on his land, and
was entitled to the ring as against the person who found it in his pool even though the
landowner did not know of its existence. See also Elliott v. Bowman, 17 Mo. App. 693
(1855).
40. See, e.g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921); United States v. Sawyer, 294
F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961); and Durfee v. Jones, 11 R.I. 588, 23 Am. R. 528 (1877). It has
been held that the legislature cannot make unconscious possession the basis of a crime.
State v. Labate, 7 NJ. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
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requires only awareness of the physical object and not perception of
its special qualities. 4' For example, one may be in possession of her-
oin, although he believes the substance to be sugar. The emphasis
placed on "control" in the Code's provision is consistent with existing
Washington law. 42
Implicit in the stated purposes of the Proposed Code is a desire to
eliminate the ambiguity and confusion inherent in the current descrip-
tions of many criminal offenses.43 The primary source of this obscu-
rity lies in the failure of the existing criminal code to define some
mental states and to clearly define others. 44
The Proposed Code, following the lead of the American Law Insti-
tute and several other states, 45 seeks to eliminate this difficulty by
41. M.P.C. § 2.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); G WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL
LAW § 6 (2d ed. 1961).
42. In State v. Jones, 114 Wash. 144, 148, 194 P. 585, 587 (1921), the Washington
Supreme Court defined "possession as including control of the thing possessed .. "
Accord, State v. Henker, 50 Wn.2d 809, 314 P.2d 645 (1957). The emphasis on "con-
trol" is important because it contemplates the union of two elements: physical power
over the object and the intent to control it. Keron v. Cashman, 33 Atl. 1055 (NJ. 1896).
Physical power without intent distinguishes possession from custody. See generally R.
BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY 19-22 (2d ed. 1955); W. HOLMES, THE
COMMON LAW, 163-194, (Howe ed. 1963); and J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 265-298
(12th ed. 1966).
43. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.020.
44. For example, whether an accused is guilty of murder in the first or second de-
gree under existing law turns on whether he killed with premeditation. Killing" [w] ith a
premeditated design to effect.., death .. ." is first degree murder while a killing" [c] om-
mitted with [only] a design to effect.., death..." is murder in the second degree. WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.48.030-.040 (1959). One would expect the distinction between first
and second degree murder to be clear and precise. It is not. The Washington Supreme
Court has approved jury instructions which defined premeditation to mean: "thought
over beforehand, for any length of time, however short.... (no particular space of time,
however, need intervene between the formation of the intent to kill and the killing)."
State v. Blaine, 64 Wash. 122, 128-29, 116 P. 660, 665 (1911). This renders the distinc-
tion between the two degrees of murder "quite indistinguishable." Wechsler and Mi-
chael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 709 (1937). See also
Weihofen and Overholser, Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime, 56 YALE
L.J. 959, 974 (1947). This same distinction between "design" and "premeditated design"
prompted Mr. Justice Cardozo to remark:
The present distinction is so obscure that no jury hearing it for the first time can
fairly be expected to assimilate and understand it. I am not at all sure that I under-
stand it myself after trying to apply it for many years and after diligent study of
what has been written in the books.
B. CARDOZO, LAW AND LITERATURE 101 (1930). Another example is the term "malice." It
is often employed in the definition of criminal offenses but its meaning has caused con-
siderable confusion. See M.P.C. § 2.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.01.010(3) (1959) defines "malice" and "maliciously" to mean "an evil intent,
wish or design to vex, annoy or injure another person." Professor Perkins notes that
proof of malice "requires something more than criminal negligence" but that "there has
been some difficulty in expressing just what is needed in this regard." PERKINS at 768.
45. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-4 to 4-7 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.05 (McKinney 1967); MIH. REV. GRIM. CODE § 305 (Final Draft 1967).
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employing four carefully defined levels of mens rea. In descending
order of culpability the four levels are: intent, knowledge, recklessness
and criminal negligence. To alleviate a source of inequity in our pres-
ent criminal law, a special effort has been made to distinguish the
concept of criminal negligence from ordinary civil negligence.46 The
Proposed Code also includes a precise definition of the term "wilful"
in order to provide a guide for the application of the Code's mental
state requirements to criminal offenses outside Title 9 of Washington's
Revised Code.47
The Code establishes a presumption that every offense, including
those not repealed by the Proposed Code,48 requires one of the four
mental states described. This presumption can be rebutted only by a
clear "legislative intent to impose absolute liability. '49 By alleviating
the harshness and inequity connected with absolute liability offenses,
this provision reflects the modern trend.50 The Code makes the culpa-
bility requirement an "element of the offense"5' which the state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 52
R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(3) seeks to eliminate the difficulties of
applying the mens rea requirements to different elements of a crime.
This section provides that when the definition of a crime refers to a
single level of mens rea, that level Will apply to all material elements
of the crime "in the absence of a clear statutory mandate to the con-
trary. '53 However, an offense may expressly require different mens
rea requirements for different elements of the crime.54 Where the de-
46. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.060 (1959), a defendant may be convicted of
manslaughter on the basis of ordinary negligence, State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn.2d 964, 385
P.2d 318 (1963), but if he is fortunate enough to be driving an automobile when he kills
another, the prosecution must establish more than ordinary negligence; aggravated neg-
ligence must be proven. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.520 (1959). State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d
760, 435 P.2d 680 (1967). Thus whether a defendant must serve a prison sentence
hinges, in part, on the arbitrary distinction between killing another while driving or not
driving a car.
47. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(6) provides:
A requirement that an offense be committed wilfully is satisfied if a person acts
knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to
impose further requirements plainly appears.
48. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.04.050(2), 9A.08.050.
49. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050.
50. PERKINS at 808. See also Force, Criminal Law and Procedure, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV.
1430 (1960), and Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 83,
88 (1959).
51. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(9)(a).
52. R.W.C.C.§ 9A.04.120(1).
53. R.W.C.C.§ 9A.08.020, Comment.
54. For example, R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.040 reads: "(1) A person is guilty of reckless
burning if he intentionally causes a fire or explosion, whether on his own property or the
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gree of the offense is determined by the level of culpability estab-
lished, a defendant can be convicted of only that degree which
includes the lowest level of culpability established for any material
element of the offense.55
Since the concept of applying clearly defined levels of culpability to
material elements of a crime is new to Washington law, it is difficult
to ascertain the effect this rule will have upon existing law. The only
obvious effect is to resolve ambiguity in some statutes and encourage
a more explicit definition of the elements of an offense in all criminal
statutes. 56 This resolution probably benefits the accused, since the
prosecution is given clearly defined burdens of proof to replace ambi-
guities prone to presumptive evidence and questionable inferences.
At first glance, it appears that the new mens rea requirements do
not depart significiantly from current law. The definitions of the four
mental states described in the Code are deceptively similar to current
definitions. It is true, as the drafters note,57 that the full impact of the
proposed culpability requirements can only be ascertained from a
comparison of particular offenses under the present and proposed
criminal codes. Although space limitation precludes such comparisons
here,58 a few generalizations can be gleaned from an analysis of the
proposed culpability requirements.
1. Intent
A survey of offenses in the Proposed Code reveals that most crimes
require proof of intent. "Intent" under the Proposed Code is defined
in terms of what is presently known as specific, not general, intent.59
property of another, and thereby recklessly-places a building of another in danger of de-
struction or damage." Two mental states are required for conviction of this offense, in-
tent and recklessness. The actor must intend to cause a fire or explosion, but need only
recklessly endanger the building of another.
55. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(5). See M.P.C. § 2.02, Comment at 131-32 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
56. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020, Comment.
57. Id.
58. See however, the sections on the offenses against property, the offenses against
persons, inchoate crimes and sexual offenses elsewhere in this comment.
59. A person intends or acts intentionally or with intent to accomplish a result or
engage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious
objective or purpose is to accomplish such a result or to engage in conduct of that na-
ture. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(a). Salmond indicates that criminal intent may be one of
two types: general or specific. J. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 367 (12th ed. 1966). Perkins
offers helpful definitions distinguishing the two. General intent is simply "an intent to do
the deed which constitutes the actus reus of the very crime .. ." PERKINS at 744. Specific
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The proposed definition of intent increases the evidentiary burden
placed upon the prosecution, for the prosecution will no longer be
able to rely upon the inference of intent that may be drawn from the
commission of the illegal act.6 0 Contrasting the evidentiary require-
ments for specific and general intent, the court in State v. Louther
stated:61
The applicable rule is that where a specific intent is an element of a
crime, the specific intent must be proved as an independent fact and
cannot be presumed from the commission of the unlawful act.
In a later case,62 the court held that circumstantial evidence may sus-
tain an inference of specific intent only when it is supported "as a
matter of logical probability." 63 Although the Proposed Code's intent
requirement precludes application of the presumption that one intends
the natural and probable consequences of his acts, 64 it does not pre-
clude logical inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence.
intent is defined as "some intent other than to do the actus reus thereof which is specifi-
cally required for guilt," e.g., the intent to steal in larceny and the intent to commit a
crime in burglary. Id. at762.
The drafters of the Proposed Code, in discussing the definition of "intent" under the
Proposed Code, state: "Probably the 6losest equivalent in Washington law to the new
definition is the rather imprecise phrase 'specific intent,' which seems similar in effect to
the new term." R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020, Comment.
60. This is because the inference of intent drawn from the commission of the illegal
act applies only to general intent crimes. Because general intent is not an adequate
mens rea under the Proposed Code, it follows that the inference will no longer have vi-
tality.
61. 22 Wn.2d 497, 502, 156 P.2d 612, 674 (1945).
62. State v. Davis, 73 Wn.2d 271,438 P.2d 185 (1968).
63. Id. at 289, 438 P.2d at 195; accord, State v. Leach, 36 Wn.2d 641, 646, 219 P.2d
972, 976(1950).
64. State v. Louther, 22 Wn.2d 497, 502, 156 P.2d 672, 674 (1945); PERKINS at 764.
The presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts has
been highly criticized by some scholars. The presumption is believed to seriously under-
mine the concept of mens rea, and to apply principles of tort negligence to criminal lia-
bility. Professor Williams says of the presumption:
This maxim, though many judges are fond of it, contains a serious threat to any ra-
tional theory of intention. It is not true in fact that a man necessarily intends the
natural.., consequences of his acts.... [T] here are some ways in which the
maxim has had a positive and objectionable effect upon the law. It has resulted in
defamation and sedition being treated in some cases as crimes of negligence, or
even of strict liability.... The other crime adversely influenced by the maxim is the
gravest in the ordinary criminal calendar: murder.
G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 89-93 (2nd ed. 1961). See also, Ashford and Risinger Pre-
sumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process, in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview,
79 YALE LJ. 165 (1970).
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2. Knowledge
As the term "knowledge" is currently defined, 65 a jury may infer
knowledge by a defendant if an "ordinary prudent man" would have
such "knowledge." This presently permits a jury to find knowledge in
cases where the defendant has been no more than reckless or crimi-
nally negligent under the terminology of the Proposed Code.66
The Proposed Code replaces this objective "ordinary prudent man"
standard with a subjective standard requiring an "awareness" by the
defendant that: (1) his conduct is "substantially certain" to cause a
result; or (2) his conduct is unlawful; or (3) criminal circumstances
exist; or (4) there is a "high probability" that a particular fact exists.67
In discarding the existing "ordinary prudent man" standard, the Pro-
posed Code reduces criminal liability predicated upon "knowledge" to
the extent that recklessness or criminal negligence presently sustain an
inference of knowledge.6 8
3. Recklessness69
Recklessness as a basis for criminal liability is, for the most part,
new to Washington law. However, traces of the concept can be found
in at least three statutes. First, the reckless driving statute70 refers to
recklessness as a "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons
or property;" second, the vehicular homicide statute71 imposes lia-
bility where death results from "the operation of. . . any vehicle in a
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.010(4) (1959). The word "knowingly" imports a knowl-
edge that the facts exist which constitute the act or omission of a crime, and does not
require knowledge of its unlawfulness; knowledge of any particular fact may be inferred
from the knowledge of such other facts as should put an ordinarily prudent man upon
inquiry.
66. See, e.g., State v. Tembruell, 50 Wn.2d 456, 312 P.2d 809 (1957).
67. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2) (b).
68. Under the proposed statute, the accused must have an actual awareness of such
facts constituting the act or omission of a crime. Under the current statute, an actual
awareness is not required. It is sufficient to infer guilty knowledge if the accused was
negligent or reckless in not being aware of such facts. See PERKINS at 779; see also State
v. Tembruell, 50 Wn.2d 456, 312 P.2d 809 (1957).
69. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(c) provides:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he knows of and consciously disre-
gards a substantial and unjustifiable risk (i) that the result described by a statute
defining an offense may occur, or (ii) that a circumstance described by a statute
defining an offense exists, and when the disregard of such risk constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would
exercise in the situation.
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.500 (1967).
71. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.520 (1970).
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reckless manner;" and third, the first degree murder statute72
predicates criminal liability on "an act imminently dangerous to
others and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life .... "
Insofar as these three statutes confer liability upon those who disre-
gard known risks, they indicate that current law recognizes "reckless-
ness" as a basis for criminal liability.
4. Criminal Negligence
Negligence as a basis of criminal liability is presently defined by
statute in terms of ordinary civil negligence.73 The Proposed Code alters
this definition significantly. Criminal negligence under the Proposed
Code requires a "gross deviation" from a reasonable standard of
care. 74 The reasons for this change are twofold. First, since a negligent
person is inadvertent by definition, the "threat of punishment for neg-
ligence must pass him by, for he does not realize that it is addressed to
him. '7 5 Second, criminal punishment should be reserved for grossly
deviant conduct, not the ordinary deviation for which civil remedies
are adequate.
The primary impact of this change will be felt in the homicide
statute. Currently, "ordinary, as distinguished from aggravated or
gross, negligence will support a conviction of manslaughter .... ,,76
The Proposed Code precludes conviction of homicide unless gross
negligence is proven.77
Although the proposed definition of criminal negligence changes
existing law, it does bring consistency into the law of negligent homi-
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030(2) (1959).
73. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.010(1) (1959) states: "Each of the words 'neglect,' 'neg-
ligence,' and 'negligently'shall import a want of such attention to the nature or probable
consequences of an act or omission as an ordinarily prudent man usually exercises in
his own business."
74. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(1) (d) provides:
A person is criminally negligent or acts with criminal negligence when he fails to
be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk (i) that the result described by a
statute defining an offense may occur, or (ii) that a circumstance described by a
statute defining an offense exists, and the failure to be aware of such risk consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would
exercise in the situation.
75. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 99 (1953); accord, M.P.C. § 2.02, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
76. State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn.2d 964, 966, 385 P.2d 318, 319 (1963).
77. Criminally negligent homicide is the lowest degree of homicide recognized in
the Proposed Code. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.050 provides: "(1) A person is guilty of crimi-
nally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another
person."
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cide. While ordinary negligence is sufficient to support a conviction of
manslaughter under present law, it is not sufficient to support a con-
viction of negligent homicide by motor vehicle. In construing the ve-
hicular homicide statute,78 the Washington Supreme Court has held
that "ordinary negligence will not support a conviction of negligent
homicide. '79 Rather, what must be shown is "an aggravated kind of
negligence or carelessness." 80 This essentially constitutes what the
Proposed Code defines as "criminal negligence." The rationale of the
Washington Legislature in requiring proof of gross negligence for
conviction under the vehicular homicide statute is an equally persua-
sive rationale for requiring such proof in the general criminal law. 8 '
A criminal negligence standard also is utilized in some of the af-
firmative defenses specified in the Proposed Code. Some affirmative
defenses require a "reasonable belief' by the accused before they can
be invoked. A "reasonable belief' under the Proposed Code is one
"which the actor is not reckless or criminally negligent in holding;" 82
thus, if the defendant is negligent (but not grossly negligent) in
holding a particular belief, such a belief would be "reasonable" under
the Code. This definition of reasonable belief marks a change in ex-
isting Washington law. Washington, like other jurisdictions,8 3
previously has defined a reasonable belief as a belief honestly held by
the defendant, one that a reasonable person would hold under the
same circumstances.8 4 The prevailing requirement that a reasonable
man standard be met suggests that if a belief is negligently held, it is
not a reasonable belief under current Washington law. Professor Wil-
liams contends that a negligently held belief has been deemed an un-
reasonable belief only in cases where negligence is the degree of cul-
pability required for conviction.8 5 Thus he concludes that it is repeti-
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.520 (Supp. 1971) (negligent homicide by use of a
motor vehicle).
79. See State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 435 P.2d 680 (1967); accord, State v. Brooks,
73 Wn.2d 653, 440 P.2d 199 (1968); State v. Collins, 55 Wn.2d 469, 348 P.2d 214
(1960); State v. Partridge, 47 Wn.2d 640, 289 P.2d 702 (1955).
80. State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 435 P.2d 680(1967).
81. The Washington Legislature apparently wished to exclude from the criminal
sanction the hundreds of minor oversights and inadvertences encompassed within the
term "negligence." See State v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760, 435 P.2d 680 (1967).
82. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(22).
83. See PERKINS at 940.
84. State v. Churchill, 52 Wash. 210, 100 P. 309 (1909).
85. G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 71 (2d ed. 1961). Professor Williams suggests
elsewhere that ordinary negligence is not a proper base from which to invoke the crim-
inal law. Id., § 43.
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tious to say that a negligently held belief is an unreasonable belief. All
that is really being said is that negligent conduct will support a convic-
tion.
If ordinary negligence will not support criminal liability directly, it
should not support it indirectly by precluding the utilization of de-
fenses by an accused who has not been grossly negligent. The Code's
definition of reasonable belief is analytically consistent with the treat-
ment of negligence throughout the Proposed Code. The real change in
Washington law lies not in the proposed definition of reasonable belief
but in the abolition of ordinary negligence as a basis for criminal lia-
bility.
The careful use of the uniform standards should be of assistance to
both judge and jury. The definitions of the four mental states, are, of
course, too "legalistic" to aid the jury directly, but the uniform appli-
cation of these terms throughout the criminal code should aid the
courts in relating the law to the facts of a particular case. Hopefully,
this will lead to greater jury understanding of the judge's instructions
and fewer appeals to determine the meaning of a particular mens rea.
B. Offenses With No Express Mental State Requirement
R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050 provides that absent "a legislative intent to
impose absolute liability," an offense which does not expressly include
one of the four defined mental states shall be "construed" to include
one of these defined mental states. The Proposed Code contains
twenty-three offenses which do not include in their definitions one of
the four defined mental states. Of these twenty-three, seven explicitly
designate culpable mental states other than one of those described in
the Code. Two of these seven offenses require that the defendant act
for the purpose of accomplishing a particular result.86 Acting for a
purpose seems synonomous with acting intentionally.87 The other five
86. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.84.060 (loitering), 9A.88.015 (communication with a minor for
immoral purposes). See State v. Rahn, I Wn. App. 159, 459 P.2d 824 (1969).
87. The Model Penal Code defines "purposely" in a similar manner to the Proposed
Code's definition of intent. M.P.C. § 2.02(2) (a) (i). It is puzzling why the drafters did
not use the word "intent" in the two statutes. The word "intent" could very easily be
substituted for the word "purpose" without changing the apparent meaning of the two
statutes. That the drafters failed to do so clouds the meaning of the two statutes by
raising the possibility that "purpose" means something other than "intent."
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statutes require that the defendant act with a prescribed belief.88
Where the statute requires that the accused believe a fact exists, the
mental state of knowledge must be satisfied. 89 Where the statute re-
quires that the accused not believe in the existence of a fact, the
mental state requirement will not be met if the accused was reckless in
failing to know if the fact existed. 90
The sexual offenses do not include a specific mental state require-
ment in their definitions.91 However, two sexual offenses can be com-
mitted if the defendant obtains sexual intercourse by "forcible com-
pulsion." 92 Forcible compulsion is defined in such a way as to "neces-
sarily involve" a mental state requirement.9 3 Moreover, it is an affirm-
ative defense that the accused reasonably believed the victim to be of
consenting age, 94 or that he believed "the circumstances giving rise
to... incapacity to consent [i.e., a mental defect, mental incapacita-
tion, or physical helplessness] were not present." 95 This means that
although the prosecution's prima facie case does not include proof of
a culpable mental state, the accused can, by evidence, place his culpa-
bility in issue. Thus the implicit mental state requirements of the
sexual offenses are derived from the affirmative defenses to the of-
fenses and the definition of "forcible compulsion."
Eight offenses in the Proposed Code neither contain a mental state
requirement in their definition nor provide affirmative defenses from
88. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.72.010 (perjury in the first degree), 9A.72.030 (false swearing),
9A.72.060 (bribe receiving by a witness), 9A.72.070 (intimidating a witness), 9A.72.080
(tampering with a witness).
89. M.P.C. § 208.20, Comment 4 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957). For example, the crime
of false swearing (R.W.C.C. § 9A.72.030) requires a person to make "a false statement,
which he believes to be false... This requires that a person make a statement which he
knows to be false.
90. "A person can be convicted if he makes a false statement without any belief in
the matter, i.e., reckless whethe.- it be true or false." M.P.C. § 208.20, Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 6, 1957). For example, first degree perjury requires that a person make a false
statement "which he does not believe to be true... " R.W.C.C. § 9A.72.0 10.
91. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.44.
92. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.030, .070.,
93. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(7). Forcible compulsion is defined to include "physical
force that overcomes earnest resistance" or express or implied threats that place the
victim in fear that either he or another person will be killed, injured, immediately kid-
napped or unlawfully imprisoned. If physical force or express threats are employed to
secure intercourse, an intent to accomplish the proscribed result necessarily is involved.
If implied threats are employed, the accused at least must be "substantially certain" (i.e.,
know) that his conduct will cause the victim to submit involuntarily to intercourse.
94. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(2)(b).
95. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(l).
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which a mental state requirement can be derived. 96 A difficult ques-
tion then arises as to whether this evidences a clear legislative intent to
impose absolute liability or whether a standard can be constructed
from which a mental state requirement can be construed. A useful
solution suggested by the Michigan and New York codes is that "a
culpable mental state... may be required for commission of that
offense.., if the proscribed conduct necessarily involves such a culp-
able mental state."197 This approach provides a framework- which the
courts may use to solve the mental state question inherent in these
eight offenses9 8 as well as the two sexual offenses discussed above.99
Three of these eight offenses require that an act be performed pur-
suant to an agreement or understanding. 100 One offense requires that
an act be performed "in return for a fee."'101 Performing an act "in
return for a fee" implies a prior understanding or agreement.. Since a
contemplated purpose or design is inherent in an understanding or
agreement, this provision seems to imply that one who acts pursuant
to an agreement or understanding must act intentionally.
Escape is another crime that "necessarily involves" a mental state
requirement. Implicit in the word "escape" is an intent to flee and
elude official detention, an intent which is manifest in most escape sit-
uations. 02 Thus the Code seems to require proof of an intent to flee
and elude official detention as a predicate to conviction for escape. 103
The mandate of the Code indicates a strong preference against ab-
solute liability crimes. However, without either a section comparable
to the Model Penal Code provision which expressly imposes a culpa-
bility requirement where a mental state is not otherwise specified 04 or
96. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.68.040 (trading in public office), 9A.76.080 (compounding),
9A.76.090 (escape in the first degree), 9A.76.100 (escape in the second degree),
9A.76.1 10 (escape in the third degree), 9A.84.050 (public intoxication, but see note
661 and accompanying text infra), 9A.88.020 (prostitution), 9A.88.030 (patronizing
a prostitute).
. 97. MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 315 (Final Draft 1967) (emphasis added); See also
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 45.05 (McKinney 1967).
98. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
99. See note 92 supra.
100. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.69.040 (trading in public office), 9A.76.080 (compounding),
9A.88.030 (patronizing a prostitute).
101. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.020 (prostitution).
102. M.P.C. § 208.33, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
103. Id.
104. M.P.C. § 2.02(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) reads as follows: "When the culpa-
bility sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law,
such element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with re-
spect thereto."
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a provision which supplies an analytic framework from which the
courts may derive the appropriate culpability requirement, 10 5
R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050 may present practical problems of construc-
tion, especially for crimes located outside the Code.
C. Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law
Directly relevant to the principles of liability established by the
Code's mental state requirements is the Code's determination of when
mistake of fact or law exculpates the accused. Under the Proposed
Code, mistake of fact constitutes an affirmative defense in three in-
stances: (1) when it negates the mental state which is an essential ele-
ment of the crime;' 0 6 (2) when the statute defining the offense ex-
pressly provides that such factual mistake constitutes a defense or
exemption; 10 7 and (3) when the mistake supports a defense of justi-
fication.108
A potential conflict exists between the mistake of fact provision and
some affirmative defenses. Although R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(l)(a)
provides that a mistake of fact is a defense if it negates the mental state
requirement of a particular offense, the provision includes no require-
ment that the mistake be reasonable. On the other hand, some affirm-
ative defenses relevant to whether a mistake of fact negated the ac-
cused's culpability do require that the mistake be reasonable. 10 9
Under which provision may the accused assert his mistake of fact de-
fense? If he asserts the mistake of fact defense provided by R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.08.040(1)(a), he need only demonstrate the honesty of his mis-
take; whether it was reasonable is irrelevant. However, if he is allowed
to proceed only under a specific affirmative defense, he may have to
demonstrate that his mistake was reasonable as well as honest.110
Two analyses may resolve the potential inconsistency. The first is
grounded in the fundamental rule of construction that where a conflict
105. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
106. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(a).
107. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(1)(b).
108. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(l)(c). See also the section on justification in this com-
ment.
109. See, e.g., R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010(2)(a), which provides that a reasonable belief
that the prior spouse was dead is an affirmative defense to a charge of bigamy.
110. Arguably the difference is only academic. Professor Cosway contends that any
unreasonable mistake is ipso facto a dishonest mistake. See the discussion of this point
in his article, at p. 77 of this volume.
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in language exists, the more specific language will control. Thus where
the language of an affirmative defense conflicts with R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.040(1)(a), the affirmative defenses, having a more specific ap-
plication, will control."'
An alternative analysis is grounded in.R.W.C.C. § 9A108.020(3),
which provides:
When a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a
specified mental state, such mental state is deemed to apply to every
material element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application
clearly appears. (emphasis added).
Thus, whenever an offense requires proof of intent, knowledge or
recklessness, an honest, albeit unreasonable, mistake of fact normally
would be relevant to whether the accused acted culpably with respect
to a material element of the offense. However, where a statute de-
fining an offense provides that a reasonable mistake of a particular
fact is an affirmative defense, the affirmative defense may be inter-
preted to indicate a legislative intent to limit the application of the
mental state requirement as permitted by R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(3).
According to this analysis, the prosecution would not need to prove
that the accused acted culpably with respect to that particular fact
until the issue is raised in connection with the affirmative defense.
Although the Proposed Code's treatment of mistake of fact is in
harmony with the provisions of several other jurisdictions, 1 2 the Code
departs somewhat from the general trend when it deals with mistake
of law.113 The Code is explicit in its retention of the common law rule
that ignorance or mistake of law generally is not a defense." 4 This
provision is not as inflexible as it might seem, however, because it is
qualified by the phrase "unless otherwise provided," which acquires
greater significance. when read in conjunction with the Code as a
whole.
In several instances the drafters specifically have provided that mis-
take of law affords a defense. Most significantly, the Code's section on
111. This analysis is consistent with R.W.C.C. 9A.08.040(1)(b), which makes spe-
cific reference to these affirmative defenses based on mistakes of fact.
112. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-6 (1971); REV. MICH. CRIM. CODE § 325
(Final Draft 1967); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 15.20 (McKinney 1967); and ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 38, § 4-8 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
113. See note 122 and accompanying text infra.
114. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(2).
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execution of a public duty 1 5 permits justification as an affirmative
defense whenever the actor reasonably believes that the law estab-
lishes a public duty which authorizes or requires the actor's conduct.
This defense is the Code's most general exception to the mistake of
law section, since the defense of justification based on execution of a
public duty may be asserted in the prosecution for any offense,"16
except that it does not permit the use of force against any person un-
less that force is expressly authorized by law."17 Narrower exceptions
to the general mistake of law rule include the provision that a person
using force to effect an arrest is justified if he reasonably believes that
the force used is necessary to effect a lawful arrest."18 A similar de-
fense is available under the section governing custodial interference.' 19
The Code also creates as affirmative defenses to the charge of big-
amy both the actor's reasonable belief that he was legally free to
remarry, and a court's entry of a judgment purporting to terminate
any prior marriage if the actor did not know that such judgment was
invalid. 120
In contrast to this rational treatment of mistake of law in specific
instances, the Proposed Code does not permit a defense of mistake of
law when the accused has acted in reliance upon an official statement
of the law later determined to be invalid or erroneous.' 2 ' The Model
115. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030. While the comments which follow this section indicate
the drafters believed it would provide only a "limited defense," the wording is open to a
broad interpretation which would exculpate many persons acting under a reasonable
but mistaken belief of law. Much of the uncertainty about the effect of the section could
be removed by a clarification of the term "public duty."
For further discussion of R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030 see the discussion of execution of
public duty in the section on justification in this comment.
116. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.010.
117. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030(2).
118. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070. See also the comment following this section at 84.
119. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.050.
120. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.010. Another affirmative defense is the actor's mistake of
fact in reasonably believing his prior spouse to be dead. Id. The present law
allows these exceptions to the crime of bigamy:
PROVIDED, That this section shall not extend to a person-
(1) Whose former husband or wife has been absent for fiue years exclusively then
last past, without being known to him or her within that time to be living, and be-
lieved to be dead; or,
(2) Whose former marriage has been pronounced void, annulled or dissolved by
a court of competent jurisdiction.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.15.010 (1959). For a discussion of the bigamy provisions of the
Proposed Code, see the section on bigamy in this comment.
121. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(2) and Comment following. It should be noted that
R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030(l)(d) justifies an act committed where the actor reasonably be-
lieved his conduct was required or authorized by "the judgment or order of a competent
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Penal Code and numerous state codes provide for such a defense. 122
This severe restriction of the defense of mistake of law seems to imple-
nient a different philosophy concerning culpability than is evident in
the Code's mens rea provisions. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.050, in particular,
refuses to impose absolute liability for an offense unless legislative in-
tent clearly warrants it. In all other cases the accused must act with
intent, knowledge, recklessness or criminal negligence. 123
Furthermore, by omitting the defense of good faith reliance on an
invalid official statement of the law, the Code has created an anoma-
lous situation for many law-abiding citizens. Under Washington law,
ignorance of a regulation will afford no defense for its violation; 2 4 yet
under R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040 a person is still vulnerable if he follows
to the letter a statement of the law which is later found invalid. Where
the actor's conduct cannot be deemed either culpable or blameworthy,
little if any purpose can be served by imposing penal sanctions. In-
flicting punishment for an act arising out of reliance on an official
statement of the law can only breed disrespect and disregard for such
statements and for the law itself. A provision allowing such a defense
is warranted by a fundamental sense of fairness and is required if the
Code's general philosophy of culpability is to be consistently applied.
III. THE DEFENSE OF CkIMINAL INSANITY
"No problem in the drafting of a penal Code presents larger intrinsic
difficulty than that of determining when individuals whose conduct
would otherwise be criminal ought to be exculpated on the ground
court or tribunal." This provision eliminates much of the hardship attendant to the
Code's elimination of a defense based upon reliance upon an official statement of the
law in the mistake of law section. However, this provision is of no avail to the actor who
relies on an official statement of the law which emanates other than from a competent
court or tribunal-e.g., a written opinion of the state attorney general.
122. The Code rejects without explanation M.P.C. § 2.04(3)(b), which exculpates an
actor who reasonably relies upon an invalid official statement of law. In doing so it dif-
fers from the codes of Connecticut, Michigan, New York and Illinois, all of which have
followed the Model Penal Code in submitting this defense, See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-6(b)(2) (1969); MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 325(2) (Final Draft 1967); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 15.20(2) (McKinney 1967); and ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-8 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
123. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020.
124. State v. Turner, 78 Wn.2d 276, .474 P.2d 91 (1970) represents the current
Washington law in this area:
Many penal laws, for example, relating to pure food and drugs, labeling, weights
and measures, building, plumbing and electrical codes, fire protection, air and
water pollution, sanitation, highway safety and numerous other areas, in the
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that they were suffering from mental disease or defect when they
acted as they did."'12
The Proposed Code's test of criminal insanity is a significant depar-
ture from current Washington law. The text of the proposed insanity
test is: 126
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of
such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks substan-
tial capacity either:
(a) to know or appreciate the nature and consequence of such con-
duct; or
(b) to know or appreciate the criminality of such conduct; or
(c) to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) Mental disease of defect excluding responsibility is an affirmative
defense.
Currently, the definition of criminal insanity is not governed by
statute; by default, the Washington Supreme Court has been given the
task of formulating a definition. Since 1909127 the M'Naghten Rule,12 8
has been this state's test of legal insanity. However, the exact compo-
sition of the test is not easily gleaned from the cases. Confusion stems
from the court's failure to approve a single formulation of the
M'Naghten Rule. 2 9 Although M'Naghten is the rule followed by most
exercise of the police power may be phrased and enforced as laws mala prohibita
and may require neither proof of intent to do a wrong nor knowledge that a
wrong will be done.
Id. at 280, 474 P.2d at 94.
125. M.P.C. § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
126. R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.0 10.
127. State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909).
128. The M'Naghten Rule as originally formulated by Lord Chief Justice Tindol in
response to five questions propounded by the House of Lords is:
[T] o establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was
labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it,
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
M'Naghten's Case, I0 Cl. and F. 200, 208 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L., 1843).
129. The court, over the years, has approved three different formulations of the
M'Naghten Rule. In most discussion of the M'Naghten Rule, the court has framed the
test only in terms of whether the defendant "did not have the ability to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong with respect to the act charged." State v. Collins, 50 Wn.2d 740,
750, 314 P.2d 660, 666 (1957); State v. Craig, 52 Wash. 66, 100 P. 167 (1909). This
formulation is taken from the second exculpatory branch of M'Naghten.
In a handful of Washington appellate opinions, the M'Naghten Rule is correctly
stated-two exculpatory branches asserted in the disjunctive. Seattle v. Hill. 72 Wn.2d
786, 797, 435 P.2d 692, 700 (1968); State v. Nicholson, I Wn. App. 853, 854, 466 P.2d
181, 182 (1970). Framed in terms of criminal capacity as opposed to criminal insanity,
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jurisdictions, it has been severely criticized by legal writers.130 Unlike
a number of states, 31 Washington repeatedly has refused to amelio-
rate M'Naghten with the "irresistible impulse" test.132
The proposed formulation is a remarkably good attempt to collect
the best features of the M'Naghten, Durham,133 irresistible impulse
the formulation says that: "If one is capable of distinguishing between right and wrong
and knows the nature and moral quality of his actions, he is deemed sane under the
M'Naghtet Rule.... Seattle v. Hill, 72 Wn.2d 786, 797, 435 P.2d 692, 700 (1968).
However, in its most recent decision on the subject, the Washington court approved ajury instruction framing M'Naghten in the conjunctive:
Is the mind of the accused so diseased or affected at the time of the commission of
the act charged that he is unable to perceive the moral qualities of the act with
which he is charged and is unable to tell right from wrong with reference to the par-
ticular acts charged.
State v. Reece, 79 Wn.2d 453, 454, 486 P.2d 1088, 1089 (1971) (emphasis added).
This writer believes that "to perceive the moral qualities of the act with which he is
charged," is simply another way of asking if the defendant knew what he was doing. Pro-
fessor Morris contends that the phrase modifies the right/wrong clause, and that the court
is asking whether the defendant is unable to tell what is morally right from what is mor-
ally wrong. This writer rejects that view. If the court wanted to ask if the defendant
could tell what is morally right from what is morally wrong, it could have done so in
much simpler terms. Also, if the phrase read simply "to perceive the qualities of his act,"
there would be no doubt that the court was asking, "did the accused know wht he was
doing?" The key term "moral" seems only to ask if the defendant really appreciated the
quality of his act; whether he fully understood the moral values involved. A jury instruc-
tion using a similar formulation of M'Naghten has been held reversible error in three
jurisdictions: see State v. Moeller, 433 P.2d 136 (Hawaii, 1967); Knights v. State, 58
Neb. 225, 78 N.W. 508 (1899); and People v. Kelley, 302 N.Y. 512, 99 N.E.2d 552
(1951); cf. Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997 (Alaska, 1962).
The M'Naghten Rule asserted in the conjunctive means that the accused must meet
both exculpatory branches of the test and not just one. As Professor Morris points out, a
conjunctive reading of the M'Naghten Rule severely narrows its application precluding
it from applying to certain obvious cases of insanity: "A man might know the nature
and quality of his act, but not know it was wrong. Conversely, a man might say that he
knew his act was wrong, but he may not have appreciated its nature and quality when he
did it." Morris, Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. L. REV. 583, 601 (1968).
130. See, e.g., J. ROcHE, THE CRIMINAL MIND 102 (Evergreen ed. 1959); Morris,
Criminal Insanity, 43 WASH. LAW REV. 583 (1968); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH
(1956); but see Mueller, M'Naghten Remains Irreplaceable: Recent Events in the Law
of Incapacity, 50 GEO. LJ. 105 (1961); Livermore and Meehl, The Virtues of
M'Naghten, 51 MINN. L. Riv. 789 (1967).
13 1. For a list of states and federal circuits using M'Naghten and the "irresistible
impulse" test, see A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 236 n. 13, and 241 n. 1 (1967).
132. See, e.g., In re White v. Rhay, 64 Wn.2d 15, 390 P.2d 535 (1964); State v.
Maish, 29 Wn.2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947).
Under the irresistible impulse rule jurors are instructed to acquit a defendant if they
find that mental disease precluded him from controlling his conduct even if he is sane
under the M'Naghten Rule. See generally Keedy, Irresistible Impulse as a Defense in
the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 956 (1952).
133. In 1954, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia pro-
mulgated the Durham Rule which simply let the jury determine: (1) whether the de-
fendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect at the time he committed the
crime, and if so, (2) whether the criminal act was the "product" of this mental disease or
defect. "The rule ... is simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his un-
lawful act was the product of mental disease or defect." Durham v. United States, 214
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and Model Penal Code rules into a single test of criminal insanity,
while avoiding each of their deficiencies. The first prong of the Pro-
posed Code's insanity defense 34 is taken from the New York Crim-
inal Code.13 5 The purpose of the subsection is to permit the jury to
find that those persons who know their conduct is wrong, but who do
not fully appreciate the nature and consequences of such conduct, are
not criminally responsible. Asking whether one appreciates the nature
and consequence of his conduct "is an ordinary way of specifying
what, in part at least, is meant by the psychiatrist's 'reality principle.'
It concerns knowledge of ordinary actions and everyday consequ-
ences."'1 36 Simply put, it asks "whether the defendant really knew
what he was doing.' 137
The Wisconsin Supreme Court offers a lucid explanation of the
purpose and importance of inquiring whether a defendant knew the
nature and consequence of his conduct: 38
F.2d 862, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Durham has received scant support among lawyers
and lawmakers. To date, no American court has adopted the Durham test of legal in-
sanity. Only two jurisdictions, Maine and the Virgin Islands, have adopted the standard
by statute. See PERKINS at 877 n. 55. Even the District of Columbia no longer adheres
to the rule. In United States v. Brawner, II Crim. Law Rptr. 2276 (June, 1972), the
District of Columbia abandoned the Durham Rule in favor of the Model Penal Code
formulation. Washington rejected the Durham Rule in State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551.
374 P.2d 942 (1962).
Another test that should be mentioned is the "Currens Test." The Currens Test is es-
sentially the second exculpatory branch of the M.P.C. rule:
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of committing the prohibited act the de-
fendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have violated.
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3rd Cir. 1961).
134. R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010(I) states: "A person is not criminally responsible for
conduct if at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacks
substantial capacity ... (a) to know or appreciate the nature and consequence of such
conduct ..
135. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1967). But notice that this provision is
not included in the Model Penal Code rule which provides:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if... as a result of mental dis-
ease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
[wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law.
(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" does not include an
abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social con-
duct.
M.P.C. § 4.01.
136. J. HALL, STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND CRIMINAL THEORY 281 (1958).
See also, J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 502-3 (1947).
137. PERKINS at 860 (emphasis added).
138. State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 115 N.W.2d 505, 521 (1962). For an example of
a case in which a psychiatrist testified that the defendant knew that his act was wrong,
but did not know the nature and quality of it, see People v. Samuels, 302 N.Y. 163, 96
N.E.2d 757 (1951).
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We think ... that including the former element (nature and quality)
gives important emphasis to one element of the realization of the
wrongfulness of an act. Suppose that one vaguely realizes that partic-
ular conduct is forbidden, but lacks real insight into the conduct. He
may be furtive about such conduct, but not really able to make a
normal moral judgment about it.
Suppose, for example, a woman with a small child finds herself desti-
tute and with little hope for the future. Believing that her child would
be better off dead than living in misery, the woman chloroforms the
child in its sleep. The woman probably knew what she was doing in
the strict sense, and she probably knew that it was criminal. But what
she lacked was "real insight" into the character and consequences of
her act. She did not appreciate that she was snuffing out a human life
and exactly what that meant. In short, she did not fully understand
the nature and quality of her act.' 3 9 Thus an important new dimen-
sion of culpability for the jury's consideration is added by the subsec-
tion.
The second prong of the proposed test is identical to the first excul-
patory branch of the Model Penal Code rule.140 Taken together, the
first two prongs of the proposed rule constitute a modern counterpart
to the M'Naghten Rule. The difference between M'Naghten and its
modern counterpart lies in the latter's use of terms "substantial capac-
ity" and "appreciate." Use of these terms avoids two of the major defi-
ciencies of M'Naghten. Instead of requiring total impairment of intel-
lectual cognition as does M'Naghten, the Code requires "substantial"
impairment of either cognition or emotional appreciation.' 4 1
The third exculpatory prong of the Proposed Code's test, 42 is a
control test which negates criminal responsibility where volition is
substantially impaired. Under the control test, even if the accused
appreciated the nature, consequence, and criminality of his conduct,
he will not be held criminally responsible if as a result of a mental dis-
ease or defect he lacked the will power to resist committing a criminal
act. Similar to the "irresistible impulse" test,' 43 the proposed statute
139. See People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427, 3 N.E.2d. 581, (1936); H. SILVING,
ESSAYS ON MENTAL INCAPACITY AND CRIMINAL CONDUCT 101 (1967).
140. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010 (1)(b); M.P.C. § 4.01.
141. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 87 (1967); Allen, The Rule of The
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, 45 MARQ. L. REv. 494, 501 (1962).
142. R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010(1)(c) is identical to the second exculpatory branch of
the Model Penal Code rule.
143. See note 132 supra.
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will exclude from criminal sanction those individuals who are incap-
able of responding to the threat of criminal penalties, such as the klep-
tomaniac and the pyromaniac. This defense can be asserted in cases
where either the act was sudden and unplanned or the crime was
planned well in advance of its commission. 44 In the latter case the
Code recognizes mental illnesses such as melancholia which are char-
acterized by brooding and reflection and which substantially affect the
actor's will power.145 Thus the proposed rule allows the expert witness
to present to the jury his full range of inquiry, while at the same time
providing the jury with a standard to which they can apply the expert
testimony.' 46 The Code rejects the Model Penal Code's controversial
section 4.01(2),147 the purpose of which is "to exclude from the con-
cept of 'mental disease or defect' the case of so-called 'psychopathic
personality.' "148 The framers of the Model Penal Code felt that the
section was needed in order to prevent the insanity defense "from
swallowing up the whole of criminal liability, as it might if all recidivists
could qualify for the defense merely by being labeled psychopaths."' 149
The section was disapproved by every psychiatrist on the American
Law Institute staff.150 Those who disfavor the section contend that it
has no basis in psychiatric fact, i.e., there are no persons with mental
abnormalities manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct. Professor Goldstein explains:15'
[Pisychopathy is never "manifested only by repeated criminal...
conduct. Psychiatrists-not just mountebanks, but the most honest
ones-would invariably testify that any psychopath would show some
144. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 70-71 (1967).
145. Id. at 71.
146. See United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 623 (2d Cir. 1966).
147. M.P.C. § 4.01(2) states: "As used in this Article, the terms mental disease or
defect do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise
anti-social conduct."
148. M.P.C. § 4.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
149. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 88 (1967); See Weihofen, The Definition
of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1960); Diamond, From M'Naghten to
Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 189, 193-94 (1962). Cf. Wechsler, The
Criteria of Criminal Responsibility, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374 (1955).
150. Diamond, From M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
189, 194 n.23 (1962).
151. A. GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 88 (1967) (quoting Kuh, A Prose-
cutor Considers the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 608, 626 (1963)). See also
United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 762 (3rd Cir. 1961); H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE
TO PUNISH 89-90 (1956); Overholser, Criminal Responsibility: A Psychiatrist's View-
point, 48 A.B.A.J. 527, 529 (1962); Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness, 21 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1960).
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other symptom of his psychopathy, even though his anti-social conduct
might be the principal outcropping."
However, Dr. Bernard Diamond contends that the category defined in
this section is "as arbitrary and capricious as excluding defendants
with red hair or blue eyes or negro blood from the benefits of the law
of criminal responsibility.' 52
The Proposed Code makes insanity an affirmative defense. This
means 'that once some evidence of the defendant's insanity is pre-
sented, the prosecution bears the burden of persuading the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was sane when he
committed the unlawful act. 53 This is a departure from current Wash-
ington law which requires that the defendant prove his criminal in-
sanity by a preponderance of the evidence. 54 The drafters felt that
there is "no compelling reason ... why the issue of moral responsi-
bility-an element of every criminal offense---should be treated dif-
ferently in terms of burdens of proof than all the other elements of the
offense which generally have the burden of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt placed upon the state."'155 Similar reasoning is followed in
twenty-two states and in the federal system.' 56 One state has held that
due process and the reasonable doubt standard require this result.157
The Rule of Diminished Capacity
Conspicuous by its absence from the Proposed Code is an explicit
provision on diminished capacity similar to that found in the Model
Penal Code:158
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect
152. Diamond, From. M'Naghten to Currens, and Beyond, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 189,
194(1962).
153. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.120(2). See also Professor Cosway's discussion of this point
at p. 67 of this volume.
154. State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 737, 466 P.2d 120 (1970); State v. Bower, 73 Wn.2d
634, 440 P.2d 167 (1968); State v. Mays, 65 Wn.2d 58, 395 P.2d 758 (1964).
155. R.W.C.C. § 9A.12.010, Comment. For an excellent argument leading to this
same conclusion, see Fletcher, Tivo Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of
Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 905 (1968).
156. Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146, 158-9 (1964). Twenty-four states (including Wash-
ington) follow the preponderance of the evidence rule. Id. at 195-7.
157. People ex rel. Juhan v. District Court for Jefferson County, 439 P.2d 741
(Colo. 1968). In light of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which the Supreme Court
gave constitutional status to the reasonable doubt standard, it may be that R.W.C.C. §
9A. 12.010(2) is now constitutionally compelled.
158. M.P.C. § 4.02(l).
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is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or
did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense.
Washington is one of a growing minority of jurisdictions which have
approved the rule of diminished capacity. 159 Relying upon dicta in an
early Washington Supreme Court decision 160 the Washington Court
of Appeals held in State v. Carter 161 that the rule of diminished ca-
pacity was part of this state's criminal law. 162 Given the emphasis
placed upon an accused's mental state in the Proposed Code,163 it is
surprising that the drafters failed to expressly include the rule of dim-
inished capacity. However, the rule appears to be incorporated implic-
itly by two sections of the Code. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.120(1) requires
that each element of an offense must be proved by competent evid-
ence beyond a reasonable doubt to establish guilt, and R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.020(1) precludes conviction unless one of the four required
mental states can be proved. Since R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(1) pre-
cludes conviction unless one of four required mental states can be
proved, all evidence relevant to the issue of mens rea, including psy-
chiatric evidence, is admissible to prove or disprove the existence of
159. To date at least eighteen jurisdictions, including Washington, have approved
the rule of diminished capacity. Only four states have expressly rejected the rule. The
remaining jurisdictions have yet to pass on the question. Brief of John M. Junker and
Harvey H. Chamberlin as Amicus Curiae, at 12-13, State v. Carter, 5 Wn. App. 802,
490 P.2d 1346 (1971).
160. In State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 588, 374 P.2d 942, 964 (1962), the Wash-
ington Supreme Court said, in dicta:
The presence of a mental disease or defect which falls short of criminal insanity
may well be relevant to issues involving the elements of degrees of certain crimes,
e.g. where malice, premeditation or intent are in issue. An accused who has the
necessary capacity to premeditate, for instance, may still introduce evidence that
he is suffering from a mental disease or defect, which disease or defect substantially
reduces the probability that he actually did premeditate with regard to the crime
with which he is charged.
161. 5 Wn. App. 802, 490 P.2d 1346 (1971).
162. The court stated: "Any competent evidence which tends logically, naturally
and by reasonable inference to prove or disprove a material issue is relevant and should
be admitted unless it is specifically inadmissible by reason of some affirmative rule of
law." Id. at 805, 490 P.2d at 1348. However, the court affirmed the conviction, stating:
We find that the jury would necessarily have had to speculate on the effect which
Mr. Carter's particular mental disorder, if present, would have had upon his ability
to form an intent to commit the crime charged. There was no testimony to tie the
alleged mental condition to the question of ability to form an intent. In the absence
of that connecting link, the offer of proof was properly refused. Before testimony
can be received into evidence, it must be shown to be relevant and material to the
case.
Id. at 807, 490 P.2d at 1349.
163. See, e.g., R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.08.020, (general requirements of culpability),
9A.08.040 (ignorance or mistake), 9A.08.080 (intoxication), 9A. 12.010 (insanity).
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mens rea.16 4 In addition, to preclude an accused from introducing
psychiatric testimony tending to negative the existence of an element
of the offense conflicts with the requirement that the state prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 165
IV. JUSTIFICATION
A. Justification Generally
The Proposed Code adopts the view that conduct otherwise pros-
cribed by law is justified under certain limited circumstances. The jus-
tification chapter of the Code1 66 includes the "choice of evils" theory
of necessity and, in addition, specifies particular circumstances under
which the use of force or the commission of otherwise illegal acts is
justified.
The proposed "choice of evils"' 67 section justifies "[c] onduct
which the actor reasonably believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another. . .. -168 This defense is subject to three
significant limitations: (1) the harm sought to be avoided must be
greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the of-
fense charged, 69 (2) the law must not otherwise preclude the defense
164. "An accused should ... always be able to assert that an element of the cri me
with which he has been charged was absent at the time he committed the act." S. BRAKEL
& R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 394 (rev. ed. 1971). In the com-
ments to the Model Penal Code, The Chief Reporter stated:
If states of mind such as deliberation or premeditation are accorded legal signifi-
cance, psychiatric evidence should be admissible when relevant to prove or dis-
prove their existence to the same extent as any other relevant evidence.
M.P.C. § 4.02(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
165. The rule of diminished capacity may be constitutionally compelled now that
the United States Supreme Court has given constitutional stature to the reasonable
doubt standard. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Court stated:
.Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable
doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact nec-
essary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
Id. at 364. If the defendant is not permitted to introduce evidence of mental impairment
tending to negative the existence of an essential element of the crime charged, it cannot
fairly be said that the state is proving "beyond a reasonable doubt... every fact neces-
sary" to establish guilt. The prosecution in such instances is being aided by a conclusive
presumption that mental impairment, not amounting to legal insanity, did not preclude
the accused from acting with the mental state required of the offense charged.
166. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.16.
167. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.020.
168. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.020(l).
169. This balancing of evils obviously is imprecise and by its very nature is a ques-
tion best left to the jury for determination. For a discussion of this point see M.P.C. §
3.02, Comment at 5-6 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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of justification under the specific circumstances involved, and (3) the
actor's determination as to the necessity for his conduct must be "rea-
sonable."
The Code restricts the "choice of evils" defense of necessity to those
instances where the law does not provide "exceptions or defenses
dealing with the specific situation involved; and.., a legislative pur-
pose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly
appear."'1 70 Thus, the choice of evils analysis does not apply, for ex-
ample, to the use of force in self-defense, because that situation is spe-
cifically dealt with under another section of the justification chap-
ter. 171
The requirement that the actor's evaluation as to the necessity for
his conduct be reasonable172 means that his choice must not be "crim-
inally negligent."1 73 Thus a mere negligent belief does not preclude
successful assertion of the defense.174 Where the defendant was either
criminally negligent or reckless in evaluating the necessity for his con-
duct, he may be held liable only for an offense for which such crim-
inal negligence or recklessness suffices to establish culpability.175
This section, unlike the Model Penal Code provision on which it is
based, does not specifically cover the situation where the actor was
reckless or criminally negligent in bringing about the situation re-
quiring such conduct. 176 As the section is now drafted an actor who is
reckless or criminally negligent in creating the situation making it
170. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.020(l)(b) and (c).
171. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.020, Comment at 65.
172. This requirement of reasonableness exists not only in the "choice.of evils" sec-
tion but is applied throughout the justification chapter. For the Code's definition of"rea-
sonable belief," see R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(22).
173. Criminal negligence requires a failure to be aware of a "substantial and unjus-
tifiable risk" and such failure must constitute a "gross deviation" from the standard of
care for a reasonable person. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(d).
174. This result is consistent with the position of the Proposed Code that criminal
liability should not be imposed for conduct that is merely negligent. See R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.020(2)(d) and Comments at 33-34.
175. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.020(2). For example, where a person is criminally negligent
in evaluating the necessity of engaging in proscribed conduct which is defined as re-
quiring a mens rea of knowledge, he may not be convicted of the offense he commits.
Instead, he may be convicted only of a lesser included offense for which the mens rea of
criminal negligence suffices. If it happens that there is no such lesser included offense, he
will be entirely exculpated.
176. M.P.C. § 3.02(2):
When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a
choice of evils or in appraising the necessity for his conduct, the justification af-
forded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.
(emphasis added).
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necessary to commit what would otherwise be an offense is completely
exculpated so long as he reasonably believes his subsequent conduct
to be necessary under the circumstances. 177 It is not clear that this is
the result intended by the drafters, and, if it was not, the section
should expressly provide that criminal negligence or recklessness in
bringing about the situation requiring a choice of evils will satisfy the
mens rea requirement for a subsequent offense requiring one of those
degrees of culpability.
The Proposed Code treats justification as an "affirmative de-
fense,"'178 meaning that once the defendant introduces evidence
raising the defense the state has the burden of disproving it beyond a
reasonable doubt. This treatment of the defense is consistent with pre-
sent Washington law.' 7 9
B. Execution of a Public Duty
The Proposed Code justifies conduct pursuant to the execution of a
public duty which the actor believes to be required or authorized by
law. 18 0 This defense also is available to a private person rendering as-
sitance to a public officer, notwithstanding the fact that the officer
exceeded his legal authority. However, the use of force toward an-
other person is not permitted by this piovision unless such use of force
is otherwise authorized by law.' 8 1 Presently there is no statute in
177. A possible explanation of the proposed provision is that the mens rea existing
with respect to conduct of an actor should apply only to that conduct and should not
carry over to be applied to subsequently developing conditions. However, there might
be situations in which it is deemed undesirable to allow the justification statute to excul-
pate entirely when it is the actor's negligent or reckless conduct which created the situa-
tion under which the choice of evils had to be made. For example, where one negligently
creates circumstances under which it is likely that the deaths of A and B will result, and
the actor makes a choice of evils so that he causes death to C by another means and
thereby saves A and B, the justification statute will save him from being convicted of the
intentional homicide. However, it is not clear whether he still will be guilty of negligent
homicide under the Proposed Code. The New York formulation of the choice of evils
doctrine is different from both the Model Penal Code and the Proposed Code. The New
York code provides that the defense of justification is not available .'here the situation
hnder which the choice was made was "occasioned or developed" through fault of the
actor. See, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 35.05(2) (McKinney 1967), MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §
605(1) (Final Draft 1967). This particular formulation is open to the criticism that a
mere negligent act can result in prosecution for an intentional crime if the actor does
respond to a choice of evils. Thus the actor would be discouraged from taking remedial
action which would subject him to prosecution for a more serious offense.
178. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.010(1).
179. See State v. Dunn, 22 Wash. 67, 60 P. 49 (1900).
180. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030.
181. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.030(2). Thus the law enforcement officer who uses force
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Washington on this subject, and no cases could be found relating pre-
cisely to this point.182
C. Use of Force in Self-Protection
The use of force toward another person is justifiable under the
Code when the actor reasonably believes such force to be necessary to
protect himself against the use of unlawful force by that other person. 183
This provision is generally consistent with present Washington law,184
with two significant exceptions.
First, contrary to present law, the proposed justification defense is
not available to the person who uses force to resist an unlawful arrest
which he knows is being made by a police officer.' 85 In State v.
Rousseau'86 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the validity of
the use of force to resist an unlawful arrest, provided "that the force
used... [is] reasonable and proportioned to the injury attempted
toward another person must reasonably believe that his actions are authorized by law
and that the use of such force is necessary as required by R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070.
182. This proposed section is consistent with M.P.C. § 3.03 and, with slight modifi-
cation, has generally been adopted by other jurisdictions examined. See, e.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.05(1) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-17 (Special
Pamphlet 1972); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 601 (Final Draft 1967).
183. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.040.
184. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(3) (1959):
The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another shall
not be lawful in the following cases: ... (3) Whenever used by a party about to be
injured, or by another lawfully aiding him, in preventing or attempting to prevent
an offense against his person, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interfer-
ence with real or personal property lawfully in his possession, in case the force is
not more than shall be necessary....
Although the present justification statute does not speak in terms of a reasonable be-
lief as does the Proposed Code, Washington case law requires that the actor's belief as to
the necessity for using force be reasonable. See State v. Rummelhoff, I Wn. App. 192.
459 P.2d 976 (1969); State v. Ladiges, 66 Wn.2d 273, 401 P.2d 977 (1965); State v.
Miller, 141 Wash. 104, 250 P. 645 (1926).
185. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.040(2). It should be noted that the unlawful arrest itself is
the only act to which the arrestee is not justified in responding with force. Should the
arresting officer go beyond a simple arrest so that the arrestee is threatened with bodily
injury, then the use of reasonable force to avoid that injury would be justified. A
problem might arise where the only factor that makes the arrest illegal is the fact that
unreasonable force is being used. However, a proper analysis would allow the use of
force by the person arrested under such circumstances on the theory that he is using
force to resist the unreasonable force, not that he is doing so to resist arrest.
The proposed section is consistent with M.P.C. § 3.04(2)(a)(i); however, New York.
Connecticut and the proposed code of Michigan all reject such a limitation. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 35.15 (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-18 (Special
Pamphlet 1972); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 615 (Final Draft 1967).
186. 40 Wn.2d 92, 241 P.2d 447 (1952).
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upon the party sought to be arrested .... ,"187 This change appears to
be based on the theory that a temporary loss of freedom resulting
-from an illegal arrest is not sufficiently serious to warrant the use of
force in its avoidance. However, the possibility of police abuse of such
a rule does exist, and it is not clear that a person should be required to
submit to a patently illegal arrest which possibly is designed to prevent
the exercise of protected rights.
Second, the proposed section significantly restricts the circumstances
under which a person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense.
Consistent with present law, a person attacked may use deadly force if
he reasonably believes the use of such force to be necessary to protect
himself against death, serious bodily harm, kidnapping or forcible rape,
so long as he has not initiated the conflict by using or threatening
deadly force.'88 However, the justification defense is not available under
the Code if the person attacked knows that he can avoid the necessity
of using deadly force with complete safety.'8 9 This limitation causes
a substantial modification of the "duty to retreat" rule in Washington.
Under present Washington law, "one who is where he has a lawful
right to be is under no obligation to retreat when attacked."'190 While
the Proposed Code does not expressly impose a duty to retreat in the
face of deadly force, the duty of avoidance it adopts is an even more
stringent limitation on the use of deadly force. It clearly includes a
duty to retreat or to take whatever other action is available before re-
sorting to deadly force whenever the actor knows that such retreat can
be accomplished with complete safety.' 9 '
187. Id. at 95, 241 P.2d at 449.
188. Under present Washington law homicide is justifiable "when there is reason-
able ground to apprehend a design on the part of the person slain to commit a felony or
to do some great personal injury to the slayer or to any such person, and there is immi-
nent danger of such design being accomplished. ... WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.170
(1959). Although on its face this statute authorizes the use of deadly force to prevent the
commission of any felony, it has been construed as authorizing the use of such force
only when the felony threatens loss of life or great bodily harm. See, State v. Nyland, 47
Wn.2d 240, 287 P.2d 345 (1955). Therefore, that aspect of the proposed section is quite
consistent with present Washington law.
189. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.040(3)(c). Only two exceptions 'o this requirement exist: (1)
where the actor is in his dwelling or place of work, and (2) where the actor is a public
officer otherwise authorized to use force in the execution of his duties, or a person au-
thorized to render him assistance, or a person justified in using force to effect an arrest
or to prevent an escape.
190. State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226, 237, 60 P.2d 71, 75-76 (1936). See also State v.
Hilsinger, 167 Wash. 427, 9 P.2d 357 (1932); State v. Meyer, 96 Wash. 257, 164 P. 926
(1917).




With respect to the use of non-deadly force, the Proposed Code
continues the established rule that there is no duty to retreat.192
D. Use of Force for the Protection of Other Persons
The Proposed Code justifies the use of force in the protection of a
third person when, under the circumstances as the actor reasonably
believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would be jus-
tified in using such force, provided that the actor reasonably believes
his intervention to be necessary for the protection of that other per-
son.193 The use of deadly force under this section is limited as under
R.W.C.C. § 9A. 16.040 in that it is not justifiable if the actor knows
that he can avoid the necessity of using such deadly force with com-
plete safety to himself and to the person whom he seeks to protect.
Again, the obligation to avoid the necessity of using deadly force ap-
parently includes the duty to retreat or to take whatever alternative ac-
tion might be available under the circumstances, so long as it can be
done with complete safety to both the actor and the third person.
This duty of avoidance clearly includes a duty to attempt to cause
the third party to retreat before applying deadly force if it appears
that such opportunity is available. However, if the victim refuses to re-
treat, the actor still is not justified in assisting with deadly force. Under
such circumstances the use of deadly force is conditioned on the actor's
reasonable belief that the person he is assisting would be justified in
using such forces;194 if the victim knows of an opportunity to retreat
but refuses to take it, his use of deadly force would not be justified.
Thus the proposed section effectively precludes the defense ofjistifica-
tion for the person who, by using deadly force, knowingly aids a third
party who stands his ground despite ample opportunity to escape. 195
sions similar to that in the Proposed Code. Those codes, however, typically require the
actor to (1) retreat, (2) surrender possession of property to a person asserting a claim of
right thereto, and (3) abstain from any action which he has no duty to take. See, e.g.,
M.P.C. § 3.04(2)(b)(iii); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-19(b)(1) (Special Pamphlet 1972); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 615(2)
(Final Draft 1967). While the Proposed Code does not specifically list the above require-
ments as conditioning the justifiable use of deadly force, it does contain language that
would include such duties.
192. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.040(4).
193. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.050.
194. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.050(1)(a).
195. By comparison, the Model Penal Code provides that when a person whom the
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This section of the Proposed Code differs from present Washington
law in two respects. First, the Code allows a reasonable mistake by
the actor in determining the right of the third person to use self-defense.
It is not clear that present Washington law would allow such a mis-
take.196 Second, since the current law does not impose a duty to re-
treat in the face of deadly force, knowledge of the actor that the third
party could retreat with complete safety would not preclude his use
of deadly force in the defense of that third person. 97
E. Use of Force for Protection of Property
The use of force in the protection of property is justifiable under the
Code when it is reasonably believed to be necessary "to prevent or ter-
minate an unlawful entry or other trespass upon land or a trespass
against or the unlawful carrying away of tangible, movable property
... ,"198 This defense is not available unless the actor reasonably be-
lieves the property to be in his possession or in the possession of an-
other for whose protection he acts. This section is generally consistent
with current Washington law. 99
One significant limitation on this defense which does not exist under
present law is that the use of force either to prevent a trespass or to
terminate one in progress is not justified if the actor knows that to do
so will expose the trespasser to a substantial danger of serious bodily
harm.200 Although this limitation is clearly consistent with a principle
actor seeks to protect would be obliged to retreaf, the actor is obliged to try to cause
him to do so "before using deadly force." M.P.C. § 3.05(2)(b) (emphasis added). This
implies that the actor is justified in using deadly force if his attempt to cause the third
party to retreat is unsuccessful.
196. In State v. Tribett, 74 Wash. 125, 132 P. 875 (1913), the court said that "one
who goes to the defense of another stands in the shoes of him he seeks to defend." Id. at
131, 132 P. at 878. A literal application of that rule would preclude a reasonable mis-
take in determining whether the third party would be justified in using such force. How-
ever, in Tribett the actor in fact did have knowledge that the third person was the initial
aggressor, so the question of reasonable mistake was not in issue.
197. See note 190 and accompanying text supra.
198. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.060(l).
199. However, while the Proposed Code allows a reasonable mistake by the actor as
to the lawfulness of his possession of the property, the present statute requires actual
lawful possession. See note 184 supra.
200. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.060(3).
Washington law does provide the limited restriction that the amount of force used to
expel a passenger from a carrier shall be "not more than shall be necessary to expel the





that places a greater value on human life than on property, other juris-
dictions have not adopted it.2 01
The Code permits the use of deadly force in the protection of prop-
erty only where the actor reasonably believes that the person against
whom the force is directed is attempting to commit a forcible offense
in or against the actor's dwelling or place of work, and the use of non-
deadly force to prevent commission of the offense would expose the
actor or another to a risk of bodily harm.2 02 This provision differs some-
what from present Washington law and places three significant limita-
tions on the use of deadly force in the protection of property.
First, the Code restricts the use of deadly force to those instances
where the offense is against the actor's "dwelling or place of work,"
while the present statute applies to an offense against any property in
the actor's possession. 203 Second, the Code requires that the offense
attempted be a "forcible offense," while the present law requires that
it be a felony characterized by "violence and surprise." 20 4 The term
"forcible offense" is not defined by the Code, but "forcible felony" is
defined as "any felony which involves the use or threat of physical
force or violence against any person."' 20 5 If forcible offense is similarly
defined the result would be that deadly force may not be used in the
protection of property unless the offense involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against a person rather than against property
alone.206 Third, deadly force may not be employed unless the use of
201. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.25 (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-21 (Special Pamphlet 1972); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 625 (Final Draft 1967).
This subsection is similar to M'.P.C. § 3.06(3)(b) which, according to the comments to
an earlier draft (M.P.C. § 3.06(2)(c), Comment at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958)), is de-
signed to apply to instances where a trespasser might be forced from a moving vehicle
or expelled from a bar drunk and unconscious late at night. However, the statute would
be applicable to a wide range of additional circumstances. For example, a person
seeking refuge from an oncoming storm of such intensity that it would expose him to
substantial danger of serious bodily harm could not be forcibly denied entrance into a
dwelling if the actor was aware of the risk of injury.
202. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.060(4).
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(3) (1959).
204. State v. Nyland, 47 Wn.2d 240, 242, 287 P.2d 345, 347 (1955).
205. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(I0) (emphasis added).
206. If "forcible offense" is defined in this manner, the result would not differ sub-
stantially from current law. In State v. Nyland, 47 Wn.2d at 242-43, 287 P.2d at 347,
the court stated that the use of necessary deadly force is allowed "in defense of [one's]
person, his family or property against one who manifestly endeavors by violence to
commit a felony, as murder, robbery, rape, arson or burglary. In all these felonies, from
their atrocity and violence, human life either is, or is presumed to be in peril."
186
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non-deadly force would expose another person to a risk of bodily
harm.207
F. Use of Force in Law Enforcement
1. Non-deadly Force
The Proposed Code justifies the use of non-deadly force when the
actor reasonably believes it to be necessary to effect a lawful arrest.208
This provision is consistent with present Washington law with respect
to the use of non-deadly force by a police officer. 209 However, the
Code expands the circumstances under which a private person is justi-
fied in using force to effect an arrest by allowing the use of non-deadly
force regardless of the nature of the crime. Present Washington law al-
lows a private person to use force to effect an arrest only where the
person arrested has committed a felony.210
2. Deadly Force
The Proposed Code allows the use of deadly force to effect an ar-
rest only where the person using such force is a police officer or is ren-
dering assistance to a person whom he reasonably believes to be a po-
lice officer.211 Additionally, such person must reasonably believe that
the arrest is for a felony that either involved the use or threatened use
of deadly force, or creates a substantial risk that the person to be ar-
rested will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is de-
layed. 212 This rule is narrower than the current law which allows the
207. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.060(4)(b). "Bodily harm" is not defined by the Proposed
Code, but "bodily injury" is defined as "physical pain, illness or any impairment of
physical condition." R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(4).
208. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(1). The use of force, however, is conditioned upon the
actor's first making known to the person to be arrested his intent to make the arrest,
unless he reasonably believes that such person already knows his purpose or that the
purpose cannot reasonably be made known to him. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(2)(a).
209. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.11.040(1) (1959). A possible difference is that the current
statute requires that the use of force be "necessary," while the proposed provision re-
quires only a reasonable belief as to necessity. However, WASH. REV. CODE §
9.11.040(3) (1959) has been held to require only a reasonable belief as to necessity, see
note 184 supra, and although there are no cases in point, the same construction should
apply to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(1) and (2).
210. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(2) (1959).
211. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(2)(b)(i).




use of deadly force whenever necessary to effect the arrest of any
felon. 213
In contrast to the Code's limitation on the justifiable use of deadly
force by private persons in effecting an arrest to those individuals as-
sisting a police officer, the Code surprisingly includes within the escape
from custody subsection a provision which erodes this limitation.
The escape from custody provision justifies the use of deadly force by
a private person "if he reasonably believes such deadly force is neces-
sary to effect the arrest of a person who the actor reasonably believes
has committed murder, manslaughter in the first degree, arson in the
first degree, robbery or forcible rape and who is in immediate flight
therefrom. '2 14 This provision is unusual both with respect to its loca-
tion within the Code and with respect to its content. If the provision
is to be included at all, it would be more appropriate to place it with-
in the subsection dealing with the use of force to effect an arrest rather
than the subsection regarding the use of force to prevent escape from
custody. By its terms this provision does not apply where a person is
attempting an escape from custody, and since it allows the use of dead-
ly force by a private party who is not assisting a police officer it is
clearly inconsistent with the limitations the Code otherwise places on
the use of force to effect an arrest.215
This provision is also unusual in justifying the use of deadly force
by a private person to effect an arrest under circumstances where a po-
lice officer would not be similarly justified. For example, under this sub-
section a private person is justified in using deadly force if he reasonably
believes it to be necessary to effect the arrest of a person he reasonably
believes to have committed a robbery.21 6 There is no requirerfient that
M.P.C. § 3.07(2)(b) in this respect, and that rule has been adopted by New York. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(2) (McKinney 1967).
213. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.160 (1959) authorizes the use of such force by a police
officer. In State v. Clark, 61 Wn.2d 138, 377 P.2d 449 (1962), the court concluded that a
private person is authorized to use deadly force under the same circumstances as a po-
lice officer. Id. at 144, 377 P.2d at 453. See also note 216 infra.
214. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(3)(c).
215. See notes 211,212 and accompanying text supra.
216. In State v. Clark the court concluded that a private person is authorized "to
use deadly force in attempting to apprehend a fleeing felon in any situation where it
would be lawful for a peace officer to do so." 61 Wn.2d at 144, 377 P.2d at 453. The
court did not base its decision on an interpretation of WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.040(2)
(1959), but rather it relied on the common law in determining what constitutes "lawful
means." This rule was then expressly limited to those instances where the homicide itself
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the robbery involve the use or threatened use of deadly force, or that
there be a substantial risk that the felon will cause death or serious bod-
ily harm if his apprehension is delayed.2 17 Thus, while a police officer
would not be justified in using deadly force to effect an arrest under
such circumstances, a private person would be so justified.218
3. Prevention of Escape
The Code adopts the general rule that the amount of force used to
prevent the escape of an arrested person may not exceed that which
might have been employed initially to effect the arrest under which the
person is in custody.219 However, an officer in a prison or an institu-
tional setting is authorized to use such force as he reasonably believes
to be necessary to prevent the escape, including deadly force.220 He is
restricted to the use of non-deadly force only when he knows that the
prisoner is in custody for an offense that is not classified as a forcible
felony. 221 This subsection is narrower than present Washington law,
which justifies homicide when the officer knew that the prisoner was
in custody for having committed any felony, whether or not it was
forcible.222
was unintentional, and the court pointed out that the Washington justification statute,
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.48.160 (1959), is limited in application to peace officers or those
actinj under their command. Therefore, under present law the "excuse statute," WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.48.150 (1959), applies to private citizens and excuses an accidental or
unintentional homicide under circumstances where the actor was using deadly force of
his own accord for the purpose of arresting a person who had committed a felony. The
Code's inclusion of R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(3)(c) is apparently an attempt to broaden
and codify the rule of Clark, an attempt that is of at least questionable wisdom.
217. Justification for the use of deadly force by a police officer does require the ex-
istence of these factors. See note 212 and accompanying text supra.
218. A similar situation exists with respect to the rapist who has committed the
crime without either the use or threatened use of deadly force. Again, a police officer
could not use deadly force under R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(2)(b), but a private person
could under R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(3)(c). This criticism does not apply to those cases
involving murder, first degree manslaughter or first degree arson, because each of those
crimes requires the use or threatened use of deadly force.
219. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(3)(a).
220. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(3)(b).
221. Id.
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.160(3) (1959). The approach of the Proposed Code on
this point is somewhat more restrictive than the statutes of other jurisdictions examined.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(7) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-22(c)




4. Assisting an Arrest
The Code justifies a private person assisting an unlawful arrest which
he reasonably believes to be lawful in using any force which he would
be justified in using if the arrest were lawful.22 3 However, if he is assist-
ing a police officer, the use of such force is justifiable unless he knows
that the arrest is unlawful.22 4 Two separate statutes presently author-
ize a private person to use force in assisting a police officer.22 5 Under
R.C.W. § 9.11.040(1) a person may use force in rendering such as-
sistance only when acting under the direction of the police officer. In
addition, R.C.W. § 9.01.055 authorizes the voluntary use of such force
when the police officer is in imminent danger of loss of life or grave
bodily injury and the action is taken under emergency conditions.
The latter statute requires only that the action be taken in "good faith,"
a standard less stringent than the Code's requirement of reasonable-
ness; but under R.C.W. § 9.11.040(1) it is not clear that even a rea-
sonable mistake would be allowed. 22 6 Neither of the present statutes
goes as far as the Code in justifying the use of force by a person volun-
tarily assisting a police officer in an unlawful arrest under circum-
stances in which the officer is not in danger of serious bodily injury.
G. Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for Care,
Discipline or Safety of Others
The Proposed Code justifies the reasonable use of force by persons
with special responsibility for care, discipline or safety of others, mak-
223. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.070(4).
224. This provision in the Proposed Code differs from M.P.C. § 3.07(4), which dis-
tinguishes between assistance rendered an officer in making an arrest at the officer's
request and assistance rendered voluntarily. Where the assistance is requested, the actor
may use such force as would be justifiable if the arrest were lawful, so long as he does
not know it is unlawful. However, where he volunteers assistance either to a police of-
ficer or to a private person, (1) he must believe that the arrest is lawful, and (2) the arrest
must be lawful if the facts were as he believes them to be. One possible effect of this dif-
ference in treatment is that under the Proposed Code the private person might be en-
couraged to volunteer assistance to a police officer making an arrest, without first stop-
ping to consider the legality of the arrest.
MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 630(5) (Final Draft 1967), N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30(4)
(McKinney 1967), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-22 (Special Pamphlet 1972) all
follow the Model Penal Code provisions in allowing the more lenient justification
standard only where the private person has in fact been directed to assist in the arrest by
the police officer.
225. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.11.040(1) (1959), 9.01.055 (Supp. 1969).
226. See note 209 supra.
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ing the amount of force allowed and the reasons permitted for its ap-
plication dependent upon the nature of the actor's responsibility. 227
Where the actor is a parent or guardian or person similarly situ-
ated, or a person acting at the request of such parent or guardian, he
is allowed to use reasonable force for the purpose of safeguarding or
promoting the welfare of the minor, including the prevention or pun-
ishment of his conduct.228 Where the actor is a teacher or person simi-
larly situated the force allowed is that which he reasonably believes
necessary for performance of his function, including the maintenance
of reasonable discipline in school, so long as the use of such force is
consistent with the welfare of the child.229 Where the actor is the guard-
ian of an incompetent, force reasonably necessary for the incompe-
tent's welfare is allowed, or, if the incompetent is in an institution,
sufficient force to maintain reasonable discipline is justified.2 30
In no case may the amount of force used by the actor be intended
or designed to cause or known to create any risk of causing death,
serious bodily harm or disfigurement. There also are limits placed on
the amount of pain or degradation that may be intended or risked,
but again, the limitation varies with the position of the actor. If the
actor is a parent or guardian, the force used may not be intended or
designed to cause or known to create any risk of extreme pain or sub-
stantial degradation;231 for guardians of an incompetent and teach-
ers, the limit is substantial pain or undue degradation. 232
Existing law covers this subject in very general terms by limiting
the amount of force allowed under such circumstances to that which is
"reasonable aid moderate," and providing that its purpose may be only
to "restrain or correct."2 33 The Proposed Code retains the require-
ment of reasonableness but substitutes degrees of pain and degradation
for the present requirement of moderation. Given the rather indefinite
nature of terms such as "extreme," "substantial," "undue," and "mod-
227. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080.
228. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(l)(a).
229. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(2)(a).
230. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(3)(a).
231. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(1)(b).
232. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(2)(b), (3)(b).
233. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.11.040(4) (1959):
The use, attempt, or offer to use force upon or toward the person of another shall
not be unlawful in the following cases ...
(4) Whenever used in a reasonable and moderate manner by a parent or his author-
ized agent, a guardian, master, or teacher in the exercise of lawful authority, to re-
strain or correct his child, ward, apprentice or scholar ....
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erate," it is not entirely clear what effect the proposed changes would
have. However, some conclusions might be reached concerning the
direction of those changes.
The drafters limited the force that may be used by parents to that
which does not cause "extreme pain" or "substantial degradation,"
while the teacher is limited to force which does not cause "substantial
pain," or "undue degradation." Presumably the difference in these
terms is designed to circumscribe more closely the amount of force
that may be used by a teacher. Since the amount of force that may be
used by a parent is greater than that which may be used by a teacher,
it follows that a parent is allowed to use such force as may cause
"substantial pain" or "undue degradation." This seems to allow the use
of substantially more force than that which is described as "moderate"
under the present statute. Furthermore, the Proposed Code allows the
use of force by the parent for the purpose of "punishment," while pres-
ent law allows its use only for the purpose of restraining or correct-
ing the child.
This section contains what might appear to be a contradiction in
terms. Allowing the actor to use such force as he reasonably believes
to be necessary so long as it does not cause the specified degrees of pain
and degradation suggests that the infliction of some degree of pain
or degradation on a child might be "reasonable." It is difficult to imag-
ine circumstances under which it would be "reasonable" to inflict "sub-
stantial pain" and "undue degradation" on a child.
It also should be noted that if the disciplinarian is a teacher there is
imposed the additional requirement that the force be "used in the ex-
ercise of lawful authority. '2 34 This provision apparently is designed
to allow local school boards to take affirmative action in limiting the
amount of force otherwise authorized.
H. Duress
The affirmative defense of duress is available under the Proposed
Code if the actor engaged in proscribed conduct because he was co-
erced to do so by "the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful
physical force upon him or a third person, which.., a person of rea-
234. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.080(2)(c).
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sonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. '235
This defense is not available to a person who intentionally or reck-
lessly places himself in a situation where it is probable that he will be
subjected to duress, or to the woman who acts merely on the command
of her husband unless she acted under such coercion as would other-
wise establish the defense.236
Under existing Washington law the defense of duress is limited to
those instances where, by threats, there is created a "reasonable appre-
hension" in the mind of the actor that in case of refusal he is likely to
suffer "instant death or grievous bodily harm. ' 237 Although there is
no case in point, this suggests that the threat of harm to a third person
is not sufficient to constitute the defense of duress in Washington. Thus
the Proposed Code substantially expands the defense by including sit-
uations where the threat is toward a third person and where the threat
is merely of physical injury. Another significant change under the Pro-
posed Code is that duress is available as a defense to a murder prose-
cution, whereas murder is specifically excluded from the current
statute.238
By generally expanding the defense of duress, the drafters of the
Proposed Code have adopted the logical position that a person should
not be held criminally liable for committing an act that any person of
reasonable firmness would have committed under similar circum-
stances.239
I. Entrapment
The Proposed Code establishes the affirmative defense of entrap-
ment where, for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission
of an offense, a public law enforcement official or one acting in cooper-
ation with him "induces or encourages another person to engage in
conduct constituting such offense, when such other person did not
then otherwise intend to commit an offense of that nature. ' 240
235. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.090(1).
236. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.090(2), (3).
237. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.01.112 (1959).
238. Id. This exception has been held to apply even when the defendant was coerced
into participating in a robbery in the course of which a person was killed. Application of
the felony-murder rule was held to preclude the defense of duress. State v. Moretti, 66
Wash. 537, 120 P. 102 (1912).
239. This section is substantially similar to M.P.C. § 2.09, N.Y. PENAL LAW §
35.35 (McKinney 1967), and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-14 (Special Pamphlet 1972).
240. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.100.
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There is no Washington statute establishing the defense of en-
trapment; however, it has been recognized repeatedly by the Washing-
ton courts.24' The entrapment provisions of the Proposed Code ap-
pear to be generally consistent with Washington case law. 242 How-
ever, it is possible that the proposed formulation is somewhat broader
than present law in providing that the defense applies "when such other
person did not then otherwise intend to commit an offense of that
nature" (emphasis added). If this language were construed literally
it would result in the entrapment defense being available to the de-
fendant who was willing to engage in such conduct, but who did not
intend to do so at that time and would not have done so in the ab-
sence of the official involvement. Under present law it is immaterial
that a person did not then otherwise intend to commit the crime so




The Proposed Code defines the crime of attempt as: (1) an intent
to commit a specific crime coupled with (2) an act which is a sub-
stantial step toward the commission of the crime and strongly corrob-
orative of the actor's intent.2 44
241. Although the defense of entrapment has been noted frequently by the Wash-
ington courts, a search of the reported cases failed to discover a case in which it was suc-
cessfully alleged. But see State v. White, 5 Wn. App. 283, 487 P.2d 243 (1971), where
counsel failed to request an instruction on entrapment and the court said, "[i] f officers
request or suggest payment of a bribe from an accused to influence their action, and the
accused, having no criminal intention to participate in the bribe prior to the request.
acquiesces to the request, he may raise the defense of entrapment to a subsequent charge
of bribery." Id. at 285, 487 P.2d at 244.
242. The Washington rule of the entrapment defense as stated in State v. Moore, 69
Wn.2d 206, 417 P.2d 859 (1966), is that" [t] he defense of entrapment is available where
the accused is lured or induced by an officer of the law or some other person, a decoy or
informer, to commit a crime which he had no intention of committing." However, the
court added that "[s] uch defense is not available where the criminal intent originates in
the mind of the accused and the police officers, through decoys or informers, merely af-
ford the accused an opportunity to commit the offense." Id. at 208, 417 P.2d at 861. See
also Seattle v. Muldrew, 71 Wn.2d 903, 431 P.2d 589 (1967).
243. This proposed subsection is narrower than M.P.C. § 2.13(1)(b) which allows the
defense if the official conduct merely creates a "substantial risk that such an offense will
be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it."
244. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.010(l). Subsection (2) renounces the defense of impossi-
bility.
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This proposed provision makes two changes in the existing law.245
First, the Washington Supreme Court recently held that the actus reus
of the crime of attempt is satisfied by slight acts done in furtherance of
a clear and obvious design or intent.246 In defining the actus reus in
terms of a substantial and strongly corroborative act, the Proposed
Code requires more movement toward the crime than does existing law
and thus allows apprehension of the criminal at a later point in time.247
Second, the Proposed Code eliminates impossibility as a defense to
the crime of attempt.248 The intent of the actor and the circumstances
as he believes them to be are the controlling elements of the crime.
This provision places primary emphasis on the dangerous intent of
the actor and not on the dangerousness of his act. 249 While the elimina-
tion of the impossibility defense broadens the ambit of the crime, the
245. Under curreit law, "An act done with intent to commit a crime, and tending
but failing to accomplish it, is an attempt to commit that crime...." WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.01.070 (1959). Although the statute would seem to require that the attempt fail,
subsection (2) of the same statute states "[a] person may be convicted of an attempt to
commit a crime, although it appears on the trial that the crime was consummated .... "
Id. at § 9.01.070 (2). The Washington Supreme Court has held the latter to be control-
ling. State v. Rowe, 60 Wn.2d 797, 376 P.2d 446 (1962).
246. State v. Goddard, 74 Wn.2d 848, 447 P.2d 180 (1968); State v. Nicholson, 77
Wn.2d 415, 463 P.2d 633 (1969).
247. While the practical necessities of proving intent will usually require that the
actus reus be at least a substantial step, the existing test does place its emphasis squarely
upon the intent of the actor and in the egregious case will permit conviction without a
showing of a substantial step. However, the substantial step test is consistent with the
other modern codes. See, e.g., M.P.C. § 5.01, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
Nevertheless, the hazards of definitionally requiring too great an actus reus can be
appreciated by considering the decision of the court in People v. Rizzo, 246 N.Y. 334,
158 N.E. 888 (1927). In Rizzo, the court found the actus reus to be mere preparation
even though the actors were in search for their intended victim. The court concluded that
an attempt had not been committed.
248. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.010(2). Under the existing law, the defense of factual or
legal impossibility may work as a bar to conviction for the crime of attempt. Cf. State v.
Ray, 63 Wn.2d 224, 386 P.2d 423 (1963) (dicta); State v. Meyer, 37 Wn.2d 759, 226
P.2d 204 (1951) (physical impossibility). But see State v. Nicholson, 77 Wn.2d 415, 463
P.2d 633 (1969). Conversely, under the Proposed Code, the actor would be guilty of an
attempt, regardless of the impossibility of the crime. Implementing its policy of incar-
cerating dangerous people, the Code allows an actor to be convicted of an attempt if
under the circumstances as the actor believed them to be, the actor manifested the re-
quisite actus reus and mens rea. For example, both the pickpocket who picks an empty
pocket and the fence who receives property which he believes to be stolen, but in fact is
not stolen, would be guilty of an attempt under the Proposed Code. Most of the other
modern codes have abolished the defense of impossibility. See, e.g., M.P.C. § 5.01(1)(a),
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.10 (McKinney 1967); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1964).
249. An often used example of this doctrine is the witch doctor who sticks pins in a
doll, attempting to murder a person. While the substantive crime is impossible of com-
pletion, the witch doctor manifests a dangerous personality, and should be incarcerated
lest he turn to more practical means of accomplishing his purpose.
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overall effect of the proposed provision is a more restrictive definition
of attempt than presently exists. Since the impossibility defense is sel-
dom raised and affects only the type of actor who can be convicted,
the substantial step test's effect of preventing arrest until a later point
in time is likely to be the much more significant of the two changes.
The statute also requires that the actor intend to commit a specific
crime. The majority of modern codes do not include this require-
ment, 250 instead requiring only that the actor intend to perform con-
duct constituting a crime. If the actor is required to intend a specific
crime, he must act intentionally with respect to each element of the
crime, regardless of the mental state requirements in the definition of
the attempted crime. However, if the actor need only intend that con-
duct constituting a crime be performed, he must specifically intend
the conduct, but not all the elements of the resulting crime. The effect
of this difference is that in the latter case it is possible to obtain a
conviction for an attempt of a crime in which the mens rea element is
satisfied by a negligent mind in regard to the attendant circumstances.
Under the Proposed Code's "specific crime" requirement, however,
each element, including the attendant circumstances, is required to
be intended.
The specific crime requirement has been criticized as an overly sim-
plistic approach to the mens rea requirement.25' The reporter of the
proposed California criminal code sums up the widespread criticism
of the specific crime requirement: 252
The intent requirement should be satisfied where the defendant in-
tends to engage in the conduct which will constitute the crime. He
need not necessarily contemplate all of the surrounding circumstances
250. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-49 (Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10 (Mc-
Kinney 1967); M.P.C. § 5.01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Contra, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38
§ 8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1964); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 1001 (Final Draft 1967). However,
the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the consequences of reckless conduct can be
deemed to have been caused intentionally. People v. Home, 110 11. App. 2d 167, 249
N.E.2d 282 (1969); People v. Coolidge, 26 Il1. 2d 533, 187 N.E.2d 694 (1963). The
Washington court has rejected this argument. State v. Leach, 36 Wn.2d 641, 219 P.2d
972 (1950). Thus it appears that the rationale used by the Illinois Supreme Court to
avoid the specific crime requirement has been rejected by the Washington Supreme
Court.
Present Washington law includes the specific crime requirement. "An act done with
intent to commit a crime and tending but failing to accomplish it, is an attempt to
commit that crime." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.01.070 (1959).
251. PROP. ORE. CRIM. CODE § 54, Comment (Final Draft 1970).
252. Id. Accord, M.P.C. § 5.01(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); contra,
PERKINS, at 573.
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included in the definition of the crime. Assume that raping a fifteen
year old is a more aggravated crime than raping a seventeen year old.
Assume also that negligence as to the age of the victim suffices for that
element of the crime. Is this not an aggravated attempt where a fif-
teen year old is attacked, even if it can ohly be shown that the defen-
dant was only negligent as to the age of the victim?
By including the specific crime requirement, the proposed attempt
provision compels inordinate concern with the intended substantive
crime, which results in a more stringent mens rea requirement for
attempt than the mens rea requirement of the crime attempted.
A comparison of the foreseeable results under the specific crime
and defense of impossibility provisions illustrates the "rob Peter to
pay Paul" draftsmanship in this section. The renunciation of the im-
possibility defense seeks to permit successful prosecution of an attempt
to commit a crime which is either impossible to attain or void of crim-
inal sanction. Conversely, the specific crime requirement may prevent
successful prosecution of an attempt to commit a crime, even though
the actor manifests the necessary intent to be convicted of the substan-
tive crime if the attempt is successful. 25 3
B. Solicitation
Under the Proposed Code, the crime of solicitation has three essen-
tial elements: (1) an intent to accomplish a specific crime, (2) an of-
fer to give money or something of value to another person, and (3)
a request that the other person engage in specific conduct which would
either itself constitute the specific crime or would establish complicity
of such other person in the crime or its attempt.254 Since there is pres-
253. This result may be questioned in light of the drafters' goals, for both types of
individuals seem equally dangerous. If anything, the actor who attempts a crime impos-
sible of successful completion may be less of an immediate danger than the actor who
has the requisite mens rea for the crime itself though he lacks the specific intent neces-
sary for an attempt conviction. Although the person exculpated of attempt might be pro-
secuted for completion of a lesser crime, prosecution for a lesser included offense seems
an unsatisfactory price to pay for the inclusion of the specific crime language.
The specific crime requirement should be redrafted so as to require "a specific intent
to perform acts and attain a result." See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.32 (1955). This language
would require the actor to specifically intend that conduct constituting a crime be per-
formed and yet would allow a lower degree of mens rea to suffice for the attendant cir-
cumstances. In this way the statute would be definitionally more consistent.
254. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.020(l) provides:
A person is guilty of criminal solicitation when, with intent to promote or facilitate
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ently no statutory crime of solicitation in Washington, 255 the common
law definition is controlling.256
The Proposed Code more narrowly defines solicitation than does the
common law in three respects. First, the Proposed Code requires that
the solicitor intend that a specific crime be committed, whereas the
common law requires that the actor know that the conduct solicted
constitutes a crime.257 This requirement, as discussed in the attempt
section,25 8 is an overly simplistic approach to the mens rea require-
ment.25 9 Arguably, this requirement is more properly included in the
solicitation provision because the early nature of this offense may re-
quire a higher mens rea requirement in order to insure that an equivo-
cal offer is not prosecuted. Nevertheless, the Code's requirement that
the actor induce another to engage in specific criminal conduct seems
to insure that an equivocal offer will not be prosecuted, 260 without
requiring intent concerning the attendant circumstances. Thus it is
doubtful that the requirement of an intent to commit a specific crime
is necessary. 261
the commission of a specific offense, he offers to give or gives money or other thing
of value to another to engage in specific conduct which would constitute such of-
fense or which would establish complicity of such other person in its commission or
attempted commission.
255. The only statute that presently relates to solicitation is WASH. REV. CODE §
9.01.030 (1959). That statute is concerned with vicarious criminal liability and does not
deal with solicitation as a separate crime. Under the Proposed Code, a solicitor would
still incur vicarious liability. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.060.
256. The common law crime of solicitation generally requires that the solicitor
urge, request or advise another person to commit a crime which is a felony, or a crime
against the public, or an aggravated misdemeanor. I ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
LAW & PROCEDURE § 81 (1957); accord, State v. Davis, 6 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. 1928); cf.
PERKINS at 582. But cf. State v. Schleifer, 99 Conn. 432, 121 A. 805 (1923).
However, in the few Washington cases that have dealt with solicitation, the defendant
was charged with the crime of attempt and not with the common law crime of solicita-
tion. State v. Butler, 8 Wash. 194, 35 P. 1093 (1894); State v. Awde, 154 Wash. 463, 282
P. 908 (1929).
257. For the definition of common law solicitation, see note 256 supra.
258. See note 251 and accompanying text supra.
259. The requirement of a "specific intent" is not found in other modern codes
which define solicitation. See M.P.C. § 5.02; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100 (McKinney 1967);
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1958);
MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 1010 (Final Draft 1967).
260. The comments to the Code state: "The utilization of the phrase specific
conduct.., is an effort to limit the applicability of this section in a way which will pro-
tect legitimate agitation or advocacy. Under this formulation ... it is necessary that the
solicitation carry meaning in terms of some concrete course of conduct that it is the ac-
tor's object to incite, by means of some economic inducement." R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.020.
Comment at 107-08. For a discussion of the specific conduct requirement, see note 261
and accompanying text infra.
261. The jurisdictions that have recently adopted criminal codes have not found it
necessary to include the "specific crime" element. See note 259 supra.
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Second, the Proposed Code requires solicitation of specific conduct,262
whereas the common law definition contains no such requirement.
Solicitation has been called an "attempt to conspire"; it therefore sup-
plants conspiracy as the earliest indictable statutory anticipatory of-
fense.263 The requirement of specific conduct is an attempt to uphold the
first amendment right to free speech (and thereby insure the constitu-
tionality of the provision) by differentiating between the expression of
abstract theories and those statements which seek to arouse specific
criminal conduct.264
Finally, the Proposed Code narrowly defines the actus reus as an
"offer of money or other thing of value," whereas under the common
law the actus reus can be urging, requesting or advising. This provision
is without precedent in the modern criminal codes.265 If the proposed
statute is designed to emphasize the dangerous intent of the actor, it
seems immaterial whether the actor urges, commands or offers money,
so long as the act is sufficient to establish the actor's dangerous in-
tent.266 In addition, obvious definitional problems are presented by this
requirement. The use of the word "offer" seems to smack of contract
law as does the language "money or other things of value." Questions
concerning when an effective offer is made, what constitutes legal
262. Most of the other modern criminal codes require the "specific conduct" ele-
ment in the crime of solicitation. M.P.C. § 5.02; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100 (McKinney
1967); MicH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 1010 (Final Draft 1967). While Illinois and Wisconsin
do not require that specific conduct be solicited, the Constitution of the United States
does require solicitation of specific conduct which is a clear and present danger if first
amendment rights are affected. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
263. M.P.C. § 5.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). The crime requires less
actus reus toward the substantive crime than any other inchoate crime. Connecticut did
not adopt a solicitation statute, and the New York reporter expressed misgivings over
the adoption of such a statute in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 100, Practice Com-
mentary (McKinney 1967).
264. The specific conduct requirement is a response to Yates v. United States, 354
U.S. 298 (1957). In that case the defendants were charged with, in effect, conspiracy to
solicit and aid and abet the overthrow of the United States. The court held that mere
advocacy of future action was not sufficient to constitute solicitation, applying Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951) (the court applied the "clear and present dan-
ger" test).
265. See M.P.C. § 5.02; ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 8-1 (Smith-Hurd 1961); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 100 (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.435 (1971); MicH. REV.
CRIM. CODE § 1010 (Final Draft 1967); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 939.30 (1955). The Oregon
statute is the most restrictive in language, limiting the actus reus to "commanding or
soliciting" whereas the New York statute seems to be the broadest, using the language
"solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or otherwise attempts."
266. The practical effect of the offer requirement is that an actor who unequivocally
urges or requests another to commit a crime, thereby clearly manifesting his own dan-
gerousness, cannot be apprehended until he offers money or some other thing of value.
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value, and differences between equitable and legal principles in contract
law, are best left to the civil law.
This narrow definition of criminal solicitation is useful only to the ex-
tent that it prevents the prosecution of an equivocal offer. However,
the statute could more directly prevent such a prosecution by explicitly
requiring an unequivocal actus reus. This would allow the provision
to encompass a broader actus reus without lessening the protection
afforded against an improper prosecution.
C. Conspiracy
The Proposed Code defines conspiracy by requiring that: (1) the
actor intend that conduct constituting a crime be performed, (2) the
actor agree with one or more persons to engage in or cause the per-
formance of such conduct, and (3) an overt act be performed which
is an unequivocal step toward commission of the crime and corrobor-
ative of the actor's intent.2 67
The changes sought by the Proposed Code are threefold. First, the
Code requires intent, whereas the present definition's mens rea element
permits conviction of one who merely "aids with knowledge. '2 68
Since the supplier or salesman who aids with knowledge is not nec-
essarily dangerous, the proposed statute properly focuses on the in-
tent of the dangerous actor. Second, the Proposed Code is unilateral
in its approach, whereas the present law is bilateral.2 69 By requiring
267. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030(1) provides:
A person is guilty of conspiracy when, with intent that conduct constituting a crime
be performed, he agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the per-
formance of such conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in pursuance
of such agreement:
(a) which act is an unequivocal step toward the performance of that crime; and
(b) which act corroborates the actor's intent that such crime be committed.
Subsection (2) will not be cited or referred to because it merely explains what is implicit
in the subsection cited.
268. Compare Eyak River Parking Co. v. Huglen, 143 Wash. 229, 255 P. 123
(1927), (an attorney who aided with knowledge was found guilty of conspiracy) with
R.W.C.C. 9A.28.030( 1).
See also People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App.2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1967); cf. United
States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940). However, aiding with knowledge can imply a
higher mental state if, for example, the product or service sold is of such a nature or
quantity as to imply that the seller had a stake in the illegal conduct. United States v.
Tramaglino, 197 F.2d 928 (2nd Cir. 1952); Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
703 (1943).
269. The present law requires proof that two or more persons agreed, whereas the
Proposed Code's unilateral approach only requires evidence that a person agreed with
one or more persons, thus obviating the existing law's implicit requirement of convic-
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merely that the actor agree with one or more persons, the statute iso-
lates the individual actor's involvement and dangerous intent, instead
of emphasizing group involvement and the dangerous nature of group
activitites. 270 The unilateral approach makes it immaterial in deter-
mining the guilt of an actor that his co-cofispirators either have been
acquitted or for some reason will not be tried.271
Third, the Code requires that an unequivocal overt act which corrob-
orates the actor's intent272 be proven, while present law has no overt
act requirement.273 The Code's requirement is unique among the mod-
em conspiracy statutes, most of which require only an overt act.
27 4
Generally, an overt act is required to afford the actor a locus poeni-
tentiae275 or to give the court minimal assurances of criminal pur-
tion of the co-conspirators. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.010 (1959) with
R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030.
270. Compare Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49 (1942); Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
271. The reason for this change is well stated by the reporter of the Illinois Revised
Criminal Code: "However, this rationale [the old rationale of acquittal for one conspir-
ator if his co-conspirator(s) was acquitted] was rejected as being too technical and over-
looking the realities of trial which involve differences injuries, contingent availabilities
of witnesses, the varying abilities of different prosecutors and defense attorneys, etc."
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 8-2, Comment (Smith-Hurd 1964); accord, PROP. ORE. CRIM.
CODE § 59, Comment at 58 (1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 105 (McKinney 1967). The bilat-
eral approach makes conviction impossible in those cases in which the actor agrees with
another whose purpose is noncriminal. For example, in People v. Bauer, 32 App. Div. 2d
463, 305 N.Y.S.2d 42 (1969), it was held that an actor cannot agree with another whose
intent is to aid in the apprehension of the actor. Under the unilateral approach, such a
conspirator would be guilty. See generally Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 700 (1963).
272. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.020 (1959) with R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030(1).
For cases illustrating the general confusion concerning the requirement of an overt act,
see State v. Galdstone, 78 Wn.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (1970); United States v. Olmstead,
5 F.2d 712 (W.D. Wash. 1925); Bannon v. United States, 156 U.S. 464 (1895).
273. The existing criminal code does not satisfactorily define the crime of con-
spiracy. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.010 (1959). The present definition is derived from
judicial opinion, which requires that a conspiracy consist of: (1) two or more persons,
(2) a combination or agreement, and (3) a desire to accomplish a criminal or unlawful
end or a lawful end by unlawful means. State v. Messner, 43 Wash. 206, 86 P. 636
(1906); Harrington v. Riclieson, 40 Wn.2d 557, 245 P.2d 191 (1952); State v. Stewart,
32 Wash. 103, 72 P. 1026 (1903). The present code expressly provides that an overt act
need not be proven. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.020 (1959).
The most recent legislative statement defining conspiracy deals with conspiracy
against government entities. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.040 (Supp. 1970). While a discus-
sion of this statute is beyond the scope of this note, the provision was borrowed from 18
U.S.C. 371 (1948). For the colorful history. of the federal counterpart, see Goldstein,
Conspiracy to Defraud the United States 68 YALE LJ. 405 (1958).
274. See ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 8-4 (Smith-Hurd 1961); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
105.20 (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-48 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 939.32 (1956); M.P.C. § 5.03 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960). Neither ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 161.450 (1971) nor MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 1015 (Final Draft 1967) requires an
overt act.
275. PERKINS at 618. Accord, ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.450 (1971); Hyde v. Shine, 199
U.S. 62, 76 (1905); United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 204-05 (1883).
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pose.2 76 The comments to the Proposed Code suggest that the pur-
pose of this requirement is to insure that an equivocal agreement
is not prosecuted.2 77 This goal could be accomplished more di-
rectly by requiring an unequivocal agreement. The provision could
then contain a less restrictive overt act requirement, and the fears of
the drafters would still be assuaged. However, since the courts gener-
ally construe any act as satisfying the overt act requirement 278 and since
the Proposed Code provides elsewhere for a statutory locus poeni-
tentiae,279 even a less restrictive overt act requirement may be un-
necessary.2 80
Finally, the word "unequivocal" in the Code's definition of conspir-
acy is ambiguous. If the unequivocal and corroborative step require-
ment is applied literally, conspiracy could replace attempt as the latest
completed anticipatory offense. This result is possible because con-
spiracy is not completed until an act is performed which is an "un-
equivocal step," which arguably is closer to actual completion of the
crime than the "substantial step" toward completion required by the
attempt provision. 28' This interpretation would have the effect of mak-
ing an attempt indictable earlier in time without a corresponding re-
definition of the penalty provisions of each crime.282 Since it is likely
276. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334 (1957); M.P.C. § 5.03(5), Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960) (misdemeanors only).
277. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030, Comment at I11.
278. Under the usual overt act requirement, the courts generally seize upon any
overt act, no matter how equivocal, if the other elements of the crime are proven. Smith
v. United States, 92 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1937); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 333,
334 (1957); Kaplan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594 (2nd Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S.
582 (1925); see Pollack, Common Law Conspiracy, 35 GEO. L.J. 328, 338 (1947): "The
courts somehow discover an overt act in the slightest action on the part of the conspira-
tors."
279. The modern codes, including the Proposed Code, allow for renunciation by the
actor. The effect of this is to provide a statutory locus poenitentiae which did not exist
before the modern codes. Compare R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.040 with State v. McGilvery, 20
Wash. 240, 55 P. 115 (1898).
280. Neither the new Oregon criminal code nor the proposed Michigan code even
requires an overt act. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.450 (1971); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §
1015 (Final Draft 1967); accord, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.22.020 (1959).
At common law, proof of the agreement was held to prove the overt act. See M.P.C. §
5.03(5), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); Note, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1122
(1924); PERKINS at 617; State v. McGonigle, 144 Wash. 252, 258 P. 16 (1927).
281. The term unequivocal is defined by Black as "clear ... and, when used with
reference to the burden of proof, it implies proof of the highest possible character and it
imports proof of the nature of mathematical certainty." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1698
(4th ed. Rev. 1968).
282. Without considering the Code's failure to articulate the relationship between
the substantial step test in the attempt section and the unequivocal step test in the con-
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that the drafters of the Code did not intend such a radical change in the
anticipatory offenses,283 the unequivocal step requirement either should
be-deleted or clearly defined to eliminate this ambiguity.
VI. HOMICIDE
The homicide section of the Proposed Code makes several changes
in the present law, the most important of which may be summarized
as follows: (1) murder is made a degreeless crime; (2) the availability
of defenses to murder is significantly increased; (3) only four instances
are specified in which a jury can return a special verdict of death; (4)
manslaughter, instead of being a catchall provision as under present
law, is graded into three offenses reflecting some changes in sent-
encing from present equivalent offenses.
A. Murder
Under the Proposed Code an individual is guilty of murder if he (1)
intentionally causes the death of another person; (2) recklessly causes
the death of another person under circumstances manifesting an ex-
treme indifference to human life; or (3) recklessly causes the death of
another person while committing or attempting to commit a forcible
felony.284 This provision incorporates the essential elements of the
prior law while eliminating anachronistic terminology such as "de-
praved mind" and "premeditation."
Under the present law,2 85 the unjustifiable and unexcusable killing
of a human being is murder in the first degree when committed with a
"premeditated design to effect the death of another." Second degree
spiracy provision, the reporter of the Proposed Code assumes that in the Code, as
drafted, conspiracy is much closer to mere preparation than is attempt and thus is less
dangerous. R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030, Comment at 111. Hence the Proposed Code grades
conspiracy as a less severe offense than attempt. Compare R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030(3)
with R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.010(3).
The Proposed Code also prevents multiple convictions on the basis of the same course
of conduct. This provision goes to both completed offenses and the other anticipatory
offenses. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.050.
283. That the intent of drafters was not to change the order of completion of the an-
ticipatory offenses is implicit in their statement that "conspiracy is... much closer to
mere preparation than completion of a criminal object, and is also further away from
completion than attempt.... R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.030, Comment at 111.
284. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(1).
285. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030(l) (1959).
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murder exists when all the first degree elements except premeditation
are proven. The present first degree murder statute has been construed
to require a "specific intent"286 to kill and is therefore substantially
equivalent to intentional murder under the Proposed Code.287
However, the relationship between the existing second degree murder
statute and the Proposed Code is not so clear. Although the term "in-
tent" commonly has been associated with and used in informations
charging a defendant with second degree murder, 288 the present
definition of "intent" is much broader than the Proposed Code's defini-
tion 289 because the courts have construed the mental state require-
ment for second degree murder as the equivalent of knowledge under
the Proposed Code. 290 However, the Proposed Code does not in-
clude the mental state of knowledge in the murder section. Absent
compensating provisions elsewhere in the Code, the result could be
that a number of presently obtainable second degree murder convic-
286. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(a), Comment at 32, citing State v. Louther, 22
Wn.2d 497, 156 P.2d 672 (1945).
287. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(l)(a).
288. See State v. Willis, 67 Wn.2d 681, 409 P.2d 669 (1966); State v. Brown, 178
Wash. 588, 35 P.2d 99 (1934). Every intentional killing must be classified as either first
or second degree murder. State v. Cooley, 165 Wash. 638, 5 P.2d 1005 (1931).
289. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(a) states:
A person intends or acts intentionally or with intent to accomplish a result or en-
gage in conduct described by the statute defining the offense, when his conscious
objective or purpose is to accomplish such a result or to engage in conduct of that
nature.
For additional discussion of the "intent" mental state under the Proposed Code, see the
section on principles of liability and responsibility in this comment.
290. A host of Washington decisions have language to the effect that "one intends
the natural and probable consequences of his actions." See, e.g., State v. Dolan, 17
Wash. 499, 50 P. 472 (1897); State v. Davis, 72 Wash. 261, 130 P. 95 (1912): State v.
Willis, 67 Wn.2d 681, 409 P.2d 669 (1966). Compare the above phrase with R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.020(2)(b)(i) which states that a person acts with knowledge when "he is aware that
it is substantially certain that his conduct will cause such result .. ." The proposed defi-
nition of knowledge and the phrase from Washington case law cited above become even
more harmonious because of the courts' determination that the "natural and probable
consequences" of an act are not enough to prove specific intent as a separate element.
See State v. Louther, 22 Wn.2d 497, 156 P.2d 672 (1945). So too, a finding of the culp-
able state of knowledge will not support a conviction for an offense which requires in-
tent. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(4). See State v. Myers, 53 Wn.2d 446, 334 P.2d 536 (1959).
It appears, moreover, that "premeditation," as that word is used in Washington, is
substantially equivalent to "intent" under the Proposed Code. This follows from looking
at premeditation as the equivalent of specific intent. Premeditation, like specific intent.
must be proven as a separate element of the crime, and may involve no more than a
moment of time. State v. White, 60 Wn.2d 551, 374 P.2d 942 (1962). In this regard.
compare White with Louthar, supra. White involved premeditation and Loutthar dis-
cussed specific intent, and the two seem compatible.
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tions would rise no higher than second degree manslaughter under the
Proposed Code.2 91
-However, the absence of "knowledge" as a culpable mental state in
the murder and first degree manslaughter provisions is arguably not a
defect in the statutes since any murder for which knowledge is the
mental state could be prosecuted under the reckless murder provi-
sion.292 But such a conclusion leads to the anomalous result that inten-
tional murder is a redundant section, since it too would be included in
the reckless murder section.293 The essence of the problem is whether
there is a difference in actus reus between intentional murder and
reckless murder.294 If there is, and the intentional murder section is
not redundant, then knowledge ought to be added to intent in the in-
tentional murder section and in the first degree manslaughter section.
The drafters did not indicate why they deviated from the Model Penal
Code which designates as murder both killings done purposely295
(intentionally) and knowingly. The Proposed Code ought to include
the mental state of knowledge in order to prevent any possible auto-
matic downgrading of murder offenses to second degree manslaughter
and to eliminate what is at best a potential source of confusion for
the court.
The proposed reckless murder provision does not differ significantly
291. Neither murder nor first degree manslaughter explicitly contains the culpa-
bility of knowledge (R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(b)) which lies between intent and reck-
lessness. If the courts do not read "knowledge" into the reckless murder provision (in-
deed, in a properly drafted statute they should not have to) then it follows that second
degree manslaughter is the highest offense for which a "knowing" defendant could be
convicted, since it is the highest offense remaining for which one could be convicted
without the mental state of intent.
This means that the effect on the plea bargaining would be substantial. There is a
mighty jump in culpability from recklessness to intent. Hence, if the culpability seems
60/40 against intent, and if "knowledge" is not available to fill the gap, recklessness as
the measure of culpability and second degree manslaughter as the crime may well be
settled for by the prosecution in case after case to avoid the possibility of being unable
to prove intent and thereby exculpating the defendant. See note 322 and accompanying
text infra.
292. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(1)(b). R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(4): "When recklessness
suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts inten-
tionally or knowingly."
293. R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(4).
294. Under the Code, the actus reus specified for first degree murder is that the actor
"cause the death of another," while that specified for second degree murder is that the
actor "engage in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
thereby cause the death of another person .. " R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020. One can only
speculate whether there is any substantive difference between these two elements.
295. M.P.C. § 201.2(1)(a). The mens rea of "purpose" in the Model Penal Code is
the equivalent of intent in the Proposed Code. See note 290 supra.
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from present law.2 96 However, the present requirement that the act be
"imminently dangerous to others" is changed in two respects by the
Proposed Code. First, the Code expressly extends the application of
the provision to situations where only one life is threatened rather
than several. 297 Second, the proposed provision applies only when the
act creates a grave risk of death, a requirement not imposed under the
present statute.298
The Proposed Code restricts felony murder to those killings which
occur in connection with "forcible felonies," 299 whereas the present law
designates a number of felonies, including arson 300 and larceny,301
which are subject to the felony murder rule.30 2 A "forcible felony"
is defined in the Code as "any felony which involves the use or threat of
physical force or violence against any person. 3 03 This definition is am-
biguous in that it does not specify whether the Code's definition of the
felony or the actor's conduct in committing the felony on a particular
occasion should be used in determining if the felony "involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any person." 304 To illus-
trate: under the Code305 arson can be committed without the use or
296. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030(2) (1961): "imminently dangerous to
others," "regardless of human life," and "evincing a depraved mind," with R.W.C.C. §
9A.32.020(l)(b): "grave risk of death to another person," "extreme indifference to
human life," and "recklessly engages."
297. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020, Comment at 118. The present statute applies only to
cases where the danger is to more than one person. State v. Mitchell, 29 Wn.2d 468.
188 P.2d 88 (1947).
298. See note 296 supra. Oregon does not include the element of grave risk of death
in its murder statute. ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.115 (1)(a) (1971). Hence, one can be con-
victed of murder without such-a showing. On the other hand, Connecticut places conduct
described in R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(l)(b) in its first degree manslaughter provision.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-55(a)(3) (Special Pamphlet 1972).
299. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020 (1)(c).
300. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030 (3) (1959).
301. See State v. Clark, 26 Wn.2d 160, 153 P.2d 297 (1944).
302. Moreover, under present law, death which occurs in connection with any
felony other than those listed in WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030 (3) (1959) is second degree
murder. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030 (2) (1959). Under the Proposed Code. second de-
gree murder is eliminated along with second degree felony-murder. It appears, however.
that there has been no conviction in Washington which has been appealed for a
non-forcible felony-murder under that statute, so its elimination is not of practical sig-
nificance. The closest case to come up on appeal was State v. Diebold, 152 Wash. 68.
277 P. 394 (1929) in which the act of returning a stolen car was not sufficiently within
the res gestae of the felony to cause the death resulting therefrom to become fel-
ony-murder. The difficulty, of course, is the lack of any concrete knowledge of convic-
tions which may not have been heard on appeal.
303. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(10).
304. For a discussion of the two approaches, see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL
LAW 547-48 (1972).
305. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.010-.030.
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threat of physical force or violence and therefore would never be a
forcible felony if the Code's definition of the crime controls. On the
other hand, a particular defendant may commit arson and, in so
doing, use force or violence against another; as for this particular de-
fendant, arson would be a forcible felony if the conduct of the partic-
ular defendant controls. Under this latter alternative, 306 any felony
could potentially fall within the scope of the felony murder doctrine.
The drafters should eliminate this ambiguity by disclosing which of
the above alternatives was intended.
Additionally, under the Proposed Code, one can avoid conviction
under the felony murder rule by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence four separate conditions.307 In substance these conditions
require the defendant to prove that he was not aware nor did he have
any reasonable ground to be aware that any participant in the crime
was going to engage in conduct likely to cause death or serious phys-
ical injury. If the defendant can accomplish the very difficult task of
proving this defense, he can then be convicted only of the underlying
felony. This allows a defense not presently available for the "inno-
cent" participant in the felony who had nothing to do with the death.308
1. Defenses to Murder
Perhaps the most significant change in the homicide section of the
Proposed Code is the "extreme emotional disturbance" defense to
306. W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 304, are proponents of the view that the
behavior of the particular defendant is determinative.
307. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(1)(c)(i)-(iv).
308. Under present law all participants are liable for prosecution under the felony
murder rule regardless of the mental state of the participants involved. WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.48.030(3) (1959). The Proposed Code is aimed at restricting the felony murder
rule to punishing culpable conduct, and thereby avoiding what would otherwise be a
kind of strict liability. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020, Comment at 119.
The logic of narrowing the felony murder rule appears to be that the culpability of the
individual causing the death ought to be closely tied to the manner in which the felony is
being committed, i.e., forcibly. It is designed to deter the use of dangerous means in
committing felonies. Id., at 118. The approach of the Proposed Code is novel in that the
forcible/non-forcible distinction has not been used in this pure sense by the Model Penal
Code or by any other jurisdiction except Illinois. See ILL. STAT. ANN. § 38.9-1(a)(3)
(Smith-Hurd 1972). For instance, the Model Penal Code, New York, Oregon, Connecti-
cut, and Michigan all include arson, which is a non-forcible felony, in their felony
murder provisions. M.P.C. § 210.2(1)(b) (commission of felony creates a rebuttable
presumption of recklessness); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(3) (McKinney 1967); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 163.115(1)(c) (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54(a)(2) (Special Pamphlet




murder.309 It is an affirmative defense that "the defendant acted under
extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable ex-
planation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under cir-
cumstances as the defendant believed them to be."131 0 This formula-
tion of the defense represents a compromise between the objective
"reasonable man" test and a purely subjective standard. The compro-
mise involves a two-step test: first, the jury must place itself in the pos-
ition of the defendant under circumstances as the defendant subjec-
tively believed them to be, and second, it must make an objective de-
termination as to the reasonableness of the defendant's actions under
those circumstances. Thus the proposed defense is available to the
defendant who holds an unreasonable belief as to the nature of the
circumstances under which he acts so long as the act itself is reason-
able based on that belief.
Although the test is sound in theory, it may be difficult to apply.31
It is not entirely clear to what extent the subjective, personal charac-
teristics of the defendant are to be read into his "situation," and the
drafting of understandable jury instructions may prove difficult.31 2
It is also an affirmative defense to a murder prosecution under the
Code that one has not used undue influence, duress or deception in
aiding the commission of a suicide. This defense does not change pre-
309. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(2) (a). Under the present law, a defendant must in all
cases be convicted of first or second degree murder if he intended to cause death. State
v. Palmer, 104 Wash. 396, 176 P. 547 (1918).
310. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(2)(a).
311. "Emotional disturbance" is not a defined term. M.P.C. § 201.3. Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) and R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.030, Comment, indicate that
it is intended at least to make viable again the "irresistible impulse" or "heat
of passion" defense. But the term "extreme emotional disturbance" does not
carry any necessary connotation of heat of passion or any measure of suddenness. In-
deed, the term could be used to refer to a very disturbed individual who, because of his
past experiences and upbringing was "extremely emotionally disturbed" at the time of
the crime. There is nothing in the language of the statute or the comments to indicate
that the circumstances surrounding the crime per se delimit the term.
312. Perhaps to avoid this difficulty, the Oregon legislature rejected a test similar to
that contained in the Proposed Code and substituted a test requiring not only that the
defendant's actions be reasonable, but also that the beliefs on which his actions are based
be reasonable. See ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (1971).
In addition to restricting the defense itself, the Oregon legislature included a provi-
sion under which "the defendant shall not introduce in his case in chief expert
testimony regarding extreme mental or emotional disturbance under ORS 163.125
unless he gives notice of his intent to do so." ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.135 (1971). The
Washington Proposed Code contains no such provision.
208
Vol. 48: 149, 1972
A Hornbook to the Code: Homicide
sent Washington law.31 3 The successful assertion of either of the af-
firmative defenses to murder does not preclude prosecution and con-
viction for manslaughter.314
2. The Death Sentence
The recent United States Supreme Court decision in Furman v.
Georgia,315 raised substantial and as yet unanswered questions as to
what criteria, if any, are constitutionally acceptable for the imposition
of the death penalty. The entire provision of the Proposed Code
dealing with the death penalty is constitutionally suspect in light of
this decision. In addition, one of the four situations in which the Code
provides that the death penalty may be returned by the jury- 3 1 6 that
of allowing the death penalty when a public official is killed-is open to
substantial criticism both because the term "public official" is not
defined and because no reason for the separate treatment of that of-
fense is provided. 317 In other respects, the proposed sentencing provi-
313. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(2)(b) is substantially the same as WASH. REV. CODE §
9.80.030-.040 (1959).
314. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(2).
315. 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972).
316. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.025(2) provides that a special verdict of death may be re-
turned in any of the following situations:
-In every trial for murder, if the court finds it relevant, the jury shall, if it finds the
defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether (i) the victim of the crime
was a peace officer who was killed in the course of performing his official duties, or
(ii) at the time of the commission of the crime the defendant was imprisoned in a
state penitentiary or was otherwise in custody upon a sentence for murder for the
term of life, or upon a sentence for murder commuted to the term of life, or having
escaped from such imprisonment or custody the defendant was in immediate flight
therefrom, or (iii) the victim of the crime was a public official, or (iv) the defendant
had solicited another to commit the murder, or had committed the murder pursuant
to an agreement that he receive money or other thing of value in return for com-
mitting the murder.
317. This provision raises numerous problems. It is not clear whether the term
"public official" includes both elected and appointed officers. Since governmental agen-
cies are by definition public, arguably all employees of those agencies are public offi-
cials. It also is unclear whether a "public official" continues in that capacity twenty-four
hours a day or just while engaging in official duties. Note that a police officer must be
performing his official duties to qualify. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.025(2)(a)(i).
If the reason for the classification is that public officials are newsworthy and in the
public eye, then there are a host of individuals who are not public officials but who are
much better known than most government functionaries. Also, it appears that candi-
dates for public office will not qualify as public officials unless they otherwise held
public office at the time of their candidacy. If the criterion for special treatment is
service to the public, then employees of charitable organizations are equally qualified. It
should be clear that this category raises tremendously complex moral problems as well
as problems of legal interpretation.
209.
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sion is similar to present Washington law in prescribing life imprison-
ment for the crime of murder where the death penalty is not
imposed. 318
B. Manslaughter
1. First Degree Manslaughter
The first degree manslaughter provision 319 is not likely to be used
often as a substantive offense under which a defendant initially will be
charged, because it involves problems of proof nearly identical to the
intentional murder provision. 320 Both sections involve crimes re-
quiring intent. The only difference between them is that the latter re-
quires an intent to kill while the former requires an intent to cause se-
rious bodily injury. This distinction is difficult to draw since in both
cases death has occurred and intent must be proven. 32'
Hence, one can expect that a charge of murder will be filed in any
case where there are grounds for believing the killing to have been
intentional, since the jury can always convict the defendant of the
lesser included offense of first degree manslaughter. 322 Moreover, the
318. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.025(1) is equivalent to WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.030(4)
(1959).
319. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.030. The proposed crime is as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when (a) with intent to
cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person
or of a third person; or (b) with intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or a third person under circumstances described
in subdivision 9A.32.030(2)(a).
320. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(t)(a).
321. For instance, in the two cases cited by the comments to R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.030
to support the thesis that the present law comports with the Proposed Code, both defend-
ants were charged originally with murder and the juries returned manslaughter verdicts.
See State v. Lewis, 80 Wash. 532, 141 P. 1025 (1914); State v. Barbour, 149 Wash. 440,
271 P. 64 (1928). Lewis clearly involved the element of intent. It is not clear whether
Barbour did, but there is language in the opinion which could be so construed. To the
extent that those cases involved manslaughter convictions for intentional killings, they
are no longer good law. See note 288, supra.
322. However, even if the evidence warranted it, the jury could not return a verdict
of second degree manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide if the defendant were
charged with an intentional killing if the present distinction between intentional and
non-intentional killing is preserved. Present law holds that if there is some intent (which
is broader than, but includes, specific intent) involved in a killing, the conviction must
be of murder in one of its degrees or nothing, and one cannot be convicted of man-
slaughter, since manslaughter is committed without a design to effect death. State v.
Cooley, 165 Wash. 638, 5 P.2d 1005 (1931); State v. Palmer, 104 Wash. 396, 176 P. 547
(1918). The Proposed Code does not discuss the potentiality of downgrading a charge of
intentional killing to an offense for which intent would not be required, i.e., second de-
gree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. This oversight may breed need-
less litigation.
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filing of murder charges would enhance the plea-bargaining power of
the prosecution more than a charge of first degree manslaughter.
.Section 9A.32.030(1)(b) provides that a person may be convicted
of first degree manslaughter if he commits an act which would be
murder but for the success of the extreme emotional disturbance de-
fense. 323 A person so convicted is guilty of first degree manslaughter. 32 4
The first degree manslaughter provision will probably serve primar-
ily the same function as second degree murder now serves. Those
defendants who appear to the jury not to be sufficiently culpable to be
convicted of murder may be found guilty of the lesser included offense
of first degree manslaughter. First degree manslaughter will operate as
a safety valve for downgrading murder rather than a substantive of-
fense under which charges will be brought.
2. Second Degree Manslaughter
The Proposed Code defines second degree manslaughter as: (a)
recklessly causing the death of another person; or (b) intentionally
aiding another person to commit suicide without the use of undue
deception, duress or influence.32 5 This provision would not effect any
significant changes in present Washington law, as there have been
equivalent dispositions under the present manslaughter statute in cases
involving arguably reckless conduct.326
C. Abortion
The Proposed Code contains no section expressly dealing with the
killing of a quick child, yet the Code repeals the present Washington
323. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(2)(a). See notes 309-314 and accompanying text supra.
324. Thus it should be noted that the defendant who succeeds in establishing the se-
vere emotional disturbance defense still may be sentenced to up to twenty years in the
state penitentiary. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.030(2). The twenty year maximum is the same as
under present law, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.060 (1959), but the maximum fine under the
Code is increased from the present $1,000 to $10,000.
325. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.040.
326. See State v. Fry, 39 Wn.2d 8, 234 P.2d 531 (1951) (Fry cut a power line which
fell and killed a man, and was sentenced to a minimum of eighteen months and a max-
imum of twenty years); State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 84 P.2d 390 (1939) (an unli-
censed healer tried to treat diabetes without drugs and was charged with gross neglig-
ence in causing the death of the diabetic); State v. Hopkins, 147 Wash. 198, 265 P. 481
(1928) (dictum). As the comments to R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.040 note, it should not change




statute on the subject.3 27 Thus the killing of a quick child, if it is to be
made criminal at all, must be covered by either the murder or man-
slaughter sections of the Code. However, the proposed murder and
manslaughter sections apply only to the killing of "persons" and "per-
son" is defined as a "natural person. '32 8 If the term "natural person"
includes the quick child, and it is not entirely clear that it does,329
then there is no need for a separate statute dealing with the offense.
This possible source of confusion could be eliminated by expressly
including the quick child within the definition of "person" and pun-
ishing the killing as first degree manslaughter, as do other states.330
D. Criminally Negligent Homicide
A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide under the Pro-
posed Code when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of
another person.331 This is a significant departure from the present
Washington law under which one can be convicted of manslaughter
for negligently causing death.332 The proposed criminal negligence
standard eliminates proscription of mere negligence and requires more
significant deviation from the standard of the reasonable man,33 3 i.e.,
criminal negligence.
An exception in current Washington law to the ordinary negligence
culpability for manslaughter is homicide by a motor vehicle, but that
is a function of the statute rather than a judicially created exception to
the rule.334 The drafters of the Code state that the present vehicular
327. Washington presently has two abortion statutes, one dealing with the
non-quick child, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.02 (Supp. 1971), and one dealing with the
quick child, WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.48.070-.080 (1959). The latter sections are repealed
by R.W.C.C. § 9A.92.010(b).
328. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(17).
329. However, the fact that the Proposed Code does not define "person" as one who
is "born and alive," as do other codes, suggests that a quick child would be included.
See, e.g., MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 2001 (Final Draft 1967).
330. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(3) (McKinney 1967).
33 1. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.050. Criminal negligence is defined as a "gross deviation
from the standard of care that a reasonable man would exercise in the situation."
R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020.
332. See State v. Ramser, 17 Wn.2d 581, 136 P.2d 1013 (1943) (gross negligence
need not be shown to sustain manslaughter conviction); State v. Hedges, 8 Wn.2d 652,
113 P.2d 530 (1941) (simple negligence in shooting fellow hunter sustained conviction
for manslaughter); see also State v. Brubaker, 62 Wn.2d 964, 385 P.2d 318 (1963).
333. See note 331 supra.
334. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.61.520 (1959). The statute itself used the term "reck-
less" and describes behavior which is tantamount to recklessness in connection with the
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homicide statute will be retained and that under the Code criminally
negligent homicide does not apply to homicides involving motor vehi-
cles. 33 5 In addition, the Proposed Code eliminates the lenient one-year
county jail term presently available for a manslaughter conviction. 33 6
VII. ASSAULT
The a~sault chapter of the Proposed Code is an attempt to define
assault clearly and to modernize existing assault provisions.3 37 The
Code's definitional approach to the offense is strikingly different
from present law, but there probably will not be any drastic differ-
ences operationally. In essence, the Proposed Code requires a
common law "battery" for every assault offense, and the battery must
cause some sort of physical injury.338
The most striking feature of the Proposed Code is its apparent "re-
sult orientation." In keeping with the predominant theories of modern
penal law, the general philosophy of the Proposed Code is that of-
crime. Thus the language of the statute calls for a higher level of culpability than does
the general manslaughter statute, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.060 (Supp. 1970). See State
v. Eike, 72 Wn.2d 760,435 P.2d 680 (1967).
335. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.050, Comment at 141.
336. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.48.060 (Supp. 1970) is eliminated by R.W.C.C. §
9A.92.010(b)(68) and by the failure to include it in the manslaughter provisions of the
Proposed Code. The elimination of the lenient sentence is consistent with the higher
culpability requirement imposed.
337. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.36.010-.070.
338. At common law, assault and battery were two separate crimes, with battery
requiring an unauthorized touching and assault being the attempt to touch. Concep-
tually, assault should be merged in the crime of battery and the crime should be called
assault or battery. Since assault was an attempted battery, attempted assault was con-
ceptually difficult, if not impossible. See generally W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL
LAW 609 (1972). The present Washington law on assault is imprecisely drafted. Battery is
not mentioned, and it is unclear whether "assault" as contemplated by the statute re-
quires a battery, or indeed, even encompasses one. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.11 (1959).
Recognizing this lack of definitional clarity in the statute, the Washington Supreme
Court has adopted the common law definition of assault as an attempt, with unlawful
force, to inflict bodily injury upon another, accompanied with apparent present ability
to give effect to the attempt if not prevented. Peasley v. Puget Sound Tug & Barge Co.,
13 Wn.2d 485, 505, 125 P.2d 681, 690-91 (1942). This definition implies that a battery is
not required, thereby ignoring the consequences of the act.
Despite the merits of this conceptual framework, the court destroyed it in the same
case by stating that the occurrence of an assault depends more on apprehension created
in the mind of the victim than upon the intent of the assailant. Id., citing Howell v. Win-
ters, 58 Wash. 436, 438, 108 P. 1077, 1078 (1910). This was reaffirmed in State v. Rush,
14 Wn.2d 138, 140, 127 P.2d 411, 412 (1942). As a result of the case law and present
statute, attempting to define assault in Washington evokes a comparison to Justice
Potter Stewart's saying that he didn't know how to define obscenity but knew it when he
saw it. Stewart, J. concurring in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
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fenses are to be graded commensurately with the actor's state of mind;
however, assault is defined as an element of culpability on the part of
the actor plus a result,33 9 and is graded according to both variables. 340
The reason for this anomalous result orientation is unclear. 34' The
Proposed Code divides injuries into two classes depending on their
339. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.36.010-.030. Under R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010(1) a person is
guilty of assault in thefirst degree when:
(a) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes serious
physical injury to any person; or
(b) with intent to disfigure another person seriously and permanently, to destroy,
amputate or disable permanently a member or organ of his body, he causes such
an injury to any person; or
(c) under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he reck-
lessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and
thereby causes serious physical injury to any person; or
(d) in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission
of a forcible felony, or of immediate flight therefrom, he intentionally or recklessly
causes serious physical injury to another person who is not a participant in the
commission of the crime.
Under R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.020(l) a person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
(a) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes physical
injury to any person; or
(b) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes physical
injury to any person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(c) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he recklessly causes
serious physical injury to any person; or
(d) with intent to prevent a peace officer from performing a lawful duty, he
causes physical injury to any person; or
(e) he recklessly causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a
deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument; or
(f) for a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he inten-
tionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment
or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug,
substance or preparation.
Under R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.030(l) a person is guilty of assault in the third degree when:
(a) with intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes physical
injury to any person; or
(b) he recklessly causes physical injury to another person; or
(c) with criminal negligence, he causes physical injury to another person by means
of deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
Some of the assault provisions precisely parallel the homicide statute, R.W.C.C. ch.
9A.32, thereby providing criminal penalties for the unsuccessful would-be murderer
where intent to murder cannot be proven.
340. Note the interrelationship of the requirements to intend serious physical injury
or physical injury and causing serious physical injury or physical injury in R.W.C.C. §§
9A.36.010-.030. See note 339 supra. Under the Proposed Code, first degree assault is a
second degree felony, second degree assault constitutes a third degree felony, and as-
sault in the third degree is punishable as a gross misdemeanor.
341. Among the modern penal codes, Washington's Proposed Code stands alone in
its result orientation. While the parallel provisions of the codes of New York, [N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 120 (McKinney 1967)], Connecticut [CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-59 to
53a-64 (Special Pamphlet 1972)], and Michigan [MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §§ 2101-2125
(Final Draft 1967)] seem superficially to be similar to Washington's, each requires that
the actor's culpability match his actions. If the culpability is of a lesser degree than the
result, the crime is graded at a lesser degree.
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extent: physical injury and serious physical injury.342 Generally, the
offense of assault is upgraded one degree for either intent to cause the
more serious injuries or actually causing them. Similarly, if the assault
is committed with a deadly weapon, the basic treatment is to upgrade
the offense by one degree. 343
There seems to be a gap in the first degree assault provisions re-
garding use of a deadly weapon. Both the second degree and the third
degree sections contain provisions which upgrade the offense one de-
gree where a deadly weapon is involved.344 However, where the actor
uses a deadly weapon and intends serious physical harm but causes
only physical harm, or where he intends only physical harm, and se-
rious physical harm results by use of a deadly weapon, there is no
provision to raise these acts to the first degree assault level.345 Such a
provision would be more consistent with the rest of the statute. This
"gap" seems to be caused by what probably is too much result orienta-
tion. Anyone who can be shown to have intended serious physical in-
jury using a deadly weapon should be punished for first degree assault,
and the punishment should not depend on whether the victim was se-
riously injured, moderately injured, or, arguably, injured at all. The
other modem codes do not have the result orientation and do not
suffer from this conceptual gap.346
The approach embodied in the Model 'Penal Code [M.P.C. § 211], the Illinois code
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 12-1 to 12-4 (Smith-Hurd 1961)], and, in a modified form, in
the Oregon code [ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 163.165-.195 (1971)] even more clearly bases the
punishment on the actor's culpability.
The Washington Proposed Code is aberrant, and its comments shed no light on why
the result-oriented approach was chosen.
342. "Physical injury" and "serious physical injury" are defined in R.W.C.C. §
9A.04.130(4), (23).
343. While it is easily understood that making the penalties stiffer for using deadly
weapons could be a deterrent to their use, it is not clear that causing the penalties to
vary depending on the result the actor achieves will have any deterrent value at all. See
note 341 and accompanying text supra.
344. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.020(1)(b) and § 9A.36.030(l)(c). More precisely, the third
degree assault provision includes the criminally negligent infliction of physical injury by
means of a deadly weapon, whereas the same act without a deadly weapon is not punish-
able as assault.
345. However, where the actor intends physical harm and serious physical injury
results through use of a deadly weapon, the actor could be punished for first degree as-
sault under R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010(1)(c) if his conduct occurred under circumstances
manifesting an extreme indifference to human life and constituted rickless behavior that
created a grave risk of death to another person. Since a "deadly weapon" by definition is
"readily capable of causing death," R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(7), and since intent to cause
serious physical harm would seem to satisfy the requirement of recklessness in the first
degree assault provision, first degree assault probably could be proved under these facts.
See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(4).
346. See note 341 supra.
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To its credit, the Proposed Code omits some archaic and unneces-
sary sections found in the present assault statute,347 eliminates what is
probably an undesirable strict liability offense,3 48 merges the assault
and attempt sections in an integrated conceptual framework, 349 and
renames and reorders some existing offenses.350
A new provision which seems to be rather rigid is the crime of reck-
347. For instance, one existing provision makes it a second degree assault to wil-
fully assault another with a whip while armed with a deadly weapon. WASH. REV. CODE §
9.11.020(5) (1959). While this provision may have been appropriate in 1909. one doubts
that it is needed now. Moreover, if a whip is construed as a "dangerous instrument," the
offense can still be treated as second degree assault whether the actor is armed with a
deadly weapon or not.
348. The strict liability offense of shooting another while hunting found in WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.11.020(7) (1959) has been eliminated. While it may be desirable to en-
courage prudence while hunting, a strict liability statute seems inappropriate. Under the
present law, if a person were to wear a deer head into the woods during hunting season,
the hunter who shot him would be guilty of second degree assault.
349. The "assault with intent to" commit a substantive felony provisions have been
eliminated to avoid duplicating the Proposed Code's attempt provisions. Under the
Code, such occurrences would be treated either as an attempt to commit the substantive
offense or as assault, whichever is the greater offense. Also, the present offense of may-
hem, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.65.010 (1959), is merged into the assault provisions rather
than being treated separately. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010(l)(b). The penalties are substan-
tially the same as those provided under the present law.
350. The new crime of "menacing" has been created to cover those instances where
the actor intentionally places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent
death or serious injury. Menacing applies where the actor does not cause actual physical
injury. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.040. The Code does not distinguish degrees of menacing, ei-
ther in means or result. It would be difficult to make a workable distinction based on
result, but where there is a deadly weapon used as a means of menacing, it would seem
consistent to raise the offense to a gross misdemeanor. This section is applicable whether
the actor succeeds in frightening his victim or not and is treated as a misdemeanor,
whereas under present law it could theoretically be treated as a second degree assault.
The existing crime of promoting a suicide attempt, WASH. REV. CODE §.9.80.040
(1959), is included in the assault section in the Proposed Code. The present code makes
no distinction as to the manner in which the actor influences the suicide and the penalty
is up to ten year's imprisonment. The Proposed Code, R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.060, substan-
tially alters the law in this area by creating two categories of this crime: if the actor
promotes suicide by undue influence, duress or deception, the act is punishable as mur-
der, or if the suicide does not result, attempted murder. Without the presence of undue
influence, duress or deception, promotion of a suicide attempt is punished as a third
degree felony. This proposal offers punishment which is more consistent with the actor's
culpability than does present law.
Coercion is shifted to the assault section of the Proposed Code from the extortion,
blackmail, and coercion chapter of the present code, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.33 (1959).
This provision is also narrowed to encompass conduct coerced only by the three most
serious threats identified in R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.005(1 l)(a), (b) and (c), and the offense is
upgraded to a gross misdemeanor from a simple misdemeanor. Unfortunately, it seems
that in reordering the crime, some forms of coercion were left entirely out of the Code.
Specifically, the forms of threats enumerated in the theft and robbery section, R.W.C.C.
§§ 9A.56.005( I l)(d)-j), other than the three enumerated above, are excluded. If the actor
is not trying to force the victim to turn over property by use of these lesser threats, the
extortion section will not cover the offense, because under R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.090 extor-
tion is limited to obtaining property by threat. Perhaps coercion by these less serious
threats should be a misdemeanor.
216
Vol. 48: 149, 1972
A Hornbook to the Code:
less endangerment. 351 This crime is designed to cover instances where
a person has the requisite culpability of recklessness for an assault of-
fense, but no injury occurs. Violation of this section is a gross misde-
meanor. The major objection is that the provision does not allow for
the widely variant degrees of culpability which would be subsumed
under this section. New York, which passed a similar statute several
years ago, chose to create two degrees of this offense, depending on
the culpability of the actor and the seriousness of the risk created.3 52
While all endangering acts will not fit neatly into one of these catego-
ries, having such an alternative seems preferable to the inflexible pro-
vision of the Proposed Code.
Moreover, it is not clear whether this statute applies to motor vehi-
cles. Although the comments state that the homicide section does not
apply to vehicular homicide,353 the Code contains neither comment
nor provision indicating that use of -motor vehicles is excepted from
the coverage of the reckless endangerment statute.354 At first blush,
including motor vehicle offenses might seem desirable as a means of
discouraging reckless driving, but given the frequency of occurrence
of acts which could be construed as reckless driving, and the not un-
common use of traffic citations as a source of revenue for local gov-
ernments, the strong potential for abuse dictates against inclusion. As
a minimum, prudence would require excepting all but the most severe
offenses, leaving the usual types of reckless driving to the motor ve-
hicle provisions.355
The Proposed Code does not have any provision regarding consen-
351. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.050.
352. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20 and 120.25 (McKinney 1967):
§ 120.20 Reckless Endangerment in the Second Degree:
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree when he reck-
lessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious physical injury
to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.
§ 120.25 Reckless Endangerment in the First Degree:
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under cir-
cumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages
in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a Class D felony.
353. R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.050. This exception is clearly stated in the comments. Id.,
Comment at 141.
354. An argument that the reckless use of motor vehicles is proscribed by the reck-
less endangerment statute is buttressed by the inclusion of motor vehicles in the Code's
definition of deadly weapons. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(7).
355. A logical solution would be to adopt the two separate degrees of reckless en-
dangerment as New York has done (see note 352 supra), excepting reckless driving
from the lesser degree, but including it in the greater degree of the offense.
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sual assaults such as fist-fights or contact sports. This provision
probably has been omitted because those codes after which this Pro-
posed Code is patterned do not contain such a provision. However,
Oregon's revised code contains a section which gives a one-degree
reduction in the offense where consent was given to the assault.3 56
This would cover instances of mutual combat where there really
is no aggressor and each actor is equally culpable.357 Although mutual
combat should be discouraged, it seems harsh to treat each combatant
as if he were the aggressor and the other merely a victim.
Finally, the felony/assault provision, 358 which apparently was put in
the assault section to parallel the felony/murder rule,359 has been limit-
ed to forcible felonies360 and to serious physical injuries.
In conclusion, the result orientation of the section should be re-
viewed to be certain that it is what is desired under the new statute.
The reckless endangerment provision should be modified to reflect a
gradation of reckless conduct and to exclude motor vehicle offenses.
The gap in the deadly weapon provision for first degree assault should
be closed, and some provision should be made for an explicit defense
to consensual assault.
356. PROP. ORE. CRIM. CODE §§ 92-94, Comment at 94 (Final Draft 1970).
357. The Model Penal Code contains a separate provision, M.P.C. § 2.11, which
tightly defines consent and details when it is a complete defense, rather than a mitigating
factor. There is also a section in the assault provisions, M.P.C. §§ 211.1(1)-(2), which
provides for a lesser penalty for simple assault where there is consent.
358. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010(l)(d).
359. The felony/assault provision suffers from a potentially serious conceptual
difficulty in that assault itself is included in the definition of a forcible felony. See
R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(10). Because of this inclusion any time a serious physical
injury results from an assault and the actor possesses a mens rea of at least reckless-
ness, the violation could be "bootstrapped" into the first degree assault section. The
recklessness requirement would not be a substantial safeguard as it probably could be
inferred in most assaults.
To cure the problem, assault should be specifically excluded from the operation
of R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010(1)(d). The presence of R.W.C.C. § 9A. 36.020(l)(c) is
evidence that the drafters of the Proposed Code did not intend the anomalous result
in the felony/assault provision, as the former provision is meaningless if assault is
treated as a forcible felony which will trigger the felony/assault rule. See note 339
supra for the text of these provisions.
360. The term "forcible felony" is defined as "any felony which involves the use or
threat of physical force or violence against any person." R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(10). This
definition is ambiguous for it fails to indicate whether the Code's definition of a felony
or the defendant's particular conduct controls in determining whether the felony in-
volves the use or threat of force. If the former controls, only those felonies traditionally
classified as "inherently dangerous" will be included within the term "forcible felony": if
the latter controls, any felony might be included depending upon the means used by the
particular defendant in committing the felony. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoT-r, CRIMINAL LAW
547-48 (1972). For discussion of an identical problem presented in the felony murder
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Overall, the proposed statute promises to be a fairer, more concise,
and more easily usable tool of criminal justice.
VIII. KIDNAPPING
The Revised Washington Criminal Code abolishes the death pen-
alty for kidnapping and grades the traditional offense of kidnapping
into five, crimes. Under the Proposed Code one is guilty of first degree
kidnapping36' if he intentionally 362 "restrains"3 63 another by secreting
him or by threatening him with deadly force, intending to curtail the
other's liberty and for the purpose of (1) holding the other for ran-
som, reward, or as hostage; (2) facilitating a felony or flight thereafter;
(3) inflicting bodily harm; (4) inflicting extreme "mental distress"; or
(5) interfering with any governmental function. If all the first degree
elements are present except the actor did not intend one of the five
proscribed purposes, the crime is second degree kidnapping. 364 If the
actor, without secreting or threatening deadly force, knowingly3 65
restrains another so as to expose him to substantial risk of bodily in-
jury, he is guilty of first degree unlawful imprisonment. 366 If the
actor knowingly restrains another under any other circumstances, the
section, see the homicide section of this comment and Professor Cosway's discussion of
felony murder in this volume.
361. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.010. The Code uses the term "abduct" to describe cases in-
volving secreting or deadly force. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.005(2). The penalty for first degree
kidnapping is a minimum of twenty years' imprisonment or a maximum $10,000 fine.
R.W.C.C. §8 9A.40.010, 9A.20.020.
362. For a definition and discussion of the term "intentionally" as used in the Pro-
posed Code, see notes 59-64 and accompanying text supra.
363. "Restrain" i§ defined as restricting another's movements, without consent or
lawful authority, by moving or confining him in a manner which interferes substantially
with his liberty. Consent is lacking if (1) physical force, intimidation, or deception is
used, or (2) the victim is under sixteen or incompetent and his parent or guardian has
not acquiesced. R.W.C.C. §9A.40.005.
364. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.020. The comments to the New York Penal Code, N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 135.20 (McKinney 1967), suggest that child stealing by a love-starved
woman and abducting a woman to prevent her marriage would be examples of second
degree kidnapping. But see note 374 infra.
Under the Proposed Code the maximum penalty for second degree kidnapping is ten
years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.40.020, 9A.20.020.
365. The Proposed Code defines the mental state "knowingly" in R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.020(2)(b). R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(3) provides that the designated mental state
must exist for all material elements of the offense unless provided otherwise. This means
that to be guilty of first degree unlawful imprisonment, the actor must "know" there is a
substantial risk of bodily injury.
366. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.030. Examples include cases in which one temporarily locks
another in a closet knowing there is a risk of suffocation, and cases in which the second
degree kidnapping affirmative defense (see note 369 and accompanying text infra) is
asserted, but the child is exposed to a risk of bodily injury. This offense is deemed less
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crime is second degree unlawful imprisonment. 367 Custodial interfer-
ence, the last and least onerous offense, makes it unlawful to "take or
entice from lawful custody" an incompetent or other person entrusted
to the custody of another. 368
The Proposed Code has adopted three affirmative defenses. The
actor's voluntary release of the victim free from serious bodily injury
before trial is an affirmative defense to first degree kidnapping. 369 In
cases of second degree kidnapping where the victim is a relative 370 of
the actor, it is an affirmative defense that the actor did not use, intend
to use, or threaten deadly force, but intended only to assume custody
of the victim. Similarly, in cases of second degree unlawful imprison-
ment where the victim is a relative of the actor and the actor's sole
intent was to assume custody of the victim, it is an affirmative defense
that the restraint did not include the use, intent to use, or threat of any
force.371
The Proposed Code alters the existing law in a number of ways.
First, it abolishes the death penalty.3 72 Second, it rejects the tradi-
onerous than kidnapping because the restraint does not involve secreting the victim or
using deadly force.
Under the Proposed Code the maximum penalty for first degree unlawful imprison-
ment is five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.40.030, 9A.20.020.
367. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.040. Under the Proposed Code the maximum penalty for
second degree unlawful imprisonment is one year's imprisonment and a $1,000 fine.
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.40.040, 9A.20.020.
368. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.050. Custodial interference has a maximum penalty of
ninety days' imprisonment and a $500 fine if a relative is enticed with the sole intent of
assuming custody; otherwise the maximum penalty is one year's imprisonment and a
$1,000 fine. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.40.050, 9A.20.020.
369. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.01O(2). If this defense is not available and the victim has
been seriously injured, the actor is still encouraged not to kill the victim because under
the Code one can be punished for both kidnapping and murder. If this defense is suc-
cessfully asserted, the defendant may still be found guilty of second degree kidnapping.
370. A "relative" is defined as an "ancestor, descendant, sibling, uncle or aunt, in-
cluding a relative of the same degree through marriage or adoption, or a spouse."
R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.005(3).
371. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.40.020(2), 9A.40.040(2). The effect of these two defenses is to
put primary emphasis on the amount of force used when a relative is restrained with the
sole intent of assuming custody. If the force is deadly, the offense will be kidnapping; if
nondeadly force is used, then unlawful imprisonment is established; and if no force is
used, the crime will be custodial interference. The rationale given for these defenses is
that the criminal law should not be used to resolve child custody disputes; such problems
are better handled by the divorce and family courts. The defenses are applicable only
where the actor's sole intent is to assume custody; presumably it would not apply where
the actor has another intent, such as vengeance toward the other parent.
372. There is no practical significance to this change in light of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Furman v. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 2726 (1972), holding (5-4) that imposi-
tion of the death penalty in the cases before the Court, which involved first degree
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tional view expressed in Washington's present law that kidnapping
should be graded into two degrees, 373 with the first degree punishing
all willful restraints where there is an intent to obtain a reward374 and
the second degree punishing the actor who, not intending to obtain a
reward, conceals 375 a child under sixteen or removes another from the
state and thereafter secretes him within the state.37 6 Third, it rejects the
Washington Supreme Court's position, first formulated in State v.
Berry,377 that with respect to kidnapping, the actor's purpose for con-
fining is "comparatively unimportant." Finally, the Proposed Code, by
adopting a comprehensive grading system, obviates the need for spe-
cialized unlawful restraint statutes. 378
murder and rape, was in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the
United States Constitution.
373. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.52.010 (1959).
374. The term "reward" has been construed to have a broad meaning not limited to
monetary gain. In State v. Andre, 195 Wash. 221, 80 P.2d 553 (1938), the court held the
benefit one received by escaping criminal arrest was sufficient "reward"; and in State v.
Berry, 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782 (1939), the court suggested a "reward," within the
meaning of the kidnapping statute, could be satisfaction of one's mental condition, such
as vengeance for self and friends.
The term "reward" is still used in defining first degree kidnapping under the Proposed
Code. If Washington continues to give this term such a broad reading, second degree
kidnapping may be relegated to include few cases outside of those in which the first de-
gree affirmative defense is available. Oregon dropped the term reward from its new
code. ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.235 (1971).
375. It is not necessary that the actor actually conceal.the child; an intent to conceal
is all that-is required. Thus, in State v. Missmer, 72 Wn.2d 1022, 435 P.2d 638 (1967),
the defendant was found guilty of second degree kidnapping when he enticed a fourteen
year old girl to go for a ride with him and then promptly attracted police attention by
running out of gas on a freeway entrance.
376. This requirement of transporting the victim across state lines, whi6h is clearly
abolished by all modern codes, was the element of asportation at common law, which
distinguished serious kidnapping from the not-so-serious false imprisonment cases.
PERKINS at 177 (2d ed. 1969). The unreasonableness of this element today is evident from
the rationale given for it in 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *219:
[k] idnapping, being the forcible abduction or stealing away of a man, woman or
child from their own country, and sending them into another, was capital by the
Jewish Law.... So likewise in the civil law, the offence [sic] of spiriting away and
stealing men and children. . . was punished with death. This is unquestionably a
very heinous crime, as it robs the king of his subjects, banishes a man from his
country, and may ... be productive of the mostcruel and disagreeable hardships ....
The difficulties of repatriation and the fact that the victim was removed beyond the
reach of the English law and the aid of his associates were other justifications for this
requirement. M.P.C. § 212, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
377. 200 Wash. 495, 93 P.2d 782 (1939). In this case, the defendant, under a mis-
taken belief that his wife had been raped, seized and confined the suspected rapist not
for the purpose of extortion, but rather with an intent to put the erroneously accused
rapist through torture which included emasculation.
378. Examples include WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.040 (1959) (compelling a woman
to marry), 9.79.050 (1959) (abduction of a female for an immoral purpose), and
9.79.060 (1959) (placing a female in a house of prostitution). All three of these offenses
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By considering such variables as the actor's ultimate objective, the
nature of the force used, the relationship of the parties, and the exist-
ence of secrecy, the Code drafters have sought to distinguish ration-
ally between simple false imprisonment and the more terrifying ab-
ductions involving extortion, ransom, or physical injury. Such a
grading system raises many issues, primarily involving value judg-
ments, to wit: whether one who intends to interfere with a govern-
mental function---any governmental function--should be held to the
same degree of culpability as the extortionist; whether the actor who is
clearly guilty of first degree kidnapping should be given preferential
treatment (a reduction of ten years imprisonment) because he released
his victim free from serious bodily injury before the police found the
victim; whether the actor is less culpable because the victim was his
relative-broadly defined as an ancestor, descendant, sibling, uncle,
or aunt; and whether the death penalty should be abolished. Other
states which have recently adopted comprehensive criminal codes
have decided these issues differently.37 9
Moreover, one may question whether the terms used in defining the
offenses are sufficiently precise to reflect the drafters' intent. The
terms "reward," "mental distress," and "any governmental function"
are used in defining first degree kidnapping,380 an offense which ap-
parently is intended to extend only to the most heinous abductions.
However, these terms are extremely vague and, as in the case of "re-
ward" under the present law,381 subject to exceedingly broad con-
structions.
Finally, unlike the Model Penal Code and other state codes, the
Proposed Code and comments fail to mention a vital issue-Whether
some provision should be made to prevent prosecution for first degree
would be repealed by the new Code, but WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94.030 (1959), which
makes it a felony for an inmate at a state penal institution to hold an officer hostage,
would not be.
379. Oregon and Illinois do not hold the kidnapper to a higher degree of culpability
because his conduct interferes with a government function. New York, Illinois, and
Oregon do not provide an affirmative defense to the kidnapper who voluntarily releases
his victim. The Model Penal Code and Illinois do not give preferential treatment to the
actor when the victim was a relative. And Connecticut and Illinois still prescribe the
death penalty for the most culpable abductions. See ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.215-.257
(1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 10-2 (Smith-Hurd 1969); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
135.30 (McKinney 1967); M.P.C. § 212.1; and CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-92(b) (1971).
380. R.W.C.C. § 9A.40.010.
381. See note 374 supra.
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kidnapping when the abduction is incident to or an integral part of the
commission of another crime. Kidnapping statutes, which tradition-
ally carry severe penalties and do not require that the victim be moved
a considerable distance or be confined for a significant length of time,
have frequently been abused by prosecutors to secure increased penalties
against criminals whose behavior basically constitutes another crime,
such as rape or robbery.382 Perhaps with the elimination of the death
penalty, the tactic will appear less attractive to the prosecutor. How-
ever, the first degree kidnapping penalties remain severe, and other
state codes have felt it necessary to deal with this problem.383 By
failing to confront this issue in the Proposed Code, the drafters either
consciously deemed it unnecessary, in which case their rationale
should be disclosed, or inadvertently missed it, in which case prompt
consideration should be given the problem.
IX. SEXUAL OFFENSES
The Proposed Code offers major changes to present Washington
law in the area of sexual offenses.3 84 The drafters of the Proposed
Code addressed two basic problems present in existing law. First,
moral proscriptions presently incorporated in sexual offense statutes
serve no secular purpose and present multitudinous problems.3 85
382. See, e.g., People v. Tanner, 3 Cal. 2d 279, 44 P.2d 324 (1935); People v.
Knowles, 35 Cal. 2d 175, 217 P.2d 1 (1950); People v. Chessman, 38 Cal. 2d 166, 238
P.2d 1001 (1951); People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
383. The Model Penal Code guards against such abuse by'limiting first degree pun-
ishment to those cases where the victim is removed from his residence or business,
moved a substantial distance, or confined in isolation for a substantial period of time.
M.P.C. § 212.1 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). New York specifies that first degree
kidnapping requires the victim be held for twelve hours. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25
(McKinney 1967). And Oregon sought to prevent such misuse by limiting first degree
prosecutions to cases where the victim was held for ransom, as a shield, to cause
physical injury, or to terrorize. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 163.215-.257 (1971).
384. See R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.44. Prostitution, indecent exposure, incest, and bigamy
are not covered in the sexual offense chapter; see R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.64 (family offenses),
and R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.88 (public indecency). For statutory treatment of sexual psycho-
paths, see WASH. REV. CODE ch. 71.06 (Supp. 1971).
385. See notes 435, 436, 437, 440 and accompanying text infra. See generally
,M.P.C. § 207.5(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); 14 REPORTS FROM
COMMISSIONERS, INSPECTORS AND OTHERS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL
OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION 85 [Cmnd. 247, London] (1957) [hereinafter cited as
WOLFENDEN REPORT]; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON HOMOSEXUALITY (1969) [hereinafter cited as HOOKER REPORT]; Fisher,
The Sex Offender Provisions of the Proposed New Maryland Criminal Code: Should
Private, Consenting Adult Homosexual Behavior Be Excluded? 30 MD. L. REV. 89




Second, sexual offenses, which proscribe widely variant forms of be-
havior and which often involve subtle psychological questions,386
cannot be adequately dealt with under overly broad statutes which
rely on subjective determinations of the victim's consent.387
The Proposed Code alleviates the first of these problems by abro-
gating criminal penalties for all sexual relations conducted between
consenting adults in private388 and thus limits the scope of criminal
prohibitions to the prevention of the achievement of sexual gratification
and Administration in Los Angeles County, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 643 (1966) [herein-
after cited as PROJECT].
386. One student characterized the general behavior and proof problems inherent in
sexual offenses as follows:
The crime covers factual situations ranging from brutal attacks familiar to tabloid
readers to half won arguments of couples in parked cars or intercourse with willing
girls who lack legal capacity to grant consent. The "facts" may be elusive, ambigu-
ous, or fabricated. And the sexual nature of the crime is conducive to false accusa-
tion. Moreover, the word "rape", plus the aspect of the "wronged" girl on the
stand, may lead to the conviction of the defendant, "though never so innocent."
Comment, Forcible and Statutory Rape: An Exploration of the Operation and Objec-
tives of the Consent Standard, 62 YALE L.J. 55, 56 (1952) [hereinafter cited as CONSENT
STANDARD].
387. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1959) is the present forcible rape statute. M.P.C.
§ 207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) posits that the grading of sexual offenses is
especially important because:
(1) the upper ranges of punishment include life imprisonment or death; (2) the of-
fense is typically committed in privacy, so that conviction often rests on little more
than the testimony of the complainant; (3) the central issue is likely to be the ques-
tion of consent on the part of the female, a subtle psychological problem in view of
social and religious pressures upon the woman to conceive of herself as a victim
rather than a collaborator; and (4) the offender's threat to society is difficult to eval-
uate.
For critical comment on reliance on subjective elements of proof, see CONSENT
STANDARD, supra note 386.
Shiff, Statistical Features of Rape, 14 J. FOR. ScI. 102, 107-9 (1969) relates the di-
lemma of a medical examiner in evaluating alleged forcible rapes. Of one hundred al-
leged rapes examined, only sixty-one constituted forcible rape. Motives for false accusa-
tion in this study included teaching " 'him a lesson'," avoiding punishment by parents.
prostitutes' revenge for not being paid, and blackmail. Id. at 108.
The propensity for false accusation makes total reliance on the consent standard
more suspect. One student observed:
Simple on its face, the consent standard does not work well. Being a subjective
standard requiring examination of the victim's state of mind, it is too uncertain a
standard for branding intercourse a crime as serious as forcible rape. It has proved
almost impossible to apply. "The major problem in regard to sexual intercourse
with the use of force is to determine the degree of victim participation.... although
a woman may desire sexual intercourse, it is customary for her to say, 'no, no, no'
(although meaning 'yes, yes, yes') and expect the male to be the aggressor .... It is
always difficult in rape cases to determine whether the female meant 'no'."
Comment, The Resistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REV. 680, 681-82
(1966).
388. This position is in accord with several other modern formulations in the sexual
offense area. See note 434 and accompanying text infra.
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by force or its equivalent and to the protection of sexual innocence
and immaturity. 389 The second basic problem is dealt with by
(a) .making proof depend on more objective standards; (b) add-
ing flexibility and definition to the statutes; and (c) inserting a
value structure into the statutory framework which makes penalties
correspond with the gravity of the conduct. 390
The sexual offense sections of the Proposed Code proscribe two
categories of sexual conduct: rape391 and non-consensual sexual con-
tact.392 Sexual contact provisions will not be analyzed in depth in this
note because they utilize basically the same structure and definitions
as the rape sections. 393 The Proposed Code provisions for rape require
proof of sexual intercourse and lack of the victim's consent resulting
from either forcible compulsion or incapacity to consent. 394 Cor-
roboration of the victim's testimony is also required.3 95 Mistake of
age and mistake of ability to consent are affirmative defenses to the
charge of rape.3 96 These prerequisites to a rape conviction under the
Proposed Code will be analyzed by comparing them with present
Washington requirements for conviction.
389. The Proposed Code would also proscribe sexual conduct which is offensive to
innocent bystanders. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.010 (public indecency).
390. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.44.
391. R.W.C.C. §6 9A.44.040-.060. See also R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.005-.020 for related
provisions.
392. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.070-.090.
393. Non-consensual sexual contact is presently covered by WASH. REV. CODE §
9.79.080 (1959) (indecent liberties). A person is guilty who takes any indecent liberties
with a "female of chaste character" without her consent. If the female is less than fifteen
years old, the crime is a felony punishable by up to twenty years; otherwise the crimeis
a gross misdemeanor. The Proposed Code creates three degrees of sexual contact: first
degree sexual contact includes sexual contact by forcible compulsion, when the victim is
physically helpless, or when the victim is less than eleven; for second degree sexual con-
tact the victim must be mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or less than fourteen;
third degree sexual contact is any non-consensual sexual contact. First degree sexual
contact is punishable by a minimum of ten years; second degree, five years, third de-
gree, ninety days. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.070-.090. The major functional difference be-
tween sexual contact and rape is the mens rea requirement that the non-consensual
sexual contact be made "for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party."
R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(2).
394. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.030-.060 (basic rape provisions), R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005
(definitions).
395. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010.
396. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020. Mistake of age is not a defense if the victim is less than
fourteen. Id.
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A. Conduct Proscribed
The first element of the crime of rape is that the actor have sexual
intercourse with another person.397 Sexual intercourse under the Pro-
posed Code includes both normal heterosexual coitus and "sexual
conduct between persons not married to each other involving the sex
organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another."398 The rape
sections of the Proposed Code thus include both traditional hetero-
sexual and homosexual rape; both categories of conduct are afforded
similar treatment throughout the sexual offense sections.399 Sexual
intercourse in heterosexual rape under present Washington law is
defined in the same way as under the Proposed Code, except that rape
as currently defined requires a female victim. 40 0 In comparison, the
Proposed Code uses completely neutral terms and thus prohibits rape
of a male by a female. Homosexual rape does not exist under present
Washington law; consensual and non-consensual homosexual inter-
course are both proscribed as sodomy. 40'
B. Lack of Consent
Although the present and proposed forcible rape provisions are
superficially similar, 40 2 they diverge in their requirements of proof of
397. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.030-.060.
398. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(1). Other jurisdictions using the Model Penal Code
format have defined "deviate sexual intercourse" separately. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53a-65(2) (Special Pamphlet 1972); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(2) (McKinney 1967). These jurisdictions also treat homo-
sexual rape separately from heterosexual rape. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-75-
77 (Special Pamphlet 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.40-.50 (McKinney 1967).
The Proposed Code's consolidation of all rapes into one set of provisions simplifies
the sexual offense sections and eliminates minor differences in the treatment of hetero-
sexual and homosexual rape present in other jurisdictions.
399. The only exception to identical treatment is that the statutory age of consent
for homosexual rape is eighteen years of age, whereas for heterosexual rape it is sixteen
years of age. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015(3)(a), as amended (197 1).
400. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1959). But present Washington statutory rape
provisions are defined in neutral terms. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1959).
401. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.100 (1959).
402. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010(2)(3) (1959) is similar to the Proposed Code in its
provision that the victim's "resistance is forcibly overcome" or that the victim's resist-
ance is prevented "by fear of immediate and great bodily harm which she has reasonable
cause to believe will be inflicted on her .. ." Id. However, these provisions only operate
as an indicia of non-consent and are not stringent requirements for conviction. Only
"sexual intercourse with a female not the wife of the perpetrator committed against her
will and without her consent" need be proven. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1959).
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lack of consent. Lack of consent, an element of all sexual offenses
under the Proposed Code, results from either the actor's forcible com-
pulsion or the victim's incapacity to consent. 403 Forcible compulsion
includes either "physical force which overcomes earnest resistance" or
severe intimidation involving an "express or implied" threat of serious
injury, kidnapping, or unlawful imprisonment.404 The requirement of
force that "overcomes earnest resistance" should be interpreted to
require an objective and independent determination of that fact.405
This requirement is consistent with the drafter's desire to prevent con-
viction on false accusations in sexual offense prosecutions. Intimida-
tion, however, requires only that the victim subjectively believe there
is serious danger to himself or another.40 6
In contrast, Washington courts have construed the current forcible
rape statute to require simply proof of the victim's subjective noncon-
sent; there need be no proof of forcible compulsion. 407 Thus under
present Washington law only two elements need be proven to sustain a
403. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015. Cf. STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR THE
REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE § 902 (1971)
which eliminates the consent standard from the crime of rape and, instead, requires
simply that the actor "[w] ith the intent to compel her to submit, compels her to
submit to the act by the use or threat of force upon her or another person."
404. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(7). The belief of the victim that he is in serious danger is
not required to be reasonable. Provisions for threats to another person, kidnapping and
unlawful imprisonment expand the present Washington law of forcible rape which only
punishes the threat of the use of force against the victim. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010(3)
(1959).
405. M.P.C. § 207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.00(8), Practice Commentary (McKinney 1967). See generally Comment, The Re-
sistance Standard in Rape Legislation, 18 STAN. L. REv. 680 (1966).
406. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(7). Using a subjective standard offers greater protection
to the victim who is being intimidated and should be contrasted with WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.79.010(3) (1959) which requires the victim to reasonably believe she is threatened by
"immediate and great bodily harm." See Comment, Sex Offenses and Penal Code Revi-
sion in Michigan, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 934, 941 (1968) for discussion of a similar provi-
sion. To some degree intimidation arguably requires objectivity, for there must be
objective proof that the actor's conduct conveyed an "implied threat." R.W.C.C. §
9A.44.005(7).
407. State v. Bridges, 61 Wn.2d 625, 628, 379 P.2d 715, 717 (1963); State v. Meyer-
kamp, 82 Wash. 607, 609, 144 P. 942, 944 (1914). It is conceivable that this construction
could be carried over to the Proposed Code if it were enacted. This construction, how-
ever, would be contrary to the Proposed Code's policy to attempt to require objective
certainty in rape prosecutions. The interpretation that there is a conflict between the
Proposed Code and the present law requirements for proof of forcible compulsion is
contrary to the drafter's comment that there is no conflict. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015,
Comment. Under present Washington law, evidence of forcible compulsion and the vic-
tim's resistance is often determinative of non-consent. See, e.g., State v. Thomas, 52
Wn.2d 255, 334 P.2d 821 (1958).
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conviction for forcible rape: sexual intercourse and the subjective
nonconsent of the victim. 408
Incapacity to consent under the Proposed Code is established if the
heterosexual rape victim is under sixteen years, if the homosexual
rape victim is under eighteen years, 409 or if the victim is mentally
defective, 410 mentally incapacitated, 41' or physically helpless. 412 The
statutory age of consent of sixteen for heterosexual rape is a reduction
from the statutory age of eighteen under the present law.413
C. Corroboration
Corroboration of the victim's testimony is required under the Pro-
posed Code for all sexual offense convictions except sexual contact in
the third degree. 414 By requiring corroboration, greater certainty of
proof is provided, thus decreasing the danger of conviction after a
false allegation. This requirement would be new to Washington. Con-
victions currently depend exclusively on the determination of the
judge and jury as to the sufficiency of evidence without any strict re-
quirement of corroboration. 41 5
408. See State v. Bridges, 61 Wn.2d 625, 628, 379 P.2d 715, 717 (1963); State v.
Meyerkamp, 82 Wash. 607, 609, 144 P. 942, 943 (1914); State v. Raymond. 69 Wash. 98.
103, 124 P. 495, 496 (1912). See also note 402 supra.
409. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015(3)(a), as amended (1971).
410. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015(3)(b).
411. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015(3)(c).
412. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015(3)(d).
413. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1959).
414. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010. The explicit exclusion of the corroboration require-
ment for sexual contact in the third degree is not explained in the comments and ap-
pears to have no rational basis. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32
BROOKLYN L. REV. 274, 275 (1966). N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.15 (1967) exempts sexual
abuse in the third degree from the corroboration requirement. People v. Doyle, 300
N.Y.S.2d 719, affd mern., 26 N.Y.2d 752, 257 N.E.2d 648, 309 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1970),
ruled that the district attorney may not circumvent the statutory requirement of corro-
boration by charging a lesser or different offense for which corroboration is unneces-
sary. This case indicates that the exemption of third degree sexual abuse does not mean
much practically in New York. For further discussion, see note 452 and accompanying
text infra.
415. State v. Paradis, 72 Wn.2d 563, 434 P.2d 583 (1967); State v. Jennen, 58
Wn.2d 171, 179, 361 P.2d 739, 743 (1961); State v. Mobley, 44 Wash. 549, 87 P. 815
(1906).
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D. Defenses
Certain limited defenses not currently available are permitted under
the Proposed Code.416 A defendant has an affirmative defense when
the victim is incapable of consenting and the defendant "believed that
the circumstances giving rise to such incapacity" did not exist.417
There is no requirement that the defendant's belief be reasonable;
subjective belief is the only apparent requisite for the defense. In a stat-
utory rape prosecution, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant
"reasonably believed" the victim to be the critical age if that age is six-
teen or older.418 This defense is not available, however, if the victim is
in fact under fourteen years of age.419
E. Classification and Penalties
The Proposed Code divides rape offenses into three degrees of
rape420 and a separate, lesser included offense of sexual misconduct.42'
The basis for classification within this structure depends upon the
amount of force involved, the mental and physical state of the victim,
the age of the victim, and the age differential between the victim and
the actor. Penalties imposed under the.various offenses correspond to
the relative gravity of the defendant's conduct.422 First degree rape
416. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020. The defenses of mistake of age and mistake of consent
operate to create a knowledge mental requirement for these two factors. The actor must
know that his victim is physically or mentally capable of consenting. Other than these
two mental requirements, the rest of the rape provisions apparently invoke absolute lia-
bility. The absence of stated mental requirements coupled with the absence of any spe-
cific statement that rape is an absolute liability offense seems to fall within R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.050, and may cause awkward impositions of mental requirements by the trial
court.
417. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(l).
418. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44-020(2)(b).
419. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(2)(a).
420. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.040-.060.
421. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.030.
422. Present Washington law prescribes the following punishments: rape--min-
imum of five years, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.010 (1959); statutory rape, victim under
ten--life, Id., § 9.79.020 (1959); statutory rape, victim ten or older but under fifteen-
.maximum of twenty years, Id.; statutory rape, victim fifteen years or older but under
eighteen-maximum of fifteen years, Id. The Proposed Code would punish rape defend-
ants as follows: rape in the first degree, rape by forcible compulsion or victim less than
eleven-minimum of twenty years, R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.040, 9A.20.020; second degree
rape, victim physically helpless or less than fourteen if actor is eighteen or more-max-
imum of ten years, R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.050, 9A.20.020; rape in the third degree, victim
mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or less than sixteen if actor is twenty or older
-maximum of five years, R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.060, 9A.20.020; sexual misconduct,
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proscribes sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compul-
sion or when the victim is less than eleven years old.423 Second degree
rape is found where the victim is physically helpless or is less than
fourteen years old and the actor is eighteen or older. 424 Third degree
rape exists if the victim is mentally defective or mentally incapacitated
or if the victim's age is below the statutory age of consent and the
actor is above a set age. 425 Finally, sexual misconduct includes all
non-consensual intercourse.426 In contrast to the Proposed Code, the
present Washington forcible rape statute does not differentiate be-
tween different types of conduct and prescribes penalties of from five
years to life. 427 Current law does grade statutory rape, with penalties
varying with the age of the victim.428
A significant difference between the Proposed Code and current law
is the deletion of numerous offenses. Crimes of sodomy, 429 adultery,430
seduction, 43' and compelling a woman to marry, 432 are abolished
except as they are absorbed in the basic rape provisions of the Pro-
posed Code.
The approach to sexual offenses taken under the Proposed Code is
basically different from that taken under present Washington law. By
eliminating moral proscriptions, relying on objective standards, re-
quiring corroboration, and creating a statutory framework which re-
flects a value structure, the Code raises fundamental policy issues as
non-consensual sexual intercourse-maximum of one year, R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.030,
9A.20.020.
423. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.040.
424. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.050.
425. Three brackets of differentials are used in defining third degree rape: (I) victim
is less than sixteen and the actoris at least twenty, (2) victim is less than sixteen and the
actor is the same sex as the victim and at least nineteen; (3) victim is less than eighteen
and the actor is the same sex as the victim and at least twenty-one. R.W.C.C. §
9A.44.060.
426. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.030.
427. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.010 (1959). The absence of distinctions between dif-
ferent types of conduct can lead to unduly harsh penalties. A sentence of from five years
to life may be appropriate for a man who rapes a woman at knifepoint, but is overly
harsh for a "back seat lover" whose companion does not technically consent. See also
note 387 supra.
428. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1959). See note 422 supra, for the penalties
under the statutory rape provisions.
429. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.100 (1959).
430. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.110 (1959).
43 1. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.070 (1959). The seduction statute has been used rarely
if at all in recent years. Adequate protection is provided by the other sexual offense
provisions.
432. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.040 (1959).
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well as potential mechanical problems that may exist in applying its
provisions.
. The major policy change is the proposal that private homosexual
and heterosexual behavior between consenting adults not be pro-
scribed. Legalization of homosexuality has been hotly debated since
the Model Penal Code recommended the repeal of laws prohibiting
homosexuality. 43 3 Pursuant to these recommendations, several states
have eliminated or minimized the crime of homosexuality and other
moral prohibitions in their codes.434
There are several persuasive reasons for eliminating legal prohibi-
tions of consensual sexual conduct between adults in private. First,
because these laws are infrequently enforced relative to the volume of
homosexual activity, problems of arbitrary enforcement and police
corruption exist.435 Second, no secular harm can be shown from such
conduct,43 6 and third, the threat of punishment is ineffective in pre-
venting homosexual acts.437 Finally, the laws are practically unenfor-
cible because the conduct is normally carried on in private.438
Countervailing arguments include: (1) removal of such laws would
remove deterrence and in effect express social approval of deviant
433. M.P.C. § 207.5(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). An additional contro-
versial study was the WOLFENDEN REPORT, supra note 385 which led to the abolition of
homosexual proscriptions in England in 1967. The HOOKER REPORT, supra note 385, is a
recent exhaustive study of the problems of homosexuality which recommends elimina-
tion of criminal prohibitions for private homosexual conduct. Id. at 16-21.
434. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-65 to -77 (Special Pamphlet 1972); IDAHO
CODE §§ 18-901 to -907 (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. § 11-2 (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.38 (McKinney 1967) (makes consensual sodomy a class B misde-
meanor). See also STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATURE COMM. FOR THE REVISION OF THE
PENAL CODE, STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE §§ 902-906 (1971), and
MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE §§ 2301-2317 (Final Draft 1967).
435. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 304 (1968). In the
years 1966-1969, King County reported thirteen sodomy convictions in comparison
to 738 grand larceny convictions and 612 burglary convictions. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
OF KING COUNTY, 1965-69, ANNUAL REPORT. The existence of alleged arbitrary enforce-
ment makes the claim of violation of equal protection a common one in most sodomy
cases. The claim has never been accepted in Washington. State v. Rhinehart 70
Wn.2d 649, 424 P.2d 906 (1967), State v. Reid, 66 Wn.2d 243, 401 P.2d 988 (1965).
See generally PROJECT, supra note 385, at 686-742; FISHER, supra note 385, at 95-97.
436. M.P.C. § 207.5(1), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) states:
No harm to the secular interests of the community is involved in typical sex prac-
tice in private between consenting adult partners. This area of private morals is the
distinctive concern of spiritual authorities.
437. HOOKER REPORT, supra note 385, at 18-20. The laws are not only an ineffective
deterrent; they create additional mental problems for homosexuals. Id.
438. PROJECT, supra note 385, at 686-742. A derivative of the difficulties in enforce-
ment is the necessity of undesirable police practices. The use of decoys to lure homosex-
uals into making advances and the surveillance of public restrooms are typical of these
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sexual conduct; and (2) relaxation of these moral standards will en-
courage a general relaxation of moral standards which may lead to
the corruption of youth.439 In weighing the arguments, 440 it is
important to note that the Proposed Code does not remove criminal
proscriptions for deviant sexual conduct that involves force or
threats,441 that is practiced with minors,442 or that violates public
decency. 443
Another troublesome issue is the proposal to reduce the statutory
age of consent from eighteen to sixteen years of age.444 The arbitrary
selection of an age of non-consent is crucial because it sets the age at
which a female may consent to sexual intercourse so as to bar a
charge of statutory rape. The purpose of setting this minimum age
limit is to protect the child who is likely to have poor judgment con-
cerning the meaning of sexual activity even though she is physically
capable of giving and receiving sexual gratification. The drafters of
the Proposed Code have concluded that today a girl of sixteen years
understands the significance of sexual intercourse and that the fiction
of statutory non-consent is not presently realistic. 445 This position is in
accord with the majority of the other states. 446
practices. Additionally, the use of police manpower in morals squads detracts from
overall police effectiveness in other areas of crime prevention.
Several recent cases indicate a desire to preserve individual rights of privacy. See
generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (enforcement of criminal
statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives held unconstitutional invasion of privacy);
Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968) (appli-
cation of sodomy statute to married individuals engaged in private, consensual acts
might be unconstitutional invasion of privacy); Buchanan v. Batchelos, 308 F.Supp. 729
(N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated for reconsideration, 401 U.S. 989 (1971).
439. FISHER, supra note 385, at 107-108.
440. These and many other arguments on both sides have been cogently discussed in
numerous works which should be considered in dealing with this problem. See generally
H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 301-312 (1968); FISHER, supra note
385, at 106-108.
441. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.040.
442. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.040-.060.
443. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.010.
444. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020.
445. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274-275
(1965). See Reiss, The Marginal Status of the Adolescent, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
309 (1960) for additional factors to be considered in setting a statutory age of consent.
446. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.015. In 1961, twenty-four states had minimum statutory
ages of consent set at sixteen years of age or lower. G. Mueller, LEGAL REGULATION OF
SEXUAL CONDUCT 74-80 (1961). Recent enactments include: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53a-66 (Special Pamphlet 1972) (sixteen); IDAHO CODE § 18-904 (Supp. 1971) (sixteen);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-4 (Smith-Hurd 1972) (sixteen); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25
(McKinney 1967) (seventeen); and ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.315 (1971) (eighteen).
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Inclusion in the Proposed Code of affirmative defenses for mistake
of age and mistake of consent will also mitigate the harshness of pres-
ent rape statutes. The mistake of age defense requires a "reasonable
belief' by the actor that his companion was legally able to consent.447
Mistake as to consent depends only on tie actor's subjective belief
that the circumstances giving rise to the victim's incapacity to consent
were not present.448 Making this defense turn only on a subjective be-
lief will have the effect of placing an immense additional burden on
the prosecution to prove the actor did not believe the victim could
consent. An objective belief requirement would be more congruous
with the policy of the rape provisions to protect those incapable of
consenting and at the same time would provide protection where an
accused "reasonably believed" his companion was capable of consent.449
The offense of "sexual misconduct," which is designated as a gross
misdemeanor and is punishable by a maximum of one year imprison-
ment,450 raises an additional issue in the prosecution of rape offend-
ers. Sexual misconduct is non-consensual intercourse and includes all
the higher degrees of rape. The existence of the offense of sexual mis-
conduct creates a prosecutorial dilemma as to whether the rape pro-
visions or the sexual misconduct provisions should be used in a parti-
cular case. The wide disparity between rape and sexual misconduct
447. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020. M.P.C. § 213.6(1) and M.P.C. § 207.4, Comment
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) recognize reasonable mistake of age as a defense to statutory
rape, and advocate the termination of absolute liability for statutory rape. People v.
Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964), judicially allowed
mistake of age as a defense to statutory rape. Implicit in the opinion is the conclusion
that protecting young girls becomes a less compelling objective as the statutory age of
consent increases. See also Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to
Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 105 (1965); Note, Mistake of Age Becomes a Defense
to Statutory Rape in California, 17 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1965). Several states have
adopted mistake of age as a defense. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-67 (Special Pam-
phlet 1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-907(1) (Supp. 1971); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §
ll-4(b)(l) (Smith-Hurd 1972); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-9-3 (1963). New York did not
include mistake of age as a defense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.10, Comment
(McKinney 1967).
448. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.020(l).
449. See Comment, Sex Offenses and the Penal Code Revision in Michigan, 14
'WAYNE L. REv. 934, 947 (1968), which makes the same basic criticism of MICH. REV.
CRIM. CODE § 2330 (Final Draft 1967).
450. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.030. The comments following state that the purpose of the
offense of sexual misconduct "is to set the basic dividing line between criminal and
non-criminal conduct of both a heterosexual and homosexual nature." Sexual miscon-
duct serves as a lesser included offense and also "penalizes voluntary heterosexual inter-
course between minors who do not differ by more than six years in age, provided the




penalties makes this an important issue.451 One commentator viewed
the problem as follows: 4 52
[S] exual misconduct... appears to be a device to make the prosecu-
tion of sex offenses easier. The prosecutor can seek an indictment for
felonies ... of rape and then reduce the charge to sexual misconduct
upon the defendant pleading guilty thereto.
The availability of an easier route to conviction by using sexual mis-
conduct could minimize the imposition of the severe penalties of the
other rape sections. 453
The Proposed Code's requirement of corroboration raises the
policy question of how much protection from false accusation the leg-
islature should give alleged rapists. Corroboration will result in a
greater degree of certainty in prosecutions for sexual offenses, 454 but,
depending on judicial construction of the requirement, corroboration
could require so much certainty as to effectively eliminate sexual of-
fense convictions. This has apparently been the case in New York.455
On the other hand, corroboration has been required for sexual of-
fenses in a number of other states without a deleterious effect.456 The
ultimate impact of a corroboration requirement in Washington will
depend on what the courts determine is sufficient corroborating evi-
451. See note 422 supra.
452. Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274, 280
(1965).
453. Id. at 281.
454. M.P.C. § 207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) includes a corroboration
requirement. New York's corroboration requirement is based on the fact that " 'crimes
of this nature are easily charged and very difficult to disprove."' N.Y. PENAL LAW §
130.15, Comment (McKinney 1967).
455. Ludwig, The Case for Repeal of the Sex Corroboration Requirement in New
York, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 378 (1970). The author posits that in 1969 in Queens
County, New York-population, 2.3 million-there have been no forcible rape convic-
tions out of fifty-eight forcible rape indictments. Id. at 386. The corroboration require-
ment has similarly nullified the enforcement of non-sexual criminal conduct when the
non-sex offense is a part of an offense which requires corroboration. People v. English,
16 N.Y. 2d 719, 209 N.E.2d 722, 262 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1965). The product of English and
other similar cases is a "doctrine of circumvention" which precludes the prosecutor from
charging a different or lesser offense for which corroboration is not required and
proving this offense by the victim's uncorroborated testimony related to an offense for
which corroboration is required. Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prose-
cutions for Sex Offenses in New York, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 272 (1971).
456. Younger, The Requirement of Corroboration in Prosecutions for Sex Offenses
in New York, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 263-66 (1971). Commentators have also
favored some form of corroboration. See Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law,
32 BROOKLYN L. REV. 274, 275 (1965); Note, Corroborating Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1137 (1967).
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dence. The possibility of a strict requirement of corroboration, espe-
cially in view of the drafters' reference in their comments to New
York cases on corroboration,457 raises the question of whether corrob-
oration should be required at all.458 The Proposed Code's require-
ment of objective proof of forcible rape may be enough protection for
the falsely accused defendant. If the corroboration requirement is re-
tained, the section should state more clearly what degree of corrobor-
ation is required.459
Additional issues pertaining to definitions and mechanics are raised
by the Proposed Code. First, the definition of sexual contact 60 -"any
touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married
to the actor, done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either
party"--creates a crime which may be extraordinarily difficult to
prove.461 Second, the Proposed Code should make clear whether the
definition of forcible compulsion requires an independent and objec-
tive determination that the force used would "overcome earnest resis-
tance. '462 Third, the requirement of a prompt complaint is conspicu-
ously absent from the sexual offense sections. The Model Penal Code
and several other jurisdictions have included the requirement that ac-
tion be instituted within three months after the occurrence. 463
457. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010, Comment.
458. The comments to the Model Penal Code suggest that the requirement of cor-
roboration for every element of the crime "would impose an impractical burden on the
prosecutor .... " M.C.P. § 207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft, No. 4, 1955). Though the
Model Penal Code has a corroboration requirement, it would require only some min-
imal evidence other than the victim's testimony. References in the comments to Dean
Wigmore's statement that corroboration requirements were unnecessary because "(1)
jurors are naturally suspicious of such complaints, and (2) the purpose of the rule is al-
ready attained by the court's power to set aside a verdict for insufficient evidence," had
some effect on the Model Code's policy determination. Id.
459. See, e.g., M.P.C. § 2-f3.6(6)-(corroboration may be circumstantial); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-68 (Special Pamphlet 1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-907(4) (Supp. 1971).
Neither Oregon nor Michigan include corroboration requirements in their revised
codes. ORE. REV. STAT. §8 163.305-.465 (1971); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE ch. 23
(Final Draft 1967).
460. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(2).
461. Comment, Sex Offenses and Penal Code Revision in Michigan, 14 WAYNE L.
REV. 934, 960 (1968).
462. See note 405 and accompanying text supra.
463. M.P.C. § 213.6(5) (complaint must be brought within three months). M.P.C. §
207.4, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) expresses the rationale behind the require-
ment for prompt complaint:
The possibility that pregnancy might change a willing participant in the sex act into
a vindictive complainant, as well as the sound reasoning that one who has, in fact,
been subjected to an act of violence will not delay in bringing the offense to the at-
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In summary, the Proposed Code's treatment of sexual offenses rep-
resents a significant change from present Washington law and offers
some productive innovations relative to other derivations of the Model
Penal Code. The basic policy changes are in accord with modern
thought in the sexual offense area; similar provisions have been
adopted by several other states. With the exception of several rela-
tively minor problems previously noted, the Proposed Code in its pre-
sent form is a much needed improvement over existing Wasington
law.
X. ARSON
The changes made by the Proposed Code with respect to fire-
related crimes are primarily organizational. Instead of separating
these crimes into two distinct chapters as is done under the present
law,464 the Code consolidates them into a single chapter. The Code's
arson chapter contains four separate offenses: arson, 465 criminal mis-
chief,466 reckless burning,467 and reckless endangerment of property. 468
tention of the authorities, are sufficient grounds for setting some time limit upon
the right to complain.... A specific possibility of extension of time is made in the
case of young children and incompetents....
See also, IDAHO CODE § 18-907(3) (Supp. 197 1).
464. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.48 (arson) prohibits conduct which is currently proscribed in
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.09 (1959) (arson) and ch. 9.40 (1959) (crimes relating to fire).
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.48.005-.040 replace WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.09, and R.W.C.C. §§
9A.48.050-.080 cover most of the conduct prohibited by WASH. REV. CODE ch. 9.40.
465. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.48.010-.030.
466. R.W.C.C. §§ .9A.48.050-.070. Both first and second degree criminal mischief
can be committed by performing one of two criminal actions: an intentional damaging
of property of another by an actor who has no reasonable belief that he has the right to
do so, or the intentional interruption or impairment of service to the public through
physical damage to or tampering with the property of a public utility or mode of trans-
portation, power or communication with no reasonable belief that the action is rightful.
The difference between the two crimes is the amount of damage the actor causes.
First degree criminal mischief requires damage exceeding $1,500 (R.W.C.C. § 9A
.48.050(1)(a); the second degree offense requires damage in excess of $250 (R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.48.060(1)(a)).
First degree criminal mischief is punishable as a third degree felony, and the second
degree offense constitutes a gross misdemeanor. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.050-.060. Criminal
mischief in the third degree, punishable as a misdemeanor with imprisonment in the
county jail for not more than ninety days and/or a fine of not more than $500 (R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.20.020(3)), requires that an actor, having no reasonable belief that he has a right to
do so, intentionally or recklessly cause physical damage to the property of another.
R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.070.
467. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.040. Reckless burning makes punishable intentional burn-
ings or explodings which recklessly place property of another in danger of destruction or
damage. This crime is punished as a gross misdemeanor which entails imprisonment in
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This gradation of arson offenses provides more flexible and precise
laws which impose sanctions appropriately reflecting the actor's culpa-
bility and the risk created by his conduct. This note will focus prima-
rily on the crime of arson rather than the less dangerous offenses of
criminal mischief, reckless burning, and reckless endangerment of
property.
While the Code makes some substantive changes in the crime of
arson, the essence of the crime remains the same. Deeming burnings
or explosions which create a risk of danger to human life more culp-
able than those which merely damage property, the Code classifies
and punishes the arson offenses according to the type of structure
damaged and the risk of death or injury created.469 The crime of
arson has two requisite elements under the Code: (1) the intentional
causation of a fire or explosion470 and (2) resultant damage to a
building.471 The aggravating factors which raise the crime to first de-
gree arson are essentially the same under the Code47 2 and the present
the county jail for not more than one year and/or a fine of not more than $1,000.
R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(2).
468. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.080. Reckless endangerment of property, punishable as a
misdemeanor, requires that an actor, having no reasonable belief that he has the right to
do so, recklessly endanger the property of another in an amount exceeding $250.
469. The Code retains what might be called a traditional classification of arson. The
proposed California criminal code abandoned the classification of arson by degrees and
classifies fire related crimes in four categories: Aggravated Arson-burnings or explo-
sions of structures with the intent to injure a person or the intentional burning or explo-
sion of a structure which in fact injures a person or damages a structure in which there is
a person (STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE § 1072 (1971)); Arson-burning or exploding
a structure (Id., § 1076); Unlawfully causing a fire or explosion-causing a fire or ex-
plosion with the intention of damaging another's property or defrauding an insurer (Id.,
§ 1078); Unlawful possession of a flammable substance-the unlawful possession of a
flammable substance with the intent to commit aggravated arson or arson (Id., § 1080).
470. By including explosions in the definition of arson, the Code eliminates prob-
lems under the present law raised in attempting to interpret the phrase "set on fire." See
note 473 infra, concerning the content of the current statute. The present law recognizes
that a building has been set on fire if it has been scorched, charred, or burned. WASH.
REV. CODE 9.09.040 (1959).
471. A "building" under the Code is defined to include "any structure, vehicle,
railway car, aircraft or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons or for carrying
on business therein." R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.005(1).
472. Under the Proposed Code, first degree arson requires that the two basic ele-
ments exist and that either (1) the building was occupied and the actor knew or reason-
ably should have known it was occupied, or if the building was in fact unoccupied, the
actor knew or should have known that a person ordinarily was present, or (2) the burned
building was a "dwelling." R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.010(1). A "dwelling" is defined as any
building used "as a home or place of lodging." R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(8).
First degree arson is punishable as a first degree felony, subjecting the actor to impris-
onment in the state penitentiary for not less than twenty years and/or a fine of not more
than $10,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(l)(a).
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law. 473 The only major change is that under the Code, first degree
arson need not be committed at night. This broadening of the crime is
sensible and consistent with the principle that burnings which create a
risk to human life should be severely punished; most buildings are
occupied during the daytime, and unpredictable habitation patterns
make the chances of a dwelling's being occupied during a daytime
burning quite high.
The Code's second degree arson provision 474 is similar to that
found under present law.475 Under both statutes second degree arson
is a crime against property alone. Curiously, the Code retains the in-
tentional burning or exploding of hay, grain, crop or timber, whether
cut or standing, as second degree arson, punishable as a second degree
felony, while it relegates the intentional burning of wharves, docks,
threshing machines, etc., presently included in second degree arson, to
the lesser crime of criminal mischief.476 The Model Penal Code's
comments call such a dichotomy absurd, 477 and there appears to be
no logical reason for maintaining it.4 7 8 Third degree arson 479 requires
473. Under the present law, first degree arson requires that an actor either (1) will-
fully "burn or set on fire in the nighttime the dwelling house of another, or any building
in which there shall be at the time a human being," or (2) willfully "set any fire mani-
festly dangerous to any human life." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.09.010 (1963). The first de-
gree offense is punishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than
five years. Id.
474. Second degree arson requires, along with the two basic elements of arson, the
intentional burning or exploding of a building or any hay, grain, crop or timber,
whether cut or standing. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.020. It is punished as a second degree fel-
ony, authorizing imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than ten years
and/or a fine of not more than $10,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(l)(b).
475. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.09.020 (1965). Under the current statute, second degree
arson includes all willful burnings of:
any building, or any structure or erection appurtenant to or adjoining any build-
ing, or any wharf, dock, threshing machine, threshing engine, automobile or other
motor vehicle, motorboat, steamboat, sailboat, aircraft, bridge or trestle, or any
hay, grain, crop or timber, whether cut or standing, or any lumber, shingle or other
timber products, or other property ....
Second degree arson is presently punishable by not more than ten years in the state pen-
itentiary and/or a fine of not more than $5,000. Id.
476. See note 466 supra.
477. M.P.C. § 220.1(1), Comment at 35 (Tent.. Draft No. 11, 1960). The Model
Penal Code classifies all of these burnings as criminal mischief. M.P.C. § 220.3.
478. The retention of these burnings as second degree arson was possibly motivated
by the recent rash of haystack burnings in eastern Washington. One might question
whether a hay burner is more culpable than a dock burner and thus whether the distinc-
tion made by the drafters can be justified.
479. Under R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.030 third degree arson is a third degree felony, pun-
ishable by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not more than five years and/or a
fine of not more than $5,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(l)(c).
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only that the actor recklessly damage a building by intentionally ig-
niting a fire or causing an explosion. In contrast to the present statute,
the Code explicitly identifies affirmative defenses for all degrees of
arson.
480
The sanctions for fire-related crimes under the Code range from
those imposed for gross misdemeanors to those imposed for first de-
gree felonies. Not only is this range of punishment broader than that
found under the present law,481 but the strictest sanction is more se-
vere than that found under most modern penal codes.482
An apparent inconsistency in sanctions stems from the. Code's dis-
tinction between "dwelling" and "building." 483 If a person burns or
explodes an isolated dwelling which he knows is unoccupied, he is
guilty of first degree arson; yet if he intentionally burns or explodes a
building which is not ordinarily occupied but which, unknown to the
actor, in fact is occupied at that time by a person who is killed in the
burning or explosion, the actor is guilty of second degree arson, and is
subject to a lesser penalty. This apparent incongruity is resolved, how-
ever, since the actor may be found guilty of first degree murder when-
ever a person is killed in the perpetration of arson in any degree.484
480. There are two affirmative defenses to first degree arson. If the building dam-
aged ordinarily is occupied, it is an affirmative defense that no person other than a par-
ticipant in the crime was present in the building when it was burned or exploded and
that the actor knew of such a condition. If the damaged building is an unoccupied
dwelling it is an affirmative defense that no other person had a possessory or pecuniary
interest in the dwelling or that those who had such an interest gave their permission, and
that the actor's intention was to destroy the building for a lawful purpose. R.W.C.C. §
9A.48.010(2), (3). The affirmative defense to second degree arson is similar to the latter
of the two defenses to first degree arson, except that it applies to a fire or explosion that
damages any of the property involved in second degree arson and not to dwellings
alone. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.020(2). The third degree offense has as an affirmative defense
proof that no person other than the actor had an ownership interest in the building.
R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.030(2).
481. Compare notes 473 and 475 and accompanying text supra, with notes 472,474
and 479 and accompanying text supra.
482. See, e.g., M.P.C. § 220.1; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.15 (McKinney 1967); and
STAFF OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. FOR THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE, STATE
OF CALIFORNIA, THE CRIMINAL CODE § 1072 (1971). All of these punish their highest
degree of arson as a second degree felony. But see MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 2805
(Final Draft 1967) and ORE. LAWS ch. 743, § 144 (1971), which grade their highest
degree of arson as a first degree felony.
483. See notes 471-472 supra. The Code defines a "dwelling" as a building which is
used as a home or place of lodging, R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.130(8), while a "building" (in
addition to its ordinary meaning) refers to any structure used for overnight lodging or
business purposes. R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.005(1).
484. Prosecution in this situation could probably be brought under R.W.C.C. §
9A.32.020(l)(b)-where "under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to
human life, [the actor] recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death
to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person ...." Whether the
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Finally, in a few respects the Code has failed to accomplish its
manifest objectives in dealing with fire-related crimes. The unequal
treatment afforded hay burners and waif burners defeats one of the
Code's goals by unreasonably differentiating between similar crimes.485
Further, although both arson in the third degree486 and reckless
burning487 require an intentional burning or explosion, the actor who
actually damages a building by his reckless conduct is punished as a
third degree felon, while the actor whose reckless conduct fortuitously
does no damage is punished only as a gross misdemeanant. Not only
can the third degree felon be punished five times more severely than
the gross misdemeanant, but he must also bear the felon's social, eco-
nomic, and political stigma. To make the severity of the punishment
turn on the fortuity of the result is to contradict the Code's purpose of
differentiating upon reasonable grounds and deterring unlawful and
dangerous conduct.488
XI. BURGLARY
The burglary chapter of the Proposed Code comprehensively deals
with all knowing and unlawful entry upon or failure to leave the prop-
erty of another. 489 The chapter describes not only the crime of bur-
glary but also the offense of criminal trespass. Following the Michigan
plan,490 the burglary chapter of the Proposed Code establishes three
degrees of burglary491 and three degrees of criminal trespass, thus
combining all of the present disjointed law within one chapter and
actor could also be convicted under R.W.C.C. § 9A.32.020(1)(c)-a killing in the course
of a forcible felony-depends on clarification of the Code's term "forcible felony," i.e.,
whether the Code's definition of the crime or the actual result of the actor's conduct con-
trols. For a discussion of this problem, see the sections on assault and homicide in this
comment.
485. The objectives of the Code are to deter unlawful and dangerous conduct, to
safeguard conduct which is without culpability from being condemned as criminal, to
give fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to constitute an offense, and to
differentiate between more serious and more minor crimes on reasonable grounds while
preserving proportionate penalties for each. R.W.C.C. § 9A.04.020().
486. See note 479 and accompanying text supra.
487. See note 467 supra.
488. See note 485 supra.
489. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.52.
490. MIcH. REv. CRIM. CODE §§ 2601-2615 (Final Draft 1967).
491. The present Washington burglary law divides the crime into two degrees. See
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.19.010, .020 (1959).
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affording greater precision and flexibility to the definition and en-
forcement of the law.
Under the Code, the crime of burglary has three requisite elements.
An actor must (1) knowingly enter or remain unlawfully (2) in a
building (3) with the intent to commit a crime against a person or
property therein. The "enter or remain unlawfully" concept emphasizes
that which is essential to burglary, an intrusion upon premises without
license .or privilege, thereby assuring continuation of the historical
protection of property. At the same time, the Code modernizes the law
by eliminating two superfluous vestiges of the common law, the pre-
requisite of breaking and entering,492 and the requirement that the
crime be perpetrated during the nighttime.493 Burglary, under the
Code, remains an inchoate crime to the extent that the actor need
only intend to commit a crime against a person or property after
having entered or remained unlawfully in a building. As a result the
Code's treatment of the crime of burglary is both archaic and modern.
By retaining as the inchoate crime of burglary what in reality is a hy-
brid of criminal trespass and attempt, the Code reflects the common
law's inability to define and distinguish between conduct punishable as
criminal trespass and conduct punishable as attempt.494 However,
within these inarticulate parameters, the Code successfully streamlines
the crime of burglary by proscribing rather restricted conduct.
First degree burglary495 exists under the Code if the actor, armed
492. See PERKINS at 192-200. Note also that "breaking" may be an element of both
first and second degree burglary under the present law. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.19.010,
.020 (1959).
493. WASH. Rav. CODE § 9.19.010 (1959). Following the common law, Washington's
present burglary statute provides that first degree burglary can only be committed
during the nighttime. Evidently the drafters of the Code felt that daytime and nighttime
burglaries created similar risks while equally terrorizing the inhabitants of the burglar-
ized premises.
494. The Model Code intimates that the elimination of the crime of burglary would
probably be the best solution:
If we were writing on a clean slate, the best solution might be to eliminate burglary
as a distinct offense.... But we are not writing on a clean slate. Centuries of his-
tory and a deeply embedded Anglo-American conception like burglary cannot
easily be discarded. The needed reform must therefore take the direction of nar-
rowing the offense to something like the distinctive situation for which it was origi-
nally devised: invasion of premises under circumstances specially likely to ter-
rorize occupants.
M.P.C. § 22.1, Comment at 57 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960). The proposed Michigan code
refers approvingly to this passage in its commentary on burglary offenses. MICH. REv.
CRIM. CODE §§ 2610-2612, Comment at 200 (Final Draft 1967).
495. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.010. Under the present law, first degree burglary is punish-




with a deadly weapon, enters or remains unlawfully in a "dwelling" 496
with the intent to commit a crime against a person or peoperty
therein. The Code narrows the present first degree offense by re-
quiring that the actor's intent be to commit a crime against a person
or property within the entered dwelling, rather than merely to commit
"some crime therein" as under the current statute.497 This provision
prevents the commission of a minor regulatory crime from escalating
what would otherwise be criminal trespass to the more serious offense
of burglary. 498 In addition, the Code alters the present law by elim-
inating aggravation of the crime when physical injury is inflicted upon
a person within the entered structure. Since the intentional or reckless
infliction of serious injury constitutes first degree assault,499 there is
no reason to consider the same circumstances in grading burglary.
Second degree burglary under the Code requires either one of the
two first degree conditions-that the building burglarized be a dwell-
ing, or that the actor be armed with a deadly weapon.500 Burglary's
three requisite elements alone constitute the third degree offense.501
These two degrees of burglary fairly well divide the present second
degree burglary offense,502 penalizing the separate elements of the ex-
isting crime in proportion to the risk created by the conduct involved.
Entering a dwelling house of another, the most dangerous and terror-
izing aspect of present second degree burglary, is retained as a deter-
minant of second degree burglary; it is punished more severely under
the Code than is entering a building, room, or other structure in which
any property is kept, an element which creates less risk and conse-
quently receives a lesser sanction as third degree burglary under the
(1959). The Code punishes first degree burglary as a first degree felony, i.e., by impris-
onment in the state penitentiary for not less than twenty years and/or a fine of not more
than $10,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(I)(a). Other model penal codes do not punish bur-
glary so severely. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.20-.30 (McKinney 1967). Evidently
the drafters of the Code felt that the magnitude of the risk created to human life when an
actor enters a dwelling armed with a deadly weapon warrants the highest degree
of punishment.
496. A "dwelling" is defined as any building "used or ordinarily used by a person
for lodging." R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.005(2). A "building" is defined to include "any struc-
ture, vehicle, railway car, aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging of persons or for
carrying on business therein." R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.005(l).
497. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.010 (1959).
498. Under the Code all degrees of burglary are felonies and require that the actor
intend to commit a crime against a person or property. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.52.010-.030.
499. R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.010.
500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.020.
501. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.030.
502. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.020 (1959).
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Code.503 Thus the Code succeeds in better defining appropriate sanc-
tions for criminal conduct.
In prosecutions for first and second degree burglary under the
Code, there is a presumption that any person who knowingly enters or
remains unlawfully in a dwelling shall be deemed to have intended to
commit a crime against a person or property therein.504 The present
law has a similar provision.505 Also, under the Code an actor may not
be sentenced for both the crime he intended to commit and burglary,
even though he may be prosecuted for both.50 6 The present draft of
the Code contains no crime concerning the possession of burglar
tools; however, the comments to the Code indicate that a section will
be drafted dealing with this crime.507
The Code is flawed by its inconsistent punishment of similar crim-
inal intents and of equivalent risk creation. The actor who commits an
armed burglary in an occupied building with the intent to commit a
crime against a person or property therein creates as great a risk as
the armed burglar who enters a dwelling with the same intent.508 Yet
503. The Code's allocation of punishment for second and third degree burglary
seems more appropriate than the present laws punishment of the two different elements
with the same sanction. The present law punishes all conduct constituting second degree
burglary by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for a maximum of fifteen years.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.020 (1959). The Code classifies second degree burglary as a
second degree felony (R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.020(2)), which is punishable by not more than
ten years in the state penitentiary and/or not more than a $10,000 fine. R.W.C.C. §
9A.20.020(l)(b). Third degree burglary is a third degree felony under the Code
(R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.030), punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not
more than five years and/or not more than a $5,000 fine. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(1)(c).
504. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.025.
505. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.030 (1959). However, the Proposed Code restricts the
times when this presumption can be applied. Under the Code, the person must have
knowingly entered or remained unlawfully in a dwelling (R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.025), while
the present law requires only unlawful entry or unlawful breaking and entering a
building or structure. Under both the present law and the Code, this presumption can be
overcome by an explanation to the jury that such entry was made without criminal in-
tent.
506. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.035. The present law allows punishment for both the crime
committed and burglary. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.040 (1959). The comments to the
Code at p. 217 state the reason for this change as follows:
... no useful social purpose is furthered by allowing cumulative sentences for rela-
tively minor offenses to be added to a felony prosecution for burglary, whereas if
the sentence for the "extra" crime is greater than for the burglary no point is served
by sentencing for both.
507. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.52, Comment at 213. Under the present law, possession
of burglar tools is prima facie evidence of intent to use such in the commission of
crime, and simply making, mending or possessing such tools is a gross misdemeanor.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.19.050 (1959).
508. However, it could be argued that the armed burglar creates a greater risk
in a dwelling than in a building, because the occupant is more likely to respond in-
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the former is guilty of second degree burglary while the latter may be
convicted of first degree burglary. The resulting disparate sanctions
perhaps can be justified by the presumption that a person burglarizing
a building has more control over the risk he creates than does the bur-
glar of a dwelling; however, such a presumption does not seem war-
ranted when one considers that the armed burglar of a crowded
country club creates a greater risk to human life than does the armed
burglar of a dwelling which the actor knows is unoccupied.
Criminal trespass differs from burglary in that the entry or failure
to leave need not be accompanied by an intent to commit a crime, nor
need the entry be into a building. The underlying concept of the entire
burglary chapter-knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully-is
basic to criminal trespass.509 The severity of the cime is determined
by the type of property trespassed upon. If the property is a dwelling,
the crime is first degree criminal trespass,510 punishable as a gross
misdemeanor;511 if it is a building, or real property which is fenced or
otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, it is
second degree criminal trespass, 51 2 punishable as a misdemeanor;51 3 if
the property is merely the premises of another, it is third degree crim-
inal trespass514 and is a violation. 515 The Code lists three affirmative
defenses to the crime of criminal trespass,516 the most useful of which
is abandonment of the building or dwelling.
stinctively with counter-force to protect his home and family than to defend himself
in another building. This distinction is recognized in the justification section of the
Proposed Code, which imposes no obligation to retreat from one's dwelling or
place of work. R.W.C.C. § 9A.16.040(3)(c)(i). See the section on justification in this
comment.
509. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.52.040-.060.
510. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.040.
511. A gross misdemeanor is punished by imprisonment in the county jail for not
more than one year and/or a fine of not more than $1,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(2).
512. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.050.
513. Under the Code a misdemeanor is punished by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than ninety days and/or a fine of not more than $500. R.W.C.C. §
9A.20.020(3).
514. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.060.
515. Under the Code a violation may be punished only by a fine of not more than
$500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4).
516. R.W.C.C. § 9A.52.065 provides the following affirmative defenses to criminal
trespass: (1) the building or dwelling was abandoned; (2) the premises were at the time
open to the public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access
to or remaining in the premises; or (3) the actor reasonably believed that the owner of
the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed
him to enter or remain.
The third affirmative defense differs from a mistake of fact defense under R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.040(1)(a) (negating the mental state of knowledge which is an element of criminal
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XII. THEFT AND ROBBERY
A.. Theft
Consolidation of the theft-related offenses of larceny, false preten-
ses, and embezzlement into the single crime of theft is the Proposed
Code's chief innovation in the theft section.517 The current Wash-
ington larceny statute merely lists these common law theft offenses,518
thus retaining the substantive distinctions that plagued the common
law.519 The crux of the new theft offense is the single social evil of
obtaining control over the property of another with intent to divert it
to the actor's own purposes.520 By focusing on one central element,
the Proposed Code eliminates many of the technical complexities of
the common law and facilitates the more efficient administration of
justice.
The theft sections of the Proposed Code consolidate only larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses, 521 treating other related offenses as
separate crimes.522 At first glance, this separation of offenses might
trespass) in requiring proof that the actor's belief was reasonable, a condition not im-
posed by the mistake of fact provision.
All affirmative defenses operate to shift the burden of proof to the prosecution once
the defendant offers some evidence supporting the affirmative defense. R.W.C.C. §
9A.04.120.
517. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.010-.040.
518. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.54.010 (1959). The five common law offenses collected
in the current Washington statute as subcategories of larceny include: (1) the typical
trespassory taking, (2) taking by false pretenses, (3) taking by embezzlement, (4) appro-
priating property received by mistake, and (5) receiving stolen property.
519. For a case so stating, see State v. Thompson, 68 Wn.2d 536, 413 P.2d 951
(1966). As anyone familiar with the common law offenses knows, the distinctions be-
tween the offenses are many and perplexing. For example, if a fiduciary lawfully re-
ceives property of the owner and subsequently forms the intent to misappropriate it, he
is guilty of embezzlement. If the same fiduciary receives property of the owner with in-
tent at that time to misappropriate it, he is not guilty of embezzlement, but rather lar-
ceny. Thus the rather important distinction between larceny and embezzlement turns on
the ephemeral criterion of when the intent was formed. For more examples of the per-
plexing distinctions, see PERKINS at 247-48.
520. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.010.
521. Most revised codes contain a similar consolidation in the area of theft, see,
e.g., MicH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 3205 (Final Draft 1967). However, the Model Penal
Code provides for consolidation of the additional theft-related offenses of extortion,
blackmail, fraudulent conversion, receiving stolen property, appropriation of lost or
misdelivered property, theft of services and unauthorized use of a vehicle under the
simple theft heading. See M.P.C. §§ 223.1-.9.
522. Thus appropriation of lost or misdelivered property, R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.050;
theft of services, R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.060; unauthorized use of a vehicle, R.W.C.C. §
9A.56.070; extortion, R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.090-.110; receiving stolen property,
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.120-.150; obscuring the identity of a machine, R.W.C.C. §
9A.56.155; and robbery, R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.160, are separate crimes under the Code.
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seem to reinstate the problems created by pre-consolidation law. But
the technical distinctions which infused common law theft crimes
were most prevalent in larceny, false pretenses, and embezzlement
offenses,52 3 and the drafters obviously believed that each of the other
offenses was sufficiently distinct to justify separation.
Examination of the crimes not included in the theft provision of the
Proposed Code largely validates the drafters' decision to treat them
separately. For example, appropriation of lost or misdelivered prop-
erty and unauthorized use of a vehicle are distinguished from theft
because they are clearly less culpable offenses than the theft crimes.5 24
Robbery and extortion are also not consolidated in the theft provision
because these crimes stress the accompanying elements of force or
threat rather than the underlying theft.525
However, two offenses which are treated separately, recovery of
stolen property and theft of services, might seem appropriate for in-
clusion in the consolidated theft offenses. Receiving stolen property
differs from the theft offenses because it proscribes conduct that takes
place after the initial theft-"retaining" and "disposing" of the prop-
erty. But if "receiving" is not consolidated under theft, then if there is
a doubt about whether the possessor of the stolen item is a thief or a
receiver, an allegation charging one may fail if the other is actually
proven. 526 This problem can easily be avoided, however, by alterna-
tively alleging theft or receiving.527
Theft of services differs from the consolidated theft offenses only in
the subject matter of the theft (services instead of goods). Thus it may
be appropriate to consolidate this offense with the other theft of-
523. See note 519 supra.
524. In appropriation of lost or misdelivered property, the culpability is reduced
because the planning stage is not present. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.050. Unauthorized use of a
vehicle is less culpable than theft because the actor must only know that the vehicle is
stolen; there is no requirement that he intend to deprive the owner of the vehicle perma-
nently. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.070(l). For a discussion of these two offenses, see text accom-
panying notes 536 and 545 infra.
525. Thus extortion and robbery are graded according to the seriousness of the ag-
gravating circumstances rather than the amount of money involved in the theft offenses.
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.100,.170. For a discussion of these offenses, see text accompanying
notes 548 and 566 infra.
526. See M.P.C. § 206.8, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954).
527. Arguably an allegation of "receiving" may be sufficient to allege both offenses,
because "receiving" is broadly defined as "intentionally to receive, retain, or dispose of
stolen property knowing that it has been stolen." R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.120(l).
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fenses.528 However, since tangible goods are not involved, this offense
is clearly'distinguishable from the consolidated theft offenses.529
Thus, except for the possible qualifications above mentioned, the
Proposed Code's consolidation-separation scheme seems quite appro-
priate.
The other major change in the proposed theft statute involves
grading. Currently, the penalty structure is divided into two categories
-grand larceny and petit larceny.530 The Code proposes a three-level
penalty structure, with the degree of penalty depending on both the
amount stolen and other factors.531 If over $1,500 is stolen, or the
theft is from the person of the victim, the crime is first degree theft
and is punished as a second degree felony. This replaces the rather
paltry $75 minimum under the present law, and substitutes a max-
imum penalty of ten years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine for the
current maximum of fifteen years. This change reflects the drafters'
recognition that inflation compels a corresponding redefinition of
theft.
If property worth between $250 and $1,500 is stolen, the crime is
second degree theft, which is a third degree felony imposing a max-
imum penalty of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine. This
second degree provision also includes theft of credit cards, the inclu-
sion of which seems warranted to deter the widespread misuse of
credit cards in theft schemes.532
For amounts less than $250, the crime is third degree theft, punish-
528. The present definition of property does not include services. R.W.C.C. §
9A.56.005(7). If the offenses were consolidated this definition would have to be ex-
panded.
529. As noted previously, the consolidated common law theft offenses-larceny,
embezzlement, and false pretenses-are difficult to distinguish and are plagued with
technicalities. See note 519 supra.
530. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.090 (1959). Grand larceny includes:
(1) Theft from the person of the victim,
(2) Theft from a building on fire,
(3) Theft of public records,
(4) Theft of a horse or other animal from a pasture,
(5) Theft of over $25 by means of a bad check,(6) Theft of over $75.
Every other theft is petit larceny. The Proposed Code provides no special treatment for
theft from a building on fire, theft of an animal from pasture, nor theft of $25 or over by
means of a bad chedk. These changes are in keeping with the thought that the method
(except for forceful takings) of wrongfully obtaining property is not as significant as the
amount wrongfully obtained.
531. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.020-.040.




able as a gross misdemeanor. The penalty for a gross misdemeanor is
the same as that now imposed for petit larceny. 533
The final change in the theft section is one of language with little
prospective substantive impact. The present larceny statute requires
only an intent to deprive the owner of his property, while the pro-
posed section requires an "intent permanently to deprive" another of
his property. 534 However, the phrase "permanently to deprive" is de-
fined to include those instances where the deprivation might not ac-
tually be permanent but would nevertheless result in the loss of a
major portion of the economic value of the property. 535 Thus the re-
quirement that an intent permanently to deprive be shown precludes
theft prosecution for mere unauthorized use, but still includes those
instances where such use results in significant economic loss to the
owner.
B. Appropriation of Lost or Misdelivered Property
Appropriation of lost or stolen property is considered a less culp-
able offense than the other theft offenses, and for this reason is treated
in a separate section.5 36
A significant inclusion in this section is the coverage of one who
knowingly steals "lost"property. This behavior is clearly as deserving
of punishment as is theft of misdelivered property,5 37 but current
Washington law does not explicitly proscribe such conduct. 538 The
new provision closes the gap in the statutory provisions, and makes it
533. The maximum penalty for a gross misdemeanor is one year's imprisonment
and a $1,000 fine. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(2). Most other codes also structure the penalty
for theft in a multidivision fashion. Each code varies in the circumstances that gauge the
relative seriousness of the penalty. The divergence is difficult to judge, but in general,
the system suggested by the Proposed Code seems appropriate. See MICH. REV. CRIM.
CODE §§ 3206-3208 (Final Draft 1967); M.P.C. § 223.1(2); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 155.25-
.40 (McKinney 1967).
534. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.010.
535. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.005(3).
536. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.050.
537. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.54.010(4) (1959) prohibits appropriation of misdelivered
property, but there is no statutory provision covering appropriation of lost property.
538. No Washington cases have decided the issue, but the offense was covered at
common law in cases in which the finder had a clue as to the ownership. See PERKINS
at 25 1. The new Code is even more stringent since it seems to require notice to a po-
lice officer whether or not there is a clue to ownership.
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clear that to avoid criminal liability, the finder must take positive steps
to return the property to its owner.539
The other change is one of penalty. Because appropriation of lost
or misdelivered goods is considered a less culpable offense than other
types of theft, it deserves a lesser penalty. Consequently, instead of the
fifteen year maximum specified under the current statute, the Pro-
posed Code reduces the maximum term of imprisonment to one year,
classifying this conduct as a gross misdemeanor if the amount stolen
exceeds $250; as a misdemeanor if the amount is between $50
and $250; and as a violation if the property does not exceed $50 in
value.540
C. Theft of Services
The theft of services provision 541 prohibits the obtaining of services
with intent to avoid payment. Under the current law, this conduct is
punishable under a motley assortment of separate statutes.542
Although the definition of services in the new Code lists several
types of activities to which it applies, the drafters clearly indicated
their intent to apply the new offense to all types of services. 543
Finally, the Proposed Code eliminates the presumption of guilt for
persons absconding from the premises without paying.544 The former
presumption is inconsistent with the Code's general principle that the
state has the burden of proving the basic criminal elements.
539. The positive action includes, but is not necessarily limited to, notifying the
police. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.050(2).
540. R.W.C.C.§ 9A.56.050(3). Thus the maximum penalty for commission of this
offense is one year in the county jail and/or a fine of not more than $1,000. R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.20.020(2). This three-fold distinction is consistent with the Code's perspective on
money value (inflation) and the relative impact on society of criminal conduct.
541. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.060.
542. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.45.040 (1959) (obtaining accommodations by
fraud). There is no general statute covering theft of services, because the word "prop-
erty" as defined for theft does not include "services."
543. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.005(9). The definition of services is expressly not limited to
the types of activities listed. This provision is in substantial accord with the Model
Penal Code, M.P.C. § 223.7, but differs from the New York code which includes only
specified types of services. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 165.15 (McKinney 1967). The reason
that the New York code limits the types of services subject to the theft provision is
that otherwise "legislation would doubtless lead to hosts of criminal charges of a basic-
ally civil nature." Id., Practice Commentary, at 506. This fear probably stems from the
semblance of these service crimes to civil debts, but if the thief obtains the service and
at the same time intends to avoid payment, the action can rightly be said to be crimi-
nal in nature.




D. Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle
The crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle is broadened somewhat
under the Proposed Code. The definition of vehicle has been ex-
panded beyond "automobile" to include aircraft and all machines
powered mechanically and by sail. 545 The only other change is one of
grading. Instead of the current felony classifications, the new Code
grades this offense as a gross misdemeanor. 546 The lesser penalty
seems appropriate due to the lesser intent required for this crime, i.e.,
there need be no intent to permanently deprive the owner of his
property. However, if the actor recklessly or with criminal negligence
destroys or substantially damages the vehicle, the crime then be-
comes a third degree felony. The drafters seem inconsistent in hing-
ing the higher penalty on the fortuity of whether the vehicle is
destroyed or damaged. The behavior the law seeks to deter is un-
authorized use, because such use creates a risk of both physical and
economic injury. These risks are the same regardless of whether the
vehicle is actually destroyed or damaged. If the risk of damage merits
more severe sanction, then the whole penalty should be increased.
Actual destruction is a separate offense, properly punishable else-
where.5 47
E. Extortion
The proposed extortion provision is very similar to the current
Washington law. The basic element, gaining property by threat, is un-
changed. However, the Proposed Code simplifies the law so that only
intentional acquisition of another's property is covered. 548 In contrast,
the existing extortion law also proscribes compelling another to "make
or destroy.., any writing intended to affect any cause of action or
defense. '549 The current extortion statute also includes obtaining
545. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.005(13), referring for the definition of "vehicle" to §
9A.04.130(26).
546. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.070(2). The maximum penalty for a gross misdemeanor
under the Code is one year imprisonment and a $1,000 fine. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020. The
existing statute imposes a penalty of ten years' imprisonment. WASH. REV. CODE §§
9.54.020, 9.92.010 (1959).
547. See, e.g., R.W.C.C. § 9A.48.080, reckless endangerment of property.
548. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.090.
549. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.33.010 (1959). To the extent that compelling anyone to
make an instrument transfers property, the offense is covered by the new Code. How-
ever, compelling another to make an instrument that does not result in transfer of prop-
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property "by means of force," while the Code separates extortion
from robbery by defining extortion as a threat of bodily injury in the
future, and robbery as a threat of immediate injury.
The Proposed Code simplifies extortion land other related offenses
by eliminating the redundant current blackmail provision 50 and by
shifting the current offense of extortion by a public officer 551 into the
bribery and corrupt influences section of the Code. 552 The main
change in the extortion provision is, as in other theft offenses, a
grading change. The current extortion statute lists five types of threats
which are penalized identically.553 The Code substantially expands
this list and makes the penalty dependent on the nature of the threat.554
If the threat is one of physical violence against persons or property, it
constitutes extortion in the first degree, a second degree felony. All
other types of threats constitute second degree extortion, punishable
as third degree felonies. The expanded list is very inclusive, as it
should be, for the objective of an extortion statute is to penalize all
acquisition of property by threat. If a particular kind of threat creates
sufficient fear in the victim to cause him to give up his property, the
action should be an offense.
It is arguable that the proposed section is overly broad in one re-
spect. Included in the list of threats constituting second degree extor-
tion is the threat "to do any ... act which is intended to harm substan-
erty or compelling another to destroy an instrument are not, and should not be included
under extortion. Rather, such non-theft offenses come more appropriately under the of-
fense of coercion, R.W.C.C. § 9A.36.070.
550. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.33.050(1959).
551. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.33.040 (1959).
552. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.68.
553. WASH. REV. CODE-§ 9.33.010 (1959) lists these five threats:
(1) To accuse anyone of a crime,
(2) To do any injury to any person or to any property,
(3) To publish or to connive at publishing any libel,
(4) To expose or impute to any person any deformity or disgrace,
(5) To expose any secret.
The current penalty for extortion is not more than five years in the state penitentiary.
554. In addition to the threats listed under the current extortion statute, see note
553 supra, the proposed provision, R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.005(1 1), includes the following
threats: (c) to subject the person threatened or any other person to physical confinement
or restraint; (g) to testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information
with respect to another's legal claim or defense; (h) to take wrongful action as an offi-
cial; (i) to bring about or continue a strike, boycott or other similar collective action to
obtain property which is not demanded or received for the benefit of the group which the
actor purports to represent; (6) to do any act which is intended to harm substantially the




tially the person threatened with respect to his... business (or) finan-
cial condition." 555 As drafted, it is arguable that this section could be
applied inappropriately to instances of normal economic bargaining.
Other codes have qualified this provision by requiring that the action
be without benefit to the actor, 556 thereby limiting its application to
those instances where the harm threatened is purely gratuitous.
F. Receiving Stolen Property
The offense of receiving stolen property, currently included under
Washington's broad larceny statute,5 57 constitutes a separate offense
under the Code.558 However, the basic elements of the crime (inten-
tionally receiving, retaining or disposing of property knowing that it
has been stolen) have not been changed. 55 9 The Proposed Code spe-
cifically includes the affirmative defense that the stolen property was
received with the intent to restore it to the owner. There is no similar
provision in the present statute, but the defense has been recognized in
case law.560 The Code also makes it clear that identification of the
original thief is not a prerequisite to a prosecution for receipt of stolen
property. While no case has been found directly on this point, the
principle is obviously implied in cases of "receiving" in which there
has been no conviction for the theft.
The Proposed Code grades the offense of "receiving" differently
from the current law. Instead of the rigid larceny penalty, the Code
555. See note 554 supra.
556. See M.P.C. § 223.4(g) and MIcH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 3201(xi) (Final Draft
1967).
557. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.54.010(5) (1959).
558. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.120. The Proposed Code makes unnecessary the "aid in
concealing or withholding" section. Insofar as the thief's actual conduct is concerned,
concealment adds nothing because the conduct is obviously covered by the specification
"retain"; insofar as others (not the thief or the receivers) aid in concealing, their conduct
would seem to be included under the accessorial sections of the Proposed Code. See,
e.g., R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.060; ch. 9A.76.
559. The language of the Proposed Code (receive, retain, dispose) seems a clearer
statement (and possibly broader) than "buy, sell, receive or aid in concealing or with-
holding" as specified under the current section.
560. State v. Martin, 94 Wash. 313, 162 P. 356 (1917). It should be noted that intent
to restore is not a valid defense to embezzlement, State v. Larson, 123 Wash. 21, 211 P.
885 (1923); nor to larceny, State v. Black, 163 Wash. 237, 1 P.2d 206 (1931); nor to
false pretenses, State v. Adams, 144 Wash. 363, 258 P. 23 (1927). The obvious reason
for this is that these crimes are complete on the taking and an inlent to restore does not
change the fact that the victim is harmed by the deprivation of the property, even if it be
only temporarily.
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imposes a three-fold penalty identical to that used in the theft sec-
tions. 561
G. Obscuring Identity of a Machine
The Proposed Code makes it a gross misdemeanor to obscure the
distinguishing marks (serial numbers) of a vehicle with intent to
render it unidentifiable, or knowingly to possess such an obscured ve-
hicle for resale.562 The current law comes very close to imposing abso-
lute liability on persons innocently possessing an obscured vehicle.563
The Code attempts to rectify this situation by removing the present
provision making mere possession prima facie evidence of guilt, by
limiting the prosecution to those who actually obscure the numbers or
persons holding machines for resale, and by allowing avoidance of
prosecution by informing the proper authorities of the obscuring.
By limiting the prosecution to sellers in the course of business, 564
the Proposed Code appears to go too far.565 Such a limitation means
that one who purchases a machine for his personal use with actual
knowledge that the serial number has been altered will not be subject
to prosecution, while one who possesses a machine for resale with sim-
ilar knowledge would be punishable under the Code. It is difficult to
justify this result in terms of the .actor's culpability. Elimination of this
limitation would have no detrimental effects, because innocent pur-
chasers are protected by the Code's requirement of knowledge, and
those who innocently received the vehicle but later acquired knowl-
edge of the alteration could be exculpated under the Code by noti-
fying the proper authorities.
561. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.130-.150.
562. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.155.
563. WASH. REV. CODE 99 9.54.030,-.040 (1959).
564. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.155(l)(b).
565. The Code punishes one who "possesses a vehicle or machine held for sale in the
course of business knowing that the serial number or other identification number or
mark has been obscured." R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.155(l)(b). Since "machine" is defined as
any machinery or device held for sale in the course of business," it-is most likely (in
terms of both grammar and equity) that the quoted reference in R.W.C.C. §
9A.56.155(I)(b) constitutes a redundant statement of the Code's definition of machine,
which is not intended to modify the phrase "possesses a vehicle." If this is the correct
construction, knowing possession of an obscured vehicle would be punishable under the
Code. This ambiguity should be clarified by deleting the words "held for sale in the





The robbery provision of the Proposed Code is basically similar to
the present law in proscribing the use or threat of immediate force in
the course of committing or attempting to commit a theft.56 6 How-
ever, the new Code does slightly change the definition and scope of
the current robbery provision 567 and substantially changes its grading.
First, instead of defining robbery to encompass threats of imme-
diate or future injury,5 68 the Code includes only threats of immediate
injury.569 Second, unlike the present law, the Code does not require
that the taking be in the presence of the victim. 570 This change prob-
ably is insignificant since the taking usually occurs in the presence of
the victim anyway. 571 Whereas the present law emphasizes the prop-
erty aspect of robbery by requiring that property actually be taken
from the victim, the Proposed Code deems the attack rather than the
theft to be of prime import, and therefore defines robbery to include
all phases of the act from the attempt to rob through the flight there-
from.57
2
The other major change is in the penalty structure. The proposed
section eliminates the rather harsh and inflexible mandatory minimum
five year sentence imposed under current law and establishes two de-
grees of robbery.57 3 Robbery in the first degree is established if in the
course of committing the robbery or in immediate flight therefrom the
actor is armed with a deadly weapon. However, if the robber can
show that the weapon with which he was armed was unloaded, then
the robbery is treated as one of second degree. Robbery in the first
566. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.160.
567. The Code eliminates the separate offenses of interfering with a railroad with
intent to commit robbery, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.75.020 (1959), and robbing sluice
boxes, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.75.030 (1959).
568. The present statute has been so interpreted. State v. Casto, 120 Wash. 557, 207
P. 952 (1922).
569. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.160. Threat of future injury is included in the extortion sec-
tion of the Proposed Code. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.090.
570. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.75.010 (1959).
571. However, to the extent that there would be cases in which a threat of use of
immediate force could be made against a victim not in his presence, (e.g., a threat to
shoot the victim in order to force him to telephone directions for the dispositions of
property located elsewhere), such cases are subject to the same increased risks as where
the taking is in the actual presence of the victim and thus should be included as robbery.
572. R.W.C.C. § 9A.56.170(l).
573. Compare WASH. REV. CODE § 9.75.010 (1959) with R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.56.170-
.190.
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degree is a first degree felony. All other robberies are second degree
felonies.57 4
XIII. FRAUD
In the area of fraud, the Proposed Code makes no significant
changes in the current law. Primary emphasis has been placed on clar-
ification, of the law,575 with some adjustment being made in grading.
The current grading of forgery involves consideration of a maze of
complex factors. 576 The Proposed Code substitutes a structure based
primarily on consideration of two crucial factors: (1) the need for
guaranteeing to the public the authenticity of instruments and records
on which the community is accustomed to rely, and (2) the ease with
which a particular activity might result in a large scale fraud.
The Proposed Code establishes a three-fold penalty based on the
above factors. First degree forgery consists of forging: (a) part of an
issue of stamps, securities or other valuable instruments issued by a
governmental agency, or (b) part of an issue of corporate stocks,
bonds or other similar instruments. This classification seems logical
because both of the above-mentioned elements are present in these
situations. Second degree forgery proscribes forgery of certain public
574. It is surprising that the proposed section does not contain a provision raising
the classification of the robbery where it is committed by two or more persons. The
added presence of an accomplice indicates greater planning and therefore a greater like-
lihood that the criminals are professionals. There is also a greater chance of violence
erupting, since the criminals emotionally reinforce each other. Consequently, inclusion
of this factor delineating a separate degree in between the proposed first and second
degree penalties would seem appropriate. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL CODE § 160.10 (Mc-
Kinney 1967); MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 3306(1) (Final Draft 1967). Under the
Code a first degree felony, imposes a minimum sentence of twenty years' imprison-
ment or a maximum of $10,000 fine. A second degree felony imposes a maximum sen-
tence of ten years' imprisonment and $10,000. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(l)(a), (b).
575. The Code simplifies the various current related offenses. For example, falsely
indicating person as corporate or public officer, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.44.070 (1959),
and true-writing signed by wrongdoer's name, WASH. REV. CODE § 9.44.070 (1959), are
incorporated under the broader definition to "falsely make" and to "falsely com-
plete," R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.005(4), (5). False certificate to certain instruments, WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.44.030 (1959), is more properly included under the perjury section
R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.76. And misconduct in signing a petition, WASH. REV. CODE §
9.44.080, is superfluous because it is already included in sections 29.79.440-.490, and
29.82.170-.220, which cover elections and petitions.
Finally, the Code includes uttering of a forged instrument or the possession with in-
tent to utter in its definitional section. This behavior is now penalized under WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.44.060 (1959).
576. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.44.010, .020(1959).
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documents and commercial instruments. 577 This type of forgery is
dangerous because it inhibits the free flow of commerce, but it does
not lend itself to large-scale frauds and hence is relegated to a lesser
penalty. Third degree forgery includes all other forgeries.
Current law authorizes that the crime of obtaining a signature by
deception be punished alternatively as a five-year felony or as a gross
misdemeanor. Such an alternative felony-misdemeanor penalty raises
possible constitutional problems 578 which the Proposed Code elimi-
nates by making the crime punishable only as a gross misdemeanor.
The Proposed Code defines the crime of criminal impersonation as
the doing of an act with intent to defraud another by a person who
has assumed a false identity.57 9 This provision is much clearer than
the current statute which makes false impersonation hinge on doing
one of several particular acts while in disguise,5 80 but it is question-
able whether there is any need for this section at all. The drafters state
in the comments that "the section is designed to prohibit misrepresen-
tations of identity for fraudulent purposes before the conduct reaches
the stage of attempted theft or theft."' 581 Attempted theft covers acts
that are done with the specific intent to steal and which are a substan-
tial step toward the commission of the offense, and theft itself covers
the completed crime. It is of doubtful wisdom to define a crime as
577. Forgery in the second degree includes forgery of:
(a) deeds, wills, codicils, contracts, assignments, commercial instruments, and
credit cards;
(b) public records; and
(c) written instruments officially issued by a public office or public employee.
R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.020.
578. The case of In re Olsen v. Delmore, 48 Wn.2d 545, 295 P.2d 324 (1956), struck
down WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.160 as constituting an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection, because it authorized prosecuting officials to use discretion in seeking dif-
ferent level penalties against individuals for commission of the same activity. The pen-
alties presently prescribed for obtaining a signature by deception are subject to the same
criticism.
579. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.050.
580. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.34.010 (1959). The acts include:
(1) Marriage,
(2) Becoming bail or surety for a party,
(3) Confessing a judgment,
(4) Subscribing, verifying, etc., any written instrument,
(5) Appearing for arraignment, etc., in any criminal proceding,
(6) Doing any act that would occasion a criminal or civil penalty if engaged in by
the impersonated person.
581. R.W.C.C. § 9A.60.050, Comment at 272.
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imposing an actus reus requirement less stringent than that necessary
in a prosecution for attempt. 582
XIV. FAMILY OFFENSES
A. Bigamy
The Proposed Code provides that a person is guilty of bigamy "if
he intentionally marries or purports to marry another person when
either person has a living spouse. '583 This provision is less inclusive
than the present statute under which continued cohabitation with the
second spouse is a crime.584 Thus, a bigamous marriage in another
state followed by cohabitation in Washington would no longer be
criminal under the Proposed Code.585
The Proposed Code specifies three affirmative defenses to the crime
of bigamy. The first is the actor's reasonable belief that the prior
spouse was dead586 and is similar to the defense available under cur-
rent law that the first spouse has been absent for five years and is be-
lieved to be dead. 587 However, the Proposed Code abandons the
rather arbitrary five year limitation and instead requires that the belief
in the first spouse's death be reasonable. 588 The second affirmative
defense is a court's judgment terminating or annuling the prior mar-
riage. This provision is also similar to current law,589 except the Pro-
posed Code adds the requirement that the actor did not know the
judgment was invalid.590 The third affirmative defense, exculpating an
582. Especially is this so when we consider the drafters' resolution of the attempt
section. In that section, they substantially revamped the current law because of dissatis-
faction with the fact that the current law punished as attempts deeds that were not suffi-
ciently advanced to be considered culpable (i.e., deeds that were too near the stage of
mere preparation). See R.W.C.C. § 9A.28.010, Comment.
583. R.W.C.C § 9A.64.010.
584. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.15.010, .020 (1959).
585. This is not likely to happen often, but it did occur in one of Washington's
few reported bigamy cases. State v. Lewis, 46 Wn.2d 438, 282 P.2d 297 (1955).
586. Specification of this reasonable mistake of fact defense overrides the normal mis-
take of fact defense otherwise available under R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.040(l)(a). See notes
109-111 and accompanying text supra.
587. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.15.010(1) (1959).
588. The current Washington bigamy statute does not expressly impose a mens rea
requirement, and it is not clear whether a mistake of fact would be a defense. How-
ever, by inference, State v. Deloria, 129 Wash. 497, 225 P. 405 (1924), permits a rea-
sonable mistake of fact, which would be consistent with recent authority in other jur-
isdictions. See, e.g., People v. Vogel, 46 Cal. 2d 798, 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
589. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.15.010(2) (1959).
590. It is unclear whether the actor can successfully assert this affirmative de-
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actor who reasonably believed that he was legally eligible to marry, is
new to Washington law.
The penalty for bigamy under the Proposed Code is approximately
the same as under present law.5 91
B. Incest
The Proposed Code defines incest as sexual intercourse with an
ancestor, descendant, brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, or
stepchild or adopted child under eighteen years of age.592 The inclu-
sion of incestuous intercourse between consenting adults and with
stepchildren or adopted children demonstrates the dual purposes of
the provision: to prevent genetic defects and to prevent the exertion of
undue influence.593 Current law covers a slightly broader class of rela-
tives by defining incest as sexual intercourse between persons related
in the fifth degree or closer by rules of civil law;594 it does not include
stepchildren, however.595 Furthermore, unlike present law,596 the
Proposed Code requires that the actor have knowledge of the relation-
ship, thus allowing the affirmative defense of mistake of fact.597
The Proposed Code provides no special penalty for incest with
children, but instead relies on the statutory rape provisions to provide
stiffer penalties for such conduct.598 The effectiveness of this proposed
fense if he did not know of the invalid judgment at the time he entered into the big-
amous marriage. Presumably judicial construction will require that the actor actually
rely upon the invalid judgment before this defense can be successfully asserted.
591. Currently a bigamist is punished by up to five years imprisonmerit. WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.15.010 (1959). A consort may be punished by up to five years or a
$1,000 fine. WASH REV. CODE § 9.15.020 (1959). Under the Proposed Code bigamy
is a third degree felony which is punished by up to five years and/or a $5,000 fine.
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.64.010(3), 9A.20.020(1)(c).
592. The relationship may be legitimate or illegitimate. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020(1)
and (2).
593. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020, Comment.
594. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.090 (1959). The Proposed Code's narrower defi-
nition, excluding such relatives as great uncles and aunts, is probably not of practical
significance. The exclusion of first cousins is perhaps more significant.
595. State v. Bielman, 86 Wash. 460, 150 P. 1194(1915).
596. State v. Glindemann, 34 Wash. 221, 75 P. 800 (1904).
597. R.W.C.C. §9A.08.040(l)(a).
598. The Code provision on incest basically makes no age distinction in its pen-
alties, except in the case of stepchildren and adopted children eighteen years old and
older. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020(l) and (2). See the comments following this section.
The age distinctions are retained in the statutory rape provisions. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.44.040-
.060, which vary their penalties with the age of the victim. These rape provisions ap-
ply equally to incestuous intercourse, providing the other elements of rape are satisfied.
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scheme is questionable. As under current law,599 the proposed incest
provision requires no corroboration beyond the testimony of the other
party. 600 However, the proposed statutory rape provision does require
corroboration. 601 Since the bulk of incest cases involve children and
arise in situations where corroborating testimony is unlikely, the crime
of incest with children under the Proposed Code often will have to be
prosecuted under the general incest provision rather than the statutory
rape section. Consequently, the more severe penalties for such crimes
will be effectively nullified.602
XV. DISORDERLY CONDUCT
A. Riot
The proposed crime of riot is committed when a person, "acting
with four or more other persons .... intentionally and unlawfully uses
or threatens to use force against any other person or against prop-
erty. ' 603 The effect of this provision is to narrow the crime of riot to
group assault and/or battery, leaving many of the traditional elements
of the riot offense to other more appropriate sections.
The current Washington statutes604 are essentially restatements of
common law unlawful assembly605 and riot,606 with some extension
599. State v. Coffey, 8 Wn.2d 504, 112 P.2d 989 (1941).
600. R.W.C.C. § 9A.64.020 does not require corroboration for incest. However,
R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010 does require corroboration for "sexual offenses" with the ex-
ception of sexual contact in the third degree.
601. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.010.
602. For example, in a case like State v. Davis, 20 Wn.2d 443, 147 P.2d 940
(1944), where there was no corroboration because the daughter was home alone with
her father, prosecution under the Proposed Code would have to be based on the in-
cest provision. The maximum penalty would be reduced from the twenty years pro-
vided by WASH. REv. CODE § 9.79.090(2) (1959), to five years under R.W.C.C. §
9A.64.020(3).
603. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010.
604. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.27.040-.050 (1959) (riot), 9.27.060 (1959) (un-
lawful assembly), 9.27.070 (1959) (remaining after warning), 9.27.080 (1959) (de-
struction of property), 9.27.090 (1959) (disguised and masked person), and 9.27.100
(1959) (owners of premises allowing masqueraders).
605. See PERKINS at 403: "An unlawful assembly is a meeting of three or more
persons with a common plan in mind which, if carried out, will result in a riot." Ac-
cord, M.P.C. § 250.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961) (which notes that "dis-
orderly conduct" is a statutory offense very akin to common law "breach of the
peace"); Comstock v. United States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1969) (concurring
opinion).
606. See PERKINS at 405:
A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons acting
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and elaboration. The proposed Code makes a number of significant
changes in the current law. 60 7
First, the minimum number of persons required to constitute the
crime of a riot is increased from three to five.608 This increased partic-
ipant requirement reflects the belief that "mob behavior [is] more
dangerous and frightening, . . . [and] it poses special problems for
police." 609 The drafters of the Proposed Code suggest that groups of
less than five persons engaging in the type of behavior prohibited by
the proposed riot statute "are more appropriately dealt with by other
offenses such as assault or criminal mischief. '610
Second, the Proposed Code requires the intentional use or threat of
unlawful force, whereas the current law61 ' on its face has no scienter
requirement apart from requiring proof of some purpose for the ante-
cedent assemblage. 612 The current law does attach a more serious
penalty where the purpose of the assembly or the intent of the actors
together (a) in the commission of a crime by force, or (b) in the execution of
some enterprise, lawful or unlawful, in such a violent, turbulent and unauthorized
manner as to create likelihood of public terror and alarm.
It may be noted that the common law crime of "rout" (movement of an unlawful
assembly toward the scene of the unlawful act) has never been incorporated into
the Washington law as a separate offense.
607. For a listing of purposes for revising disorderly conduct statutes. see M.P.C.
§ 250, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). It may be useful to note that the pres-
ent Washington law is virtually identical to the New York Penal Law of 1909 regard-
ing riot. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 2090-2093 (McKinney 1967) (Appendix).
608. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.020(1)(a). This change is consistent with the new formu-
lations in New York, Connecticut and Oregon, and the proposed code for Michigan,
each of which increases the number of persons required. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
240.05 (McKinney 1967) (five or more); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-175 (Special
Pamphlet 1972) (seven or more); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 5510 (Final Draft
1967) (six or more); ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.015 (197 1) (five or more).
609. M.P.C. § 250.1, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). The comment
notes that the number of persons differentiating mob action from individual action
must necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. M.P.C. § 250.1 retains the requirement that
three or more persons be involved.
610. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010, Comment 2, at 336. See R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.36.010-
.030 (assault), 9A.48.050-.070 (criminal mischief).
611. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.040 (1959).
612. The Washington Supreme Court has held that a bystander is not liable simply
because he is present at the scene of a riot. State v. Moe, 174 Wash. 303, 24 P.2d
638 (1933). Although the Washington court does not seem to have passed di-
rectly upon the requirement of intent, it said in Moe: "[W] hen several people are en-
gaged in perpetrating a crime, each is responsible for the acts of the others done in
furtherance of the common purpose ... and all who participate are chargeable with ...
riot .... " (emphasis added). Id. at 306, 24 P.2d at 639. The Proposed Code equates
intent with purpose. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2). See also Comstock v. United
States, 419 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1969) (discussing Washington law as applied in the
Assimilative Crimes Act).
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is essentially to obstruct the administration of government.613 The
Proposed Code eliminates any distinction between penalties based on
the purpose of the assembly or the actions.614 In addition, the drafters
of most modern revised criminal codes have phrased the scienter re-
quirement for riot in terms of intentionally or recklessly causing or
creating a grave risk of causing public alarm.615 The Proposed Code,
by comparison, leaves unregulated all activity which results from the
actor's conscious disregard of the fact that his group's behavior cre-
ates a grave risk of causing public alarm. 616
Third, the Proposed Code eliminates the incitement provision of
the current law617 on the ground that it is covered by basic principles
of accessorial liability.61 8 This change eliminates the separate penalty
for incitement and leaves the accessory liable for the same offense as
that committed by those incited. This is a substantial change in the
current statutory law and the common law, both of which recognize
that the crime of inciting to riot is complete without the perpetration
of the offense solicited.619
Fourth, the Proposed Code eliminates disturbing the peace as an
element of the crime of riot, and instead requires that there be a
threat to use force or violence against another person or property.620
Finally, the Proposed Code eliminates the increased penalty which
presently is imposed if the rioting offender is disguised,62' and also
613. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.050(l) (1959). Also, in 1971 the Washington
legislature made it a separate gross misdemeanor to interfere with, obstruct, or im-
pede the administration of justice by picketing or parading. WASH. REV. CODE §
9.27.015 (Supp. 1971).
614. But see R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.76 (obstructing governmental operation).
615. See codes cited note 608 supra.
616. Recklessness presumably will suffice under the present statute which contains
no express mens rea requirement. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.040 (1959). The drafters
suggest that this change is made to avoid possible constitutional problems of vague-
ness. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010, Comment at 337.
617. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.050(2) (1959) provides that if the actor "shall
direct, advise, encourage or solicit other persons present or participating in a riot or
assembly to acts of force or violence," then the actor is guilty of riot.
618. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010, Comment 2, at 336-37 (cross referencing to
R.W.C.C. 9A.08.060, which governs liability for the conduct of another and complicity).
619. PERKINS at 650. Both the Oregon code and the proposed Michigan code
eliminate incitement to riot as a separate offense. See codes cited note 608 supra. But
see the recently enacted revised criminal codes of New York and Connecticut, both
of which retain incitement as a separate offense. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.08 (McKin-
ney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-178 (Special Pamphlet 1972).
620. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.040 (1959) does treat disturbing the peace as an
element of the crime of riot. The Proposed Code includes disturbing the peace only
within the broader offense of disorderly conduct. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030.
621. See WASH. REv. CODE § 9.27.050(1) (1959). The present criminal provisions
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eliminates the current separate offenses of assembling in disguise and
knowingly permitting such assemblies on certain premises. 622 These
changes are consistent with most modern revised criminal codes. 623
As does the current law, the Proposed Code treats the fact that the
actor is armed with a deadly weapon as an aggravating circumstance
which warrants a more severe penalty. 624
B. Failure to Disperse
The proposed offense of failure to disperse replaces the existing
Washington laws of unlawful assembly62 5 and remaining after
warning to disperse.62 6 This offense requires: (1) overt acts within a
group of four or more persons which create a substantial risk of
causing personal injury or substantial property damage, and (2) the
intentional refusal or failure to disperse when officially ordered to do
so. 627 This formulation differs from the present Washington approach,
which makes "unlawful assembly" an inchoate riot offense needing no
overt act beyond assembly, and which makes failure to disperse a
strict liability offense after the warning or order to disperse has been
given.628
dealing with activity done in disguise primarily are designed to deal with the activities
of organizations such as the Ku Klux Klan. There seems to be little current need for
an increased penalty for such activity. Note that federal law already covers this type
of activity. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970).
622. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.090-.100 (1959).
623. See codes cited nete 608 supra. Presumably, much of the behavior presently
prohibited is adequately covered by federal law. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 241 (1970).
624. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010 (making armed rioting a third degree felony.
which is punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution for a maximum
term of not more than five years or by a fine of not more than one thousand dollars
or both). See also R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(l), (2). Otherwise rioting is punished as a
gross misdemeanor. For current Washington law, see WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.050(1)
(1959) (imposing the same penalty as does the Proposed Code).
This increased penalty seems appropriate, as the drafters of the Code point out, in
light of the increased risks created. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.010, Comment at 337.
625. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.060 (1959).
626. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.070 (1959).
627. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.020. The comment to this section suggests that "failure to dis-
perse" must be with knowledge of the order to disperse before any liability attaches. Id.,
Comment at 340.
628. In State v. Fisk, 79 Wn.2d 318, 324, 485 P.2d 81, 84 (1971), the court
stated:
It is thus apparent that the primary thrust of RCW 9.27.060 [unlawful assembly]
is to prohibit and/or punish those persons who would knowingly participate in an
assemblage of three or more individuals entertaining a common intent to commit
an unlawful act by force, disrupt or threaten to breach the public peace, injure or
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The current Washington provision proscribing threats or acts
tending toward a breach of the peace, or an injury to persons or
property629 is narrowed under the Proposed Code: (1) mere threats
are no longer sufficient-there must be an act creating the risk, and
(2) the risk regarding property damage must be substantial. 63 0
Finally, it should be noted that, while the Proposed Code narrows
the prohibited behavior to conduct of a more serious nature, the pen-
alty for violating the statute is reduced from a gross misdemeanor to a
misdemeanor.631
C. Disorderly Conduct632
The Proposed Code defines four categories of actions constituting
disorderly conduct:633 (1) intentional production of noise which is
found to be excessive and unreasonably disturbing;634 (2) use of abu-
sive language635 which thereby recklessly creates a risk of assault;636
threaten to injure persons or property, or to commit or attempt to commit any
unlawful act. Criminal intent is the touchstone of the offense defined. State v.
Dixon, 78 W.D.2d 813,479 P.2d 931 (1971).
... [T] he elements of the offense set forth in RCW 9.27.070 [failure to disperse]
may be listed as: (1) the unauthorized presence of the person charged at an un-
lawful group meeting; (2) the issuance to that person of a warning to disperse by
a magistrate or public officer; and (3) the failure or refusal to disperse after
such warning. Criminal intent on the part of the person charged is not a pre-
requisite to conviction. (emphasis added).
629. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.060(3) (1959).
630. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.020(1)(a).
631. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 (1959) (gross misdemeanor is punishable
by imprisonment for up to one year in the county jail or a fine of not more than one
thousand dollars, or by both); R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(3) (misdemeanor is punishable
by imprisonment for up to ninety days in the county jail or a fine of not more than
five hundred dollars or by both). The drafters apparently believe that the current
penalties are too severe for the risks involved; thus the reduction of this offense to a
misdemeanor is in keeping with the overall tenor of this chapter of the proposed
Code.
632. This proposed provision covers conduct currently dealt with in various sec-
tions of Title 9: WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.11.050 (provoking assault), 9.27.010 (dis-
turbing meeting), 9.27.020 (disturbance on highway), and 9.87.010 (vagrancy).
R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030, Comment at 341.
633. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030.
634. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(1)(a). The drafters state: "If the actor does not
intend to cause the proscribed result at the time of his conduct, it would seem clear
that once informed of the fact.., a continuation of the behavior would bring the ac-
tor within the statute." Id., Comment at 341.
635. Using a concept of "symbolic language," the courts could easily include
the use of a "sign" or "gesture" as part of the prohibited abusive language and thus,
in this respect, the Proposed Code would be consistent with present law. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.11.050 (1959) (provoking assault).
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(3) intentional disruption, without lawful authority, of any lawful as-
sembly or meeting; and (4) intentional obstruction of vehicular or
pedestrian traffic.
The most significant aspects of the proposed disorderly conduct
provision are the specification of mens rea requirements for the con-
duct proscribed, and a reduction in the degree of the offense.6 37
The present law does not proscribe conduct which creates noise
disturbances as does the Code's disorderly conduct provision.6 38
However, such conduct is covered to some extent by the existing
statute which prohibits wilful provocation, by word, sign, or gesture,
of another person, to commit assault or breach of the peace. 639
The proposed provision prohibiting intentional disruption of any
lawful assembly 640 is similar to present Washington law, 64 1 except that
the proposed statute applies only to the disruption of a "lawful" meet-
ing, while the present law applies to any meeting "not unlawful in its
character." Thus under the Proposed Code an unauthorized person
could disrupt with impunity a meeting not unlawful in its character,
but technically unlawful. 642
636. "Recklessness" under the Proposed Code requires knowledge of and conscious
disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.08.020(2)(c).
This requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew that his use of the
language in question would create a substantial risk of assault and consciously dis-
regarded the possible or probable consequences of his conduct.
637. Disorderly conduct is a violation under the code. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030. The
drafters state:
The grading of this offense as a violation reflects the judgment that the conduct
governed is of minor criminological significance, and that any such conduct that
threatens more than minimal harm is adequately dealt with by other provisions ....
Id., Comment at 341. This gradation follows the New York provision for making un-
reasonable noise. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1967). But see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182 (Special Pamphlet 1972) (making such offense a mis-
demeanor); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 5525 (Final Draft 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. §
166.015 (1971); M.P.C. § 250.1 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961). A violation may be
punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4)(c).
This constitutes a reduction from a gross misdemeanor in one instance, WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.27.060 (1959) (unlawful assembly), and from a misdemeanor in all
others. For penalty provisions, see note 631 supra.
638. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(l)(a). The only direct reference to such conduct
under present law is WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.020 (1959) (disturbance on highway).
639. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.11.050 (1959). Note that provoking assault is pro-
scribed by the Code's disorderly conduct provision which punishes recklessly creating
a risk of assault by use of abusive language. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(b).
640. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(1)(c).
641. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.27.010 (1959). Under this statute, shouting a deroga-
tory but not obscene expletive by one opposed to the speaker without any indication
of further purpose or intent to break up the gathering is not an unlawful disruption.
See Spokane v. McDonough, 79 Wn. 2d 351, 485 P.2d 449 (1971).
642. A meeting is technically unlawful when, for example, it is unlawful as to
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Finally, the disorderly conduct provision prohibits the intentional
obstruction of vehicular or pedestrian traffic.643 In order to avoid pos-
sible constitutional problems raised by prosecuting a person who ob-
structs traffic while attempting to assert his first amendment rights
under the United States Constitution, 644 the Code defines "obstruct"
as rendering "impassable without subjecting others to unreasonable
inconvenience or hazard" and exempts a gathering of persons to hear
a person speak or otherwise communicate.645
The exemption of persons gathered to hear a speaker is obviously
designed to insure protection of first amendment rights, but it is argu-
able that this exemption goes too far. Of the other modern codes
examined, only the proposed Michigan code646 goes as far as the Pro-
posed Code in exempting such gatherings even though they be inten-
tionally obstructive.647 The Model Penal Code generally proscribes
obstructive conduct, which is engaged in either intentionally or reck-
lessly, and excepts persons gathered to hear a speaker only where their
actions result in reckless obstruction.648 Even this limited exception
applies only until such time as the persons so gathered are officially
ordered to move.649 It is highly questionable whether the first amend-
ment requires allowing the intentional obstruction of traffic simply
because the persons engaging in the conduct are gathered to hear a
speaker; the Model Penal Code formulation might be a desirable al-
ternative to the Proposed Code provision.
Finally, the obstruction of traffic provision of the Code is classified
time and/or place, but otherwise lawful. Under the current law if the meeting were
lawful in character, a disruption without lawful authority would be an offense. Con-
sistent with the previous subsections of the Proposed Code, the offense is down-graded
from a misdemeanor to a violation.
643. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(1)(d). Present Washington law does not specifically
prohibit the intentional obstruction of traffic as does the Code. However, the unlawful
assembly provision, WASH. REv. CODE § 9.27.060 (1959), presumably would cover
such conduct by groups of three or more.
644. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.030(1)(d), Comment at 342.
645. See R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.005(l). The language of this section is similar to
that of M.P.C. § 250.2(1), but, unfortunately, it is not without ambiguity. The clear
intent of the drafters is to limit application of the statute to those instances where
passage cannot be accomplished without exposure to unreasonable inconvenience
or hazard. However, as presently drafted, the statute might be read as applying only
where the passersby are not subjected to unreasonable inconvenience or hazard.
646. MICH. REv. CuM. CODE § 5501(a) (Final Draft 1967).
647. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20(5) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-182(5) (Special Pamphlet 1972); ORE. REv. STAT. § 166.025(e) (1971).
None of these codes expressly seeks to protect first amendment rights.





only as a violation even though it requires a mens rea of intent. 650
This differs from most other modern revised codes which classify such
an offense as a misdemeanor while requiring the lower mental state of
recklessness. 651
D. False Reporting
The Proposed Code makes it a gross misdemeanor to knowingly
make a false report or warning of an alleged occurrence or impending
occurrence of a fire, explosion, crime, catastrophe, or emergency, with
knowledge that it is likely to cause public inconvenience or alarm. 652
This formulation is consistent with other modern criminal codes. 653
Current Washington law does not proscribe most of the conduct
within this proposed provision. However, one existing statute prohibits
bomb threats or threats to injure property as well as knowing commu-
nication of any information concerning such threats with intent to
alarm others. 654 The Proposed Code would proscribe other conduct
which presents the same sort of evil as that covered by the current
Washington law,655 while reducing the existing mental state require-
ment from "intent to alarm" to "knowledge of likelihood of alarm."
This reduction of the mental state requirement is consistent with other
modern formulations 656 and seems reasonable in light of the gravity of
the potential evil. 657
650. The maximum fine is $500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4).
651. See MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 5525(2) (Final Draft 1967); ORE..REV.
STAT. § 166.025(e) (1971); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-182(b) (Special Pamph-
let 1972). But cf. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 1967) (making the offense
a violation but with a lower mental state of recklessness). It should be noted, however,
that the above cited codes require either intent to cause public inconvenience or
reckless creation. of a risk thereof. The Proposed Code has no requirement that pub-
lic inconvenience either be intended or result, thus, an absolutely deserted sidewalk
might be rendered impassable and thereby be "obstructed."
652. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.040.
653. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.50(l) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-180(a)(1) (Special Pamphlet 1972); MicH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 5550
(Final Draft 1967); ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.025(g) (1971) (treating this offense as
part of disorderly conduct); M.P.C. § 250.3.
654. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.61.160 (1959).
655. The drafters suggest such an offense should be in the criminal code, be-
cause the risks of panic and consequential personal injury or property damage or the
risks created by emergency calls by police or firefighting officials are serious. R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.84.040, Comment.
656. Codes cited note 653 supra.
657. The drafters of the Model Penal Code, in commenting upon a similar pro-
vision in that code, said: "The behavior dealt with in this section is an aggravated
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E. Public Intoxication
The Proposed Code prohibits public intoxication due to alcohol,
narcotics or other drugs where the degree of intoxication is such that
it endangers the intoxicated person or other persons or property or an-
noys persons in his vicinity.658 This offense is graded as a misdemeanor
in order to avoid the problem of "leaving the actor free to return
immediately to his conduct,"6 59 a result which could occur if the of-
ficer is restricted to merely issuing a citation for a violation. The Code
drafters view this section as merely a "short-term stopgap," with the
ultimate goal being the development of widespread detoxification
treatment and counselling centers to deal with the problem.660
Subsequent to the drafting of the Proposed Code, the Washington
Legislature enacted the very comprehensive Uniform Alcoholism and
Intoxication Treatment Act.661 Sections 12 and 13 of this Act seem to
meet the problems which the Proposed Code addresses by effectively
providing for protective custody and/or emergency commitment to an
approved treatment facility. This new Act treats public -intoxication as
a public health problem rather than as a criminal problem. In light of
this recent legislation, the proposed provision dealing with public in-
toxication should be deleted from the Proposed Code.
F. Loitering662
The proposed loitering section replaces the current vagrancy law663
form of disturbing the peace which... can have grave consequences." M.P.C. §
250.8, Comment at 52 (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961).
658. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.050. For a comprehensive discussion of criminalizing
public intoxication, see Morris, Overcriminalization and Washington's Revised Crim-
inal Code, at pp. 11-16 of this volume.
659. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.050, Comment at 345.
660. Id.
661. Ch. 122 [1972], Wash. Laws 2nd Ex. Sess.
662. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060.
663. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.87.010 (1959) includes thirteen separate vagrancy of-
fenses, punishable as gross misdemeanors. The statutory crime of vagrancy, the his-
torical antecedent of loitering, has been defined as: "'status' resulting from miscon-
duct and in the form of a socially harmful condition or mode of life which has been
defined and made punishable by law." PERKINS at 427. The validity of attaching crim-
inal processes to status or associational relationships was upheld in Scales v. United
States, 376 U.S. 203, 227 (1961), without the requirement of the commission of spe-
cific acts of criminality. But cf. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding
status as a drug addict could not be made subject to criminal penalty without contra-




and makes several changes which may best be noted by examining
each provision seriatim. 664 Generally, this section defines "loitering"
as remaining in or about some particular public place for a specified
unlawful purpose.6 65
First, this provision of the Code makes it an offense to remain in a
public place for the purpose of engaging or soliciting another person
to engage in prostitution.6 66 It is significant that this provision, unlike
the present law,667 applies to such activity only when it occurs in a
public place.6 68 Thus, remaining in a place designed for actual resi-
dence for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting prostitution is not
unlawful since such a place is expressly excepted from the definition
of a "public place," even though a substantial group of persons might
have access. 669
664. Certain portions of the current vagrancy statute are deleted altogether. For
a listing of subsections not included, and the drafters' reasons for not including them,
see R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Comment at 347-48.
665. The Proposed Code expressly rejects the language of the Model Penal Code
which states:
A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in
a manner not usual for law abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant
alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity.
M.P.C. § 250.6. The Model Penal Code expressly would consider the refusal to iden-
tify oneself upon request by a peace officer among the circumstances warranting alarm.
It has been noted that a constitutional dilemma is presented by loitering statutes:
To avoid the dangers of vagueness, the statute should focus on failure to ac-
count for oneself in certain circumstances [as does the Model Penal Code]; yet,
to respect the privilege against self-incrimination, the statute must focus on loiter-
ing conduct itself.
Note, 43 WASH. L. REV. 844, 855 (1968). The drafters of the Proposed Code cite
this Note and reason that the constitutional dilemma can be avoided: "with properly
drafted criminal statutes and a useful doctrine of attempt, there is no pressing need
to twist loitering statutes into specie of inchoate offense." R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Com-
ment at 346.
666. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060. This provision should be read in conjunction with the
"public indecency" provisions which make prostitution and/or patronage of a prosti-
tute unlawful. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.020-.035. The relationship is discussed by the draft-
ers at R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Comment. Taken together these provisions proscribe
essentially the same acts as the present sections, prohibiting the practice or solicita-
tion of prostitution as well as keeping, living in or working in a house of prostitution.
WASH. REv. CODE § 9.87.010(3), (9) (1965).
667. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(3), (9) (1965).
668. The Proposed Code defines "public place" as "a place to which the public or
a substantial group of persons has access" but not rooms or apartments designed
for actual residence. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.005(2).
669. Although the exception of rooms or apartments designed for actual resi-
dence is an exception from a non-exclusive and non-exhaustive list of examples of
"public places," it seems probable that the drafters meant the provision to be con-
strued to exclude such rooms or apartments from the definition of "public place."
This proposed provision is basically consistent with the revised code adopted in
New York and that proposed for Michigan. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 240.00(1), 240.35(3)
(McKinney 1967); MicH. REV. CRIM. CODE §§ 5501(b), 5540(l)(c), 5540(3) (Final
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This provision also prohibits remaining in any transportation facil-
ity, 67 0 unless specifically authorized to do so, for the purpose of solicit-
ing or engaging in any commercial activity. This provision is new
to Washington law,67 1 and the drafters' comments indicate it is de-
signed to protect travelers in busy transportation facilities from
annoyances and harrassment and minimize the likelihood of the sort
of petty property offenses which often occur in such places. 672
In addition, this provision makes it unlawful to remain in any place
with another person for the purpose of unlawfully using or possessing
a narcotic or dangerous drug.673 This provision operates as a supple-
ment to drug control laws by aiding law enforcement under circum-
stances in which actual use of drugs cannot be proven.67 4
Further, this statute makes it a violation to remain in or near any
court, jail, morgue or hospital, for the purpose of soliciting business
Draft 1967). The Proposed Code is also in accord with those codes in grading the loi-
tering offense as a violation which would eliminate the possible jail sentence
in Washington under the current vagrancy statute.
670. R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.84.005(3) defines a transportation facility as "any convey-
ance, premises or place used for or in connection with public passenger transporta-
tion . ..."
671. As the drafters note, this provision covers, inter alia, that sort of commer-
cial activity currently prohibited by the vagrancy law. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Com-
ment. The provision is a direct adaptation of the New York and the proposed Mich-
igan loitering provisions. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(7) (McKinney 1967);
MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 5540(f) (Final Draft 1967). Both the New York and the
proposed Michigan laws would also prohibit remaining in a transportation facility
for the purpose of entertaining persons by singing, dancing, or playing any musical
instrument. Such conduct would be covered by the proposed Washington law only in-
sofar as it could be deemed "commercial."
672. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Comment at 347. Grading this offense as a vio-
lation for which a five hundred dollar fine may be imposed for each count seems to
be a reasonable and efficacious means to achieve the aforementioned design of the pro-
vision. The Proposed Code is not clear as to whether the prohibition of soliciting in
transportation facilities applies only to soliciting for commercial activity or to solicit-
ing in general. Current law does make it a misdemeanor for a healthy person to soli-
cit alms. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(6) (1965).
673. This provision is an adaptation of the New York and the proposed Michigan
laws. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(9) (McKinney 1967); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE §
5540(g) (Final Draft 1967).
674. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060, Comment at 347. Of course, requiring the state to
establish the actor's purpose in loitering imposes an extremely difficult burden of proof
on the prosecution. The statutory presumptions contained in the illegal possession
laws probably still constitute the most effective way for the criminal law to deal with
drug sale, possession, and use.
This provision includes a portion of the conduct proscribed by the current law,
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(11) (1965), making it unlawful to be an habitual nar-
cotic user, but without the arguably unconstitutional emphasis, on the status of the
defendant as an habitual user. Regarding the constitutional problem of using the "ha-




for an attorney. This provision is essentially a continuation of the cur-
rent law, 675 merely changing the degree of the offense from an un-
designated gross misdemeanor to a violation. 676
Finally, this provision prohibits intentionally remaining in or about
a building or buildings or public premises adjacent thereto of any
public or private school without having any lawful reason or relation-
ship involving custody of or responsibility for a pupil or any other li-
cense or privilege to be there. 677 This provision is similar to the cur-
rent law678 and is basicly consistent with most modern revised crim-
inal codes. 679
The present Washington loitering provision is currently being chal-
lenged. While the Washington Supreme Court upheld its constitu-
tionality,680 the United States Supreme Court vacated that judgment
and remanded it for further consideration in light of two other recent
decisions. 681
The entire disorderly conduct chapter 682 of the Proposed Code
treads on ground which is a constant source of constitutional litiga-
tion. While the drafters' comments express great concern for limiting
675. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(19) (1965).
676. The current law provides for imprisonment for not more than six months
in the county jail or a fine of not more than $500. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010 (1965).
A violation is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.010(3).
677. R.W.C.C. § 9A.84.060(l)(e).
678. WASH. REV. COoE § 9.87.010(13) (1965). The proposed provision does dif-
fer from the present law by requiring a mens rea of intent. The present statute requires
that the defendant act "wilfully," a requirement that is met by either intent or knowl-
edge under the present law. See State v. James, 36 Wn.2d 882, 221 P.2d 482 (1950).
679. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(5) (McKinney 1967); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-185(a) (Special Pamphlet 1972); ORE. REV. STAT. § 166.045(1)(a)
(1971); MICH. REV. CRIM. CODE § 5540(e) (Final Draft 1970).
680. State v. Oyen, 78 Wn.2d 934, 480 P.2d 766 (1971).
681. Oyen v. Washington 41 U.S.L.W. 3002 (U.S. June 29, 1972). In Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972) the Court upheld an ordinance prohibiting
willful noise-making or diversions which disturb or tend to disturb the peace and good
order of a school situated adjacent to the location of the person or persons engaged
in the disruptive behavior.
The Grayned Court, in addressing the issue of constitutional vagueness, held that
the ordinance gave adequate warning since it prohibited willful interference with nor-
mal school activity or willful creation of an imminent threat of such interference. The
Court further held that the ordinance was not overbroad and did not constitute a
broad invitation to discriminatory enforcement, since it did not prohibit any expression.
per se, but only prohibited willfully created disruptive noise.
In the other recent decision, Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 92 S.
Ct. 2286 (1972), the Court held an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet
of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute, to
be unconstitutionally overbroad. The Court reasoned that the ordinance drew an im-
permissible distinction between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful picketing.
682. R.W.C.C. ch. 9A.84.
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the proscribed behavior to meet constitutional bounds, the boundary
lines are unclear. Therefore, it is essential to consider the broad guide-
lines set forth by the United States Supreme Court, and to test each of
the proposed provisions by determining: (1) whether it gives a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden; and (2) whether, even if it gives fair notice, it is so broad as
to include behavior which is protected by the Constitution.683
XVI. PUBLIC INDECENCY
A. Indecent Exposure
Under the Proposed Code a person commits the misdemeanor of
public indecency if he exposes his genitals or anus in a public place
knowing his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.684 This provi-
sion makes several significant changes in the present law.685 The
major change is that the new Code's specification of public places
means that exposure in a private place, such as a home, will no longer
be criminal. 686 Furthermore, the requirement of knowledge that the
conduct will cause affront or alarm suggests that exposure to an audi-
ence of adults on notice would not be punishable. 687 The limitation to
genitals or anus allows topless performances. 688 The proposed penalty
is less severe than the penalty imposed under the existing law covering
this conduct. 689
683. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 92 S. Ct. 839 (1972).
684. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.010.
685. Current law is found in WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.120 (1959) (indecent or
obscene exposure), 9.87.010(7) (1959) (vagrancy-lewd, disorderly, or dissolute
persons), and 9.79.080 (1959) (indecent or obscene exposure to children under fif-
teen years of age). The bulk of the reported cases fall under the latter statute.
686. Although the delicacy of the opinions makes it difficult to be certain, it
appears that the bulk of prosecutions have been for exposure in private places. In
State v. Galbreath, 69 Wn.2d 644, 419 P.2d 800 (1966), the defendant exposed him-
self to a seven year old girl in a room of his house. Under WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080
(1959) he would be subject to twenty years' imprisonment. Under the Proposed Code
he could not be punished for public indecency, although he might be guilty of the
misdemeanor of communication with a minor for immoral purposes. R.W.C.C. §
9A.88.015.
687. Current law does not require intent to cause affront. State v. Winger, 41 Wn.
2d 299, 248 P.2d 555 (1952). Conceivably topless and/or bottomless performances
could be punished under existing law.
688. The status of current law is unclear. There are no reported cases of prose-
cutions under state statutes for topless performances.
689. The Code's classification of public indecency as a misdemeanor makes it
punishable by up to ninety days in the county jail and/or a fine up to $500. R.W.C.C.
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B. Communication with a Minor for Immoral Purposes
The Proposed Code makes it a misdemeanor to communicate with
a child under fourteen years of age for immoral purposes. 690 This is
similar to current Washington law, 691 except that the Proposed Code
reduces the critical age from eighteen to fourteen and changes the
grading of the offense from a gross misdemeanor to a misdemean-
or.
692
Present law does not impose a mens rea requirement for this crime,
so it is probable that even a reasonable mistake as to the age of the
child would not be a defense. 693 Although the Proposed Code also
fails to specify a mens rea requirement for this offense, it is arguable
that a reasonable mistake negating the mens rea of negligence would
be a defense in view of the rules of construction set out in R.W.C.C. §
9A.08.050. 694
C. Prostitution Offenses
The Proposed Code has separate sections covering the conduct of
four classes of people connected with prostitution: the prostitute, the
customer, the pimp or madame, and the obliging hotel owner or land-
lord. In some areas the Code is broader than current law; in other
areas it is narrower.
1. Prostitution
Under the Proposed Code a person is guilty of prostitution if such
person engages, agrees to engage, or offers to engage in sexual con-
§ 9A.20.020(3). Current penalties may vary from the vagrancy penalty, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.87.010 (1959), of up to six months in the county jail and/or $500, to the
penalty for indecent exposure to children under fifteen years of age, WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.79.080 (1959), of tip to 20 years' imprisonment. This latter penalty, how-
ever, may be intended for the more serious crime of taking indecent liberties with a
child, which is also covered by WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.080 (1959).
690. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.015.
691. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.130 (1959).
692. A gross misdemeanor under current law is punished by up to one year in the
county jail and/or a fine up to $1,000. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.020 (1959). A misde-
meanor under the Proposed Code is punished by up to ninety days in a county jail
and/or a fine up to $500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(3).
693. There are no cases on point.
694. See the section on principles of liability and responsibility in this comment.
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duct for a fee. 695 The sex of the parties is immaterial. 696 While the
scope of the acts designated by "sexual conduct" is unclear, the
phrase probably encompasses conduct other than sexual intercourse. 697
Currently, prostitution is prohibited under two sections of the va-
grancy statute which penalize persons practicing prostitution as well
as persons living or working in a house of prostitution.698 Because it is
uncertain if male or homosexual prostitution is proscribed under pre-
sent Washington law,699 the Proposed Code is potentially broader
than existing law in that it explicitly covers male and homosexual
prostitution and all sexual conduct, rather than simply intercourse.7 00
The punishment for vagrancy currently is not more than six months
in jail or a fine of not more than $500. The offense under the Pro-
posed Code is punishable as a misdemeanor for the first three convic-
tions and as a gross misdemeanor for any conviction thereafter.701
2. Patronizing a Prostitute
The Proposed Code makes it a violation to patronize a prosti-
tute.702 There are three forms of patronizing: (1) payment of a fee
for sexual conduct with the actor pursuant to a prior understanding,
(2) payment of a fee pursuant to an understanding that an individual
will engage in sexual conduct with the actor, and (3) solicitation of
another to engage in sexual conduct with the actor for a fee.703
695. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.020. The requirement of a "fee" could arguably exclude
a mistress who receives general support over a period of time.
696. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.035 specifies that the sex of the parties is immaterial and
that a male can engage in prostitution relative to a female customer.
697. Unfortunately, the Proposed Code does not define "sexual conduct." The Mod-
el Penal Code defines "sexual activity" as carnal knowledge, deviate sexual inter-
course, and sexual contact. M.P.C. § 207.12(6). In the sexual offenses area, the Pro-
posed Code does define "sexual contact" as the touching of sexual or other intimate
parts for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire. R.W.C.C. § 9A.44.005(2).
698. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(3), (9) (1959).
699. The few reported cases provide no answer.
700. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.035.
701. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.020(2)(a) and (b). Since there currently is no such
offense as prostitution, all prostitutes convicted under vagrancy statutes would probably
start with a clean slate.
702. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.030. A violation is punishable by a fine of not more than
$500. R.W.C.C. § 9A.20.020(4).
703. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.030. As in the offense of prostitution, the sex of the par-




The inclusion of customers within its criminal sanctions is the
greatest change effected by the Code. Currently no statute expressly
makes the customer guilty of a crime, and no statute has been con-
strued to include such behavior.704 Although the penalty is slight, the
Code does direct at least some pressure to a class of persons much
more responsive to modifying their behavior under threat of criminal
prosecution. If used, it could have a significant impact on reducing
prostitution.
3. Promoting Prostitution
The Code punishes persons who promote prostitution with three
degrees of severity according to the nature and extent of the promo-
tional activity. There are five variables utilized in grading the offense:
(1) age of the prostitute, (2) use of force or intimidation, (3) number of
prostitutes promoted, (4) occurrence of activity advancing prostitu-
tion, and (5) realization of profit from prosititution. 705
Promoting prostitution in the first degree is a second degree felony70 6
and includes a person who either advances or profits from prostitution
compelled by force or intimidation, or advances or profits from the
prostitution of a person under seventeen years of age. Promoting pros-
titution in the second degree is a third degree felony.707 The second
degree offense penalizes a person who advances the prostitution of
one or more prostitutes or who profits from management, supervision,
control or ownership of an enterprise involving two or more prosti-
tutes. The crime of promoting prostitution in the third degree, a gross
misdemeanor, punishes the person who knowingly profits from prosti-
tution.7 08
Current law covering the promotion of prostitution is found in
704. Conceivably a customer could be prosecuted as a vagrant under WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.87.010(7) (1959), which includes lewd, disorderly, and dissolute per-
sons.
705. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.050-.070. Two definitions are basic to the statutory scheme.
Advancing prostitution is knowingly causing or aiding a person to engage in prostitu-
tion, soliciting customers, providing persons or premises to operate or assist operation
of a house of prostitution, or engaging in any other conduct aiding prostitution. R.W.C.C.
§ 9A.88.040(l). Profiting from prostitution is receiving money pursuant to an agree-
ment to participate in proceeds of prostitution. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.040(2).
706. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.050.
707. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.060.
708. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.070.
274
Vol. 48: 149, 1972
A Hornbook to the Code: Public Indecency
Washington's vagrancy, abduction, and pimping statutes. 709 The great
bulk of the cases fall under the pimping section.
Although there are a few areas where the Proposed Code seems
narrower,71 0 the broad definition of "advances prostitution" found in
R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.040 encompasses most of the activity covered by
existing Washington law, as well as some additional conduct. In addi-
tion to numerous specified activities such as soliciting, the Code in-
cludes any conduct designed to "institute, aid or facilitate an act or
enterprise of prostitution."171' Current Washington law does not cover
such conduct. 712 Both the current and proposed law have a variety of
penalties.7 13
4. Permitting Prostitution
Under the Proposed Code a person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor
if he knows premises under his use and control are being used for
prostitution and fails to make a reasonable attempt to halt such use.7 14
709. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(3) (1959) includes as a vagrant every person
who solicits prostitution or keeps a house of prostitution. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(10) (1959) includes any person who lives or works in a house of prostitution or so-
licits for any house of prostitution. There are no reported cases.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.050 (1959) punishes persons who take females under
eighteen years of age for purposes of prostitution or who inveigle or entice unmarried
virgins into prostitution. Again, there are no reported cases.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.060 (1959) punishes a wide range of promotional activ-
ity from forcing a female into prostitution to simply living with a prostitute.
710. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.87.010(10) (1959) classifies a resident of a house of
prostitution as a vagrant. The Proposed Code makes no reference to such a person.
Although WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.060(4) (1959) makes it punishable for a husband
or parent to permit a female to practice prostitution, the Proposed Code does not cov-
er such activity. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.060(5) (1959) covers living with or accept-
ing the earnings of a prostitute. The new Code does not cover living with a prostitute;
accepting the earnings of a prostitute is covered under the Code only to the extent the
money is paid pursuant to an agreement or understanding that the person is to parti-
cipate in the proceeds of prostitution. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.040(2). Current law requires
no such agreement, nor does it require that the acceptance be a knowing one. State v.
Zenner, 35 Wash. 249, 77 P. 191 (1904).
711. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.040(1).
712. The mere furnishing of facilities for prostitution is not currently prohibited.
State v. Basden, 31 Wn.2d 63, 196 P.2d 308 (1948).
713. The Proposed Code's penalties range from up to ten years and/or $10,000
for first degree promoting to up to one year and/or $1,000 for third degree promoting.
R.W.C.C. §§ 9A.88.050-.070, 9A.20.020(1)(a)-(c). Currently the penalties range
from up to ten years and/or $1,000 for abduction, to up to six months in a countyjail or $500 for vagrancy. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.79.050 (1959), 9.87.010 (1959).
714. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.080. This offense directs pressure against people who con-
ceivably would modify their behavior if the law were enforced. Attempted eviction or
a complaint to the police would probably exculpate a landlord or property owner.
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As a matter of policy, the drafters of the Code believed this offense
was necessary "to create a legal incentive" for property owners to
refuse to tolerate the use of their premises for such purposes. 715 Per-
mitting prostitution is not punished under existing Washington law. 716
CONCLUSION
While recognizing that the Revised Washington Criminal Code is a
marked improvement over its present counterpart, the student authors
of this comment have sought to explain the changes in the Proposed
Code, to pinpoint the areas in which the Code might be improved,
and to raise issues which the drafters of the Code and its comments
do not address. Developments subsequent to drafting of the Code, such
as passage of the Uniform Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment
Act 717 and the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,7 18
require that certain changes be made before the Code is enacted.
There are ambiguities in the Code which should be clarified; the
definition of "forcible felony" is a good example. 719 In addition, there
are changes in the Proposed Code which arguably might impede
effective law enforcement; the rape corroboration requirement 720
and the Code's definition of "serious bodily injury" 72' are but a few.
Finally, the drafters have failed to treat comprehensively the past
problems created by some offenses; their failure to protect against
abuse by prosecutors of the kidnapping offense is an example. 722 Hope-
fully, the students' efforts to isolate these and other shortcomings of
the Code and to propose solutions will facilitate an understanding of
the Code, and be of aid in the consideration of its passage.
715. R.W.C.C. § 9A.88.080, Comment.
716. State v. Basden, 31 Wn.2d 63, 196 P.2d 308 (1948). However, accepting
additional sums above room rent is currently prohibited. State v. Columbus, 74 Wash.
290, 133 P. 455 (1913).
717. Ch. 122 [1972], Wash. Laws2ndEx. Sess.
718. 92S. Ct. 2726(1972).
719. See note 360 supra.
720. See notes 414, 415 and accompanying text supra.
721. See the discussion of this point in Mr. Schillberg's article, A Prosecutor's View
of the Revised Washington Criminal Code, at p. 141 of this volume.
722. See notes 382, 383 and accompanying text supra.
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